Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 91
Thomas C. Schelling, Morton H. Halperin. Chapter 9 INSPECTION AND INFORMATION INSPECTION has been overemphasized in most dis- cussions of arms control . It is but one of a series of problems in- volved in making arms control work . The ...
Thomas C. Schelling, Morton H. Halperin. Chapter 9 INSPECTION AND INFORMATION INSPECTION has been overemphasized in most dis- cussions of arms control . It is but one of a series of problems in- volved in making arms control work . The ...
Pagina 102
... Inspection It was mentioned that inspection could lead to an increase in tensions if it were poor at screening out false evidence of violation . The inspection itself could prove to be irritating in relations among participants , if any ...
... Inspection It was mentioned that inspection could lead to an increase in tensions if it were poor at screening out false evidence of violation . The inspection itself could prove to be irritating in relations among participants , if any ...
Pagina 103
... inspection scheme is that it is bound to yield information beyond its intended purposes . This is partly because the ... inspection and control , is the acquisition of targeting information for a strategic attack as a by - product of an ...
... inspection scheme is that it is bound to yield information beyond its intended purposes . This is partly because the ... inspection and control , is the acquisition of targeting information for a strategic attack as a by - product of an ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems