Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 3
... necessarily desirable if only it is " inspectable " and that it necessarily makes war less likely . The reader will find that most of the present study is concerned less with reducing national capabilities for destruction in the event ...
... necessarily desirable if only it is " inspectable " and that it necessarily makes war less likely . The reader will find that most of the present study is concerned less with reducing national capabilities for destruction in the event ...
Pagina 52
... necessarily just a punitive retaliatory capability ; it might include provision for attacking such enemy weapons as had not yet been launched . It might also include active and passive defense of the homeland , of the kind that would be ...
... necessarily just a punitive retaliatory capability ; it might include provision for attacking such enemy weapons as had not yet been launched . It might also include active and passive defense of the homeland , of the kind that would be ...
Pagina 79
... necessarily com- mitted to the creation of formal institutions . Arms control that is more opportunistic or limited in its intent , that seeks to supplement national military policies in directions that are mutually beneficial but that ...
... necessarily com- mitted to the creation of formal institutions . Arms control that is more opportunistic or limited in its intent , that seeks to supplement national military policies in directions that are mutually beneficial but that ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems