Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 38
... countries , and to prevent the spread of the technology for producing weapons . The " Nth " country prob- lem has given a major impetus to the drive for nuclear - weapons control . Many feel that only through some international ...
... countries , and to prevent the spread of the technology for producing weapons . The " Nth " country prob- lem has given a major impetus to the drive for nuclear - weapons control . Many feel that only through some international ...
Pagina 46
... Countries Neutralist opinion is also important . As the 1960 General As- sembly session again made clear , the neutral nations can exert pres- sure on the East and the West in relation to arms agreements . Many neutralist nations seem ...
... Countries Neutralist opinion is also important . As the 1960 General As- sembly session again made clear , the neutral nations can exert pres- sure on the East and the West in relation to arms agreements . Many neutralist nations seem ...
Pagina 81
... countries we nego- tiate with , but to allied countries and neutral countries , with in- tentional or unintentional conveyance to our potential enemies of correct or incorrect notions of what our position is . Negotiating informal ...
... countries we nego- tiate with , but to allied countries and neutral countries , with in- tentional or unintentional conveyance to our potential enemies of correct or incorrect notions of what our position is . Negotiating informal ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems