Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 99
... better he knows what it is that we know , the better he is able to adapt to the weaknesses in our system . Deterrence of Violation Implicit in any desire to monitor compliance is the notion of de- terrence . Inspection is based on the ...
... better he knows what it is that we know , the better he is able to adapt to the weaknesses in our system . Deterrence of Violation Implicit in any desire to monitor compliance is the notion of de- terrence . Inspection is based on the ...
Pagina 117
... better ) his own stra- tegic force , or to take appropriate military and diplomatic counter- measures . It is also apparent that each side must continually appraise the other side's intentions . How to interpret an apparent bulge in the ...
... better ) his own stra- tegic force , or to take appropriate military and diplomatic counter- measures . It is also apparent that each side must continually appraise the other side's intentions . How to interpret an apparent bulge in the ...
Pagina 124
... better achieved by spending more money . Restraints can be accommo- dated , and particular kinds of reduced capabilities accepted , if compensating expenditures in other directions can be made . There is in fact little presumption that ...
... better achieved by spending more money . Restraints can be accommo- dated , and particular kinds of reduced capabilities accepted , if compensating expenditures in other directions can be made . There is in fact little presumption that ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems