Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 54
... difficult to arrive at any simple , durable , and reasonable comparison between the weap- ons on both sides ; a submarine with 16 missiles of a certain ac- curacy and reliability , carrying a certain nuclear warhead , on station a ...
... difficult to arrive at any simple , durable , and reasonable comparison between the weap- ons on both sides ; a submarine with 16 missiles of a certain ac- curacy and reliability , carrying a certain nuclear warhead , on station a ...
Pagina 83
... difficult to keep up to date , than most political and economic data . Finally , any serious arms arrangement would involve matters of extreme importance to governments ; and while arms control is not unique in its involvement of vital ...
... difficult to keep up to date , than most political and economic data . Finally , any serious arms arrangement would involve matters of extreme importance to governments ; and while arms control is not unique in its involvement of vital ...
Pagina 105
... difficult to effect the individual identification ; in other cases , such as patrolling aircraft , the identification of individ- uals may be extremely difficult . Unilateral Intelligence We have emphasized the relation of formal ...
... difficult to effect the individual identification ; in other cases , such as patrolling aircraft , the identification of individ- uals may be extremely difficult . Unilateral Intelligence We have emphasized the relation of formal ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems