an unenlightened, and, perhaps, a corrupt bench, than which there cannot be a greater curse to a civilized country. Whenever the law is rendered vague and uncertain, injustice and judicial despotism ride rough-shod over the necks of the people. In England they pay more attention to this matter, though, perhaps, they lean too much to the other extreme.

"It is singular (say these volumes) that so long a noviciate should have been required in early times, before a student was allowed to be called to the bar. At present, a person who does not possess a master of arts' degree, cannot be called until his name has been on the books of the society for five years, during three of which, he must keep terms. In very early times, by the orders of the Inner Temple, no one could have been called to the bar under eight years, which had been reduced in Dugdale's times to seven. During this period, the student (unless he were called ex gratiâ) was to perform twelve grand moots, and twenty-four petty moots, at some Inn of Chancery. (Dugd. Orig. p. 159.) In the Middle Temple, there was a similar order made, (11 James I.) that no one should be called to the bar, under seven years' standing. (Ibid. p. 191.) So in Gray's Inn, by an order made, (5 Charles I.) no gentleman could be called to the bar unless he had been seven years usually in commons in this society; or of two years' continuance usually in commons in an Inn of Chancery, and five years at least in usual commons in this house. (Ibid. p. 281.)

"Not satisfied with requiring this tedious probation, it was thought fit by the benchers of the Middle Temple, in 1 Elizabeth, to prohibit the utter barristers from pleading at any bar until they were of twelve years' standing. This prohibition, issued by command of the judges, (Dugd. Orig. p. 191) but it was probably soon forgotten; for, in the year 1635, we find the following order, among others, proceeding from the same society.

"That whereas there have been heretofore, anciently, divers acts made by the preceding benchers, governours of this house, to restrain the too early practice of young barristers which suit not so well unto these times: the masters of the bench have therefore ordered, that no young barrister presume to take upon him to practise, at any of the courts of Westminster, before he have been full three years at the bar, at least, upon pain to be corrected before the bench, and fined, or otherwise dealt with, as to them, in their discretions, shall seem meet. Neither do they intend to call any to the bar hereafter, other than such as have their full time, and are otherwise qualified thereunto, as the orders of the house do require: and, therefore, they enjoin the gentlemen, under the bar, to apply and follow their studies to keep the case, to perform their exercises, to order their habits and hair to decency and formality, according to the orders of the house; and to yield due respect and observance to the benchers and ancients, their govenours. As they expect and desire the preferment to the degree of the bar, or otherwise care to be lyable to the censure of the bench; or (as the cause shall require) to be cut off from the society."

If so much time be appropriated then to the study of the law, as much, at least, devoted to the same pursuit here, would not be thrown away.

These volumes take a view of the history of the ancient and modern reports of the English law. Of the present system as it exists in England, they say "should it be suffered to continue, we can anticipate no other fate than that which Mr. Viner contemplated when he regarded his ponderous abridgment :like the Tarpean maid, to be oppressed with our own volumes, as she was with the helmets of the Sabines." If they complain with justice of the increasing number of their reports, how much more may we who are obliged to procure their books and our own in addition. Reports from four and twenty States, besides those from the United States' courts, annually issued, and too often of little value! obtained at an enormous expense, and when obtained, condemned as no authority! Forty years ago, the evil of bad reporting was complained of in England, but it has increased ever since, insomuch, that it is difficult to discover what will be received as authority, and what rejected.

"The consequences of this desultory and irregular system of reporting, are highly injurious. The authority of a decision is made to depend upon the character of the reporter, with regard to which, the learned judges are by no means always of the same opinion. Lord Thurlow tells us thatCarthew and Comberbach are equally bad authority.' (1 Br. Ch. Ca. 97.) While Lord Kenyon, on the other hand, informs us that Carthew is, in general, a good reporter." (2 T. R. 776.) There are few reporters who have altogether escaped censure from the Bench. 'Eighth Modern is a miserably bad book.' (1 Burr, 386.) Eleventh Modern is a book of no authority.' (Dougl. 61.) Twelfth Modern is not a book of any authority.' Dougl. 83) The book called Reports in Chancery, in Lord Nottingham's time, is a book of no authority.' (3 Atk. 334, 1 Wils 162.) Fitzgibbon's Reports is a book of no authority.' (3 Atk. 610.) Some of the cases in Freeman are well reported, but the book is of no authority.' (Cowp. 15.) Keble is a bad reporter.' (3 T. R. 17.) A very inaccurate reporter.' 3 Wils. 330.) The authority of Popham is none.' (1 Keb 676.) As for the case from Noy's Reports, I wholly reject that authority. It was but an abridgement of cases by Sergeant Size, who, when he was a student, borrowed Noy's Reports, and abridged them for his own use.' (Per Twisden J. 1 Vent. 81.) Lord Mansfield has denounced several reporters. He absolutely forbade the reading of Mosely's Reports. (5Burr, 2629-3 Austr. 861.) Of Bunbury he said Mr. Bunbury never meant those cases should have been published. They are very loose notes.' 5 Burr, 2658.) So he forbade the citing of Barnardiston's Reports in Chancery, as it would be misleading students to put them

Mr. Selwyn also, in his Nisi Prius, speaks of the "known accuracy" of Carthew. 56

VOL. III.-NO. 6.

upon reading them. He said it was marvellous, however, to such as knew the Sergeant, and his manner of taking notes, that he should so often stumble on what was right, and yet there was not one case in his book which was so throughout.' (2 Burr, 1142.) Sometimes the courts are compelled to take two bad reporters instead of one good one. 'The case cited,' says Lord Mansfield, 'is an express authority, and is reported in two books, each of which states the case in the same way. It is, however, objected that these books are of no authority; but if both the reporters were the worse that ever reported, if they substantially reported a case in the same way, it is demonstration of the truth of what they report, or they could not agree.' (R. v. Genge, Cowp. 16.) The objections to such loose and irregular reports, apply with double force to the reports of Nisi Prius decisions, where the matter of the case is often as objectionable as the manner in which it is reported. Very likely,' says Mr. Justice Bayley, 'one's first thoughts at Nisi Prius may be wrong, and I am extremely sorry that they are ever reported, and still more so that they are ever mentioned again, at least so far as my Nisi Prius decisions are concerned, because I think they are entitled to very litle weight. What is said by a Judge upon a trial, is merely the first impression of his mind on a point coming suddenly before him, and which he had no opportunity of considering beforehand.' (Doe v. Staunton, 1 Ch. R. 121.)"

These remarks, though applicable to many American reports, do not affect those which are confined to the decisions of the Supreme Courts of appellate jurisdiction; but even they are injuriously affected by the prevailing practice of inserting long speeches of counsel, and of attempting to illustrate particular points or subjects by essays of the reporter in the form of voluminous excursus. Now we must join in the universal clamour against this abuse of our patience and pockets. Where is the honesty of thus swelling a volume, we are obliged to buy, with stuff that nobody reads, and that enhances the cost of the book? If the reporter wishes the reputation of an original writer, let him publish his essays separately; but he should insert nothing in his reports except a brief statement of the facts necessary to the elucidation of the case, the points made by the counsel, the authorities cited to support them, and the decision of the court. If the reporters, who are guilty of these practices, were to hear the disparaging remarks which are often made upon their works, even by their friends, they would, we are convinced, correct their error.

We are entertained in these volumes with some amusing anecdotes of the English Judges. Of Lord Kenyon's Latinity, they give us the following specimens :

"Lord Kenyon's classical acquirements are well known to have been slender He was, nevertheless, exceedingly fond of ornamenting his judgments with Latin quotations, which did not always fall exactly into

their right places. Upon one occasion, he is said to have concluded his summing up in the following manner: Having thus discharged your consciences, gentlemen of the jury, you may retire to your homes and your hearths in peace, and with the delightful consciousness of having well performed your duties as citizens; you may lay down your heads upon your pillows, and say, Aut Cæsar, aut nullus.' Upon another occasion, his Lordship wishing to illustrate in a strong manner, the conclusiveness of some fact, thus addressed the jury- Why, gentlemen of the jury, it is as plain as the noses upon your faces! Latet anguis in herba! Even death could not divorce him from his bad Latin. Upon his hatchment, it is said, there was inscribed, Mors Janua vito. On this fact being related to Lord Ellenborough, his lordship observed, 'Yes, sir: it was by his own particular directions; and, moreover, it saved the expense of a dipthong!'"

What will those persons in this country, who believe in the scholarship of all the British Judges, say to such specimens of it? One of the well-known peculiarities of Lord Chancellor Eldon, is happily hit off in the following doggrel, which, at the same time, illustrates the merits very correctly, as we are told, of four eminent barristers.

That the Chancellor said, 'I doubt!'

The care with which he sometimes defined the exact shade of doubt on his mind, may be judged of, from what fell from him in the case of the Marquis of Townsend v. Stangroom. (6 Ves. 328.) This was a bill for a specific performance of an agreement, and it was attempted to introduce parol testimony to show a mistake in the writing. "His Lordship said, that he would not say that upon the evidence without the answer, he should not have had so much doubt whether he ought not to rectify the agreement, as to take more time to consider whether the bill should be dismissed." It is fortunate for the harmony of the Bench, that no one, like old Judge Dyer, had to follow his Lordship, or he might have said of him, as he did of his brother Baldwin, "but Baldwin was of a contrary opinion, though neither I, nor any one else, I believe, understood his refutation." (Dyer, 43.)

The style of Sir Thomas Plumer may be contrasted with Lord Eldon's. In the celebrated case of Cholmondly v. Clinton, he is said to have thus expressed himself: "Testator says to himself, I'll have the right heir of Samuel Rolle; and be he male, or be he female, he's the man for my money!" This might have been as happily versified as Sir John Pratt's decision of a case of a pauper's settlement, as reported in Burns' Justice.

"A woman having a settlement,

Married a man with none;
The question was, he being dead,
If that she had was gone.

"Quoth Sir John Pratt, the " settlement,

Suspended doth remain,

Living the husband; but him dead,

It doth revive again."

Chorus of the Puisne Judges.

"Living the husband, but him dead,
It doth revive again!"

The corruption of the English bench, from the time of Alfred down to the middle of the sixteenth century, is noticed in these volumes. Alfred, it is said, caused forty-four judges to be hanged in one year as murderers, for false judgments. Some of the cases were singular. He hanged Cadwine because he judged Hackery to death when the jury was divided; the prisoner having three in his favour, the judge removed them and substituted three others, who condemned him. He hanged Cole for condemning a madman; Athulf, for sentencing to death a minor; and Athelstan, for judging Herbert capitally for an offence not mortal. Edward I. caused many of his judges to be prosecuted to outlawry, for falsifying the records. The pernicious habit of making presents to the judge who was to try the donor's case, was prevalent till the time of Lord Bacon, who fell a sacrifice to it, though he carefully advised others not to follow it. Horne Tooke, however, delighted to defend him-" his judgments, in his own court, he observes, were always dictated by equity, and never once complained of. The accusations against him were minute, frivolous and vexatious; while his sentence, 'to be rendered for life, incapable of any place or employment, to be precluded from sitting in Parliament, or coming within the verge of the court, to be fined £40,000, and remain a prisoner in the tower during the King's pleasure,' was incommensurate with, and far exceeded his supposed offences. The sums stated to be