Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 80
... interpretation in particular instances , and dependent on the subsequent accumulation of some coherent body of " case law , " or interpretations . Other legislation is quite detailed and explicit . There is much to be said for both ...
... interpretation in particular instances , and dependent on the subsequent accumulation of some coherent body of " case law , " or interpretations . Other legislation is quite detailed and explicit . There is much to be said for both ...
Pagina 114
... interpretation of such a limitation is simply that 100 ( or whatever the agreed number is ) is the proper number , in the sense that more would be too dangerous in the case of war , fewer would be inadequate for deterrence . Another ...
... interpretation of such a limitation is simply that 100 ( or whatever the agreed number is ) is the proper number , in the sense that more would be too dangerous in the case of war , fewer would be inadequate for deterrence . Another ...
Pagina 118
... interpretation of a country's military activities . What looks like cheating may be the equivalent of budget padding . Even will- ful cheating , such as one may find in the echelons of a government agency during a budget hearing , may ...
... interpretation of a country's military activities . What looks like cheating may be the equivalent of budget padding . Even will- ful cheating , such as one may find in the echelons of a government agency during a budget hearing , may ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems