isted otherwise than it is, is no less contrary to the idea of necessity, with which we set out, than to suppose it not to exist at all.

Now, it is justly observed by Locke*, that "the one general specific conception of matter makes us speak of it as one thing; yet really all matter is not one independent thing, neither is there any such thing existing as one material being, or any single body that we know or can conceive." It is manifestly plain, as has been already hinted, that what we term the material world is made up of an infinite number of parts. But as the whole is supposed eternal, independent, self-existent, so must all the parts exist independently. And as it has been declared a contradiction to suppose of the whole, that it should have existed different from what it is, so is it no less absurd to suppose the

* Vol. ii. p. 244.

+ Thus Ocellus Lucanus: "The world having been eternal, it is necessary that the things existing in it, and. the parts of it, viz. the heaven, earth, and air, must have been eternal: for, of these the world itself consists."

different existence of any of the parts, "since all variety or difference of existence must needs arise from some external cause, and be dependent upon it, and proportionable to the efficacy of that cause, whatsoever it be."

How contrary the very form and appearance of the world is to this notion of necessity, need not be much insisted upon. Many parts of it are, in fact, annually undergoing the greatest changes. Probably no theorist can be found hardy enough to assert of particular lakes or seas, or mountains, even that they did exist, much less that they must have existed necessarily, and have borne the form they bear at present, from eternity. Yet, if you take these qualities away from individual parts of the universe, a Socratic disputant may stick close to the concession, and gradually deny them of the whole *. Can we conceive it otherwise than arbitrary, whe

* Sykes has done this: "If the universe is God, every part of him, except what constitutes space, may be conceived not necessary, and yet the whole is necessary. Can any idea be more self-contradictory than this?"

ther our earth should be attended by a single moon, or be surrounded by as many satellites as Jupiter or Saturn? But if the world be necessarily existent, these things are not arbitrary, but governed by the same immutable necessity by which the world itself exists: unless it can be denied that to suppose the possibility of alteration in that which exists necessarily, involves a contradiction, and is absurd.

These cursory observations are sufficient to show that the doctrine of the world's eternity is embarrassed by objections which forcibly urge us to seek some further explanation of the phenomena by which we are surrounded. If it be asked, what advantage can be expected from bringing the subject back at all to metaphysics; a sort of argument which an Alciphron may say at last "he has always found dry and jejune, unsuited to his way of thinking, which may perhaps puzzle, but will never convince him*;" I would reply, that there is some advantage in

* See Berkeley, Minute Philos. vol. ii. p. 445, quarto edit.

showing that, to whichever side we turn, insurmountable difficulties oppose us, till we admit the agency of an intelligent immaterial Creator; whose presence in the system at once dispels the cloud, and diffusés the only light which on a subject so far removed from our comprehensions as the creation of the world, our minds are capable of receiving. It will not be denied, that if metaphysical speculations were adverse to the existence of such a Being, the positive evidence which asserted it would require extraordinary strength and cogency. It is reasonable therefore to expect, that whatever historical or probable evidence we may hereafter find in favour of the existence of a Creator, should derive at least as much additional force from the concurrence of metaphysical arguments, as it would be deprived of, if such researches terminated in the contrary conclusion.

CHAPTER II.

On the Opinion which ascribes the Formation of the World to Chance.

WHILST the most reasonable * among the heathen philosophers who have left any record of their opinions, asserted that matter was itself eternal, but moulded into the form of our world by the operation of an intelligent Deity; and others (as we have seen), deifying the world itself, contended for the eternity of its visible form; the hypothesis of Epicurus and his followers differed altogether from them all; and referred the existence of the world neither to the necessity of its own nature, nor to the interference of a Divine Architect †, but to the fortuitous concurrence of eternal atoms. Atoms, he affirmed, of an infinite smallness and in perpetual motion, compose the universe: and falling by chance into the region

*I do not hesitate to give this character to Pythagoras and Plato, notwithstanding the absurdity attending their doctrine of the eternity of matter.

+ The Snyos of Plato.