Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 45
... United Nations and diplomatic recognition by the United States . Here one has to weigh the pos- sible gains , in terms of modifying and moderating Chinese policy , against the costs of giving China greater influence in world affairs and ...
... United Nations and diplomatic recognition by the United States . Here one has to weigh the pos- sible gains , in terms of modifying and moderating Chinese policy , against the costs of giving China greater influence in world affairs and ...
Pagina 46
... United States and the Soviet Union to do so . The problem is that many of the countries that are likely to get nuclear weapons in the next several years are allies of the United States . This brings into focus , sharply , the effect of ...
... United States and the Soviet Union to do so . The problem is that many of the countries that are likely to get nuclear weapons in the next several years are allies of the United States . This brings into focus , sharply , the effect of ...
Pagina 48
... United States to develop invulner- able strategic forces and large - scale conventional forces , it might be that the electorate and even some policy makers within the United States would take the nuclear - test agreement as a symbol of ...
... United States to develop invulner- able strategic forces and large - scale conventional forces , it might be that the electorate and even some policy makers within the United States would take the nuclear - test agreement as a symbol of ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems