Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 49
... participants and the rest of the world against the dangers of war and aggression ? Much current discussion suggests that there are but two principal desiderata . The first is that the general level of armaments , some- how measured , be ...
... participants and the rest of the world against the dangers of war and aggression ? Much current discussion suggests that there are but two principal desiderata . The first is that the general level of armaments , some- how measured , be ...
Pagina 72
... participants , or the opposing bloc of participants , may at any time abandon the agreement is itself a motive for continually analyzing the wisdom of going along . There may , on the analogy with war itself , be a phenomenon of ...
... participants , or the opposing bloc of participants , may at any time abandon the agreement is itself a motive for continually analyzing the wisdom of going along . There may , on the analogy with war itself , be a phenomenon of ...
Pagina 133
... participants to take the view that the arms understandings , once reached , are outside the bounds of normal politics and to be judged by a wholly different set of standards from those that apply in agreements even among allies . It has ...
... participants to take the view that the arms understandings , once reached , are outside the bounds of normal politics and to be judged by a wholly different set of standards from those that apply in agreements even among allies . It has ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems