Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 34
... INTELLIGENCE " Arms race " refers to the interaction between two or more ad- versaries ' military programs , to a tendency for each side's program to respond to what the ... intelligence is poor on 34 STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL Intelligence,
... INTELLIGENCE " Arms race " refers to the interaction between two or more ad- versaries ' military programs , to a tendency for each side's program to respond to what the ... intelligence is poor on 34 STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL Intelligence,
Pagina 36
... intelligence that might be stabilizing with safe- guards to preclude other intelligence from leaking through that would be destabilizing . Intelligence arrangements - both those that yield good intelli- gence and those that work ...
... intelligence that might be stabilizing with safe- guards to preclude other intelligence from leaking through that would be destabilizing . Intelligence arrangements - both those that yield good intelli- gence and those that work ...
Pagina 105
... Intelligence We have emphasized the relation of formal inspection to unilat- eral intelligence , as supplements to each other . There is another relation that needs to be noted . It is that many techniques of sur- veillance , sources of ...
... Intelligence We have emphasized the relation of formal inspection to unilat- eral intelligence , as supplements to each other . There is another relation that needs to be noted . It is that many techniques of sur- veillance , sources of ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems