Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 19
... consider an " accidental " or pre - emp- tively motivated war , one that the initiator himself deplores , one that is " self - defensive , " or one that results from the piling up of threatening commitments on both sides from which no ...
... consider an " accidental " or pre - emp- tively motivated war , one that the initiator himself deplores , one that is " self - defensive , " or one that results from the piling up of threatening commitments on both sides from which no ...
Pagina 45
... consider the possibility of Soviet violation by arrange- ments with the Chinese . If an agreement excludes China one has to consider that the Chinese may be able to disrupt the agreement when they wish to , by creating a crisis that ...
... consider the possibility of Soviet violation by arrange- ments with the Chinese . If an agreement excludes China one has to consider that the Chinese may be able to disrupt the agreement when they wish to , by creating a crisis that ...
Pagina 74
... considering how one is making out under the arms agree- ment one must consider , so to speak , what the balance of forces would be at various intervals after the arms race were resumed , on various assumptions about the degree to which ...
... considering how one is making out under the arms agree- ment one must consider , so to speak , what the balance of forces would be at various intervals after the arms race were resumed , on various assumptions about the degree to which ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems