Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 20
... least some reason to suppose that the deliberate military action would be somewhat confined to ur- gent military targets . If this is a possibility - if the attacker either cannot afford to waste weapons on population strikes , or ...
... least some reason to suppose that the deliberate military action would be somewhat confined to ur- gent military targets . If this is a possibility - if the attacker either cannot afford to waste weapons on population strikes , or ...
Pagina 69
... least to make known , that it has done so . In fact , it may have to demonstrate it , in order to get the political leverage . A large supply of illicit weapons cannot be used for threats if they remain secret . ( There is the ...
... least to make known , that it has done so . In fact , it may have to demonstrate it , in order to get the political leverage . A large supply of illicit weapons cannot be used for threats if they remain secret . ( There is the ...
Pagina 129
... least easily be accommodated . There is also the possibility that crises and limited wars would be occasions for abuse of inspection and control , as well as for evasion . Exorbitant and unforeseen demands - or at least demands that ...
... least easily be accommodated . There is also the possibility that crises and limited wars would be occasions for abuse of inspection and control , as well as for evasion . Exorbitant and unforeseen demands - or at least demands that ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems