Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 35
... example can be turned around , of course . ) This assumes that the character of the arms race is at least po- tentially stable . If in fact we want to have a force that is substan- tially greater than the Soviet's , and if they want to ...
... example can be turned around , of course . ) This assumes that the character of the arms race is at least po- tentially stable . If in fact we want to have a force that is substan- tially greater than the Soviet's , and if they want to ...
Pagina 86
... example , regarding the con- duct of clandestine intelligence , or the cessation of intrusions , spoofing activity , harassment , and so forth might have to be secret only because the matters discussed are usually not openly ac ...
... example , regarding the con- duct of clandestine intelligence , or the cessation of intrusions , spoofing activity , harassment , and so forth might have to be secret only because the matters discussed are usually not openly ac ...
Pagina 104
... example , it may be difficult to examine missile sites or air- craft to see whether the agreement is complied with , without ob- taining excessive or even intolerable knowledge of their precise locations . Alternatively , it may be ...
... example , it may be difficult to examine missile sites or air- craft to see whether the agreement is complied with , without ob- taining excessive or even intolerable knowledge of their precise locations . Alternatively , it may be ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems