Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 58
... matter how nicely the balance between the opposing forces may be kept - no matter how well some ratio of forces is preserved in the process of arms reduction - the greater security sought at some extremely low level of forces may ...
... matter how nicely the balance between the opposing forces may be kept - no matter how well some ratio of forces is preserved in the process of arms reduction - the greater security sought at some extremely low level of forces may ...
Pagina 80
... matter . Communicating with the Potential Enemy ( Partner ) Even in the case of formal diplomatic negotiation , culminating in a treaty , communicating with the partner ( potential enemy ) country is a complex matter . In addition to ...
... matter . Communicating with the Potential Enemy ( Partner ) Even in the case of formal diplomatic negotiation , culminating in a treaty , communicating with the partner ( potential enemy ) country is a complex matter . In addition to ...
Pagina 83
... matters of extreme importance to governments ; and while arms control is not unique in its involvement of vital ... matter of full agreement and common understanding between East and West . And it is almost as clear that , whatever ...
... matters of extreme importance to governments ; and while arms control is not unique in its involvement of vital ... matter of full agreement and common understanding between East and West . And it is almost as clear that , whatever ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems