Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
Vanuit het boek
Resultaten 1-3 van 39
Pagina 2
... dangers of warfare , the matter must be judged on its merits and not simply according to whether the sizes of armies go up or down . If it appears that the danger of accidental war can be reduced by improved intelligence about each ...
... dangers of warfare , the matter must be judged on its merits and not simply according to whether the sizes of armies go up or down . If it appears that the danger of accidental war can be reduced by improved intelligence about each ...
Pagina 14
... danger might be substantially deflated by measures that reduced the likely success of attack , by reducing both sides ' expec- tations of attack . THE DANGER OF ACCIDENTAL WAR In current usage " accidental war " refers to a war that ...
... danger might be substantially deflated by measures that reduced the likely success of attack , by reducing both sides ' expec- tations of attack . THE DANGER OF ACCIDENTAL WAR In current usage " accidental war " refers to a war that ...
Pagina 121
... danger of ac- cidental war as well as of premeditated war might thereby be sub- stantially reduced . So might the danger of " escalation " of small wars into a general war , and the danger of local military crises erupting into a ...
... danger of ac- cidental war as well as of premeditated war might thereby be sub- stantially reduced . So might the danger of " escalation " of small wars into a general war , and the danger of local military crises erupting into a ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
14 andere gedeelten niet getoond
Overige edities - Alles bekijken
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems