Sect I. The different solutions hitherto given by philosophers, examined.

and to which, consequently, we have an absolute assurance of the fact.

PART III. The third hypothesis.

THE third hypothesis which I shall produce on this subject, is Mr Hume's. Only it ought to be remarked previously, that he doth not propose it as a full solution of the question, but rather as a supplement to the former two, in the doctrine of both which, he, in a great measure, acquiesces. Take his theory in his own words. He begins with putting the question, "What is it then, which, in this case," that is, when the sorrow is not softened by fiction, " raises a plea"sure from the bosom of uneasiness, so to speak; and "a pleasure, which still retains all the features and "outward symptoms of distress and sorrow? I answer: This extraordinary effect proceeds from that very eloquence, with which the melancholy scene "is represented. The genius required to paint objects in a lively manner, the art employed in col"lecting all the pathetic circumstances, the judgment displayed in disposing them; the exercise, I say, of these noble talents, together with the force of expression, and beauty of oratorial numbers, diffuse "the highest satisfaction on the audience, and excite "the most delightful movements. By this means, "the uneasiness of the melancholy passions is not only overpowered and effaced by something stronger of an opposite kind, but the whole movement of

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Of the cause of thar pleasure we receive from affecting objects or representations.

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"those passions is converted into pleasure, and swells "the delight which the eloquence raises in us. The same force of oratory, employed on an uninteresting subject, would not please half so much, or ra"ther would appear altogether ridiculous; and the "mind being left in absolute calmness and indifference, would relish none of those beauties of imagi"nation or expression, which, if joined to passion, give it such exquisite entertainment. The impulse "or vehemence arising from sorrow, compassion, indignation, receives a due direction from the senti"ments of beauty. The latter, being the predomi"nant emotion, seize the whole mind, and convert "the former into themselves, or at least tincture them "so strongly, as totally to alter their nature: and the "soul being, at the same time, roused by passion, "and charmed by eloquence, feels on the whole a strong movement, which is altogether delightful."

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I AM Sorry to say, but truth compels me to acknowledge, that I have reaped no more satisfaction from this account of the matter, than from those which preceded it. I could have wished indeed, that the author had been a little more explicit in his manner of expressing himself; for I am not certain that I perfectly comprehend his meaning. At one time he seems only to intend to say, that it is the purpose of eloquence, to the promoting of which, its tropes and figures are wonderfully adapted, to infuse into the mind of the hearer, such compassion, sorrow, indig

Sect. I. The different solutions hitherto given by philosophers, examined.

nation, and other passions, as are, notwithstanding their original character, when abstractly considered, accompanied with pleasure. At another time it appears rather his design to signify, though he doth not plainly speak it out, that the discovery made by the hearer, of the admirable art and ingenuity of the speaker, and of the elegance and harmony of what is spoken, gives that peculiar pleasure to the mind, which makes even the painful passions become delightful.

IF the first of these be all that he intended to affirm, he hath told us indeed a certain truth, but nothing new or uncommon; nay more, he hath told us nothing that can serve in the smallest degree for a solution of the difficulty. Who ever doubted, that it is the design and work of eloquence to move the pas sions, and to please? The question which this naturally gives rise to, is, How doth eloquence produce this effect? This, I believe, it will be acknowledged to do principally, if not solely, agreeably to the doctrine explained above*, by communicating lively, distinct, and strong ideas of the distress which it exhibits. By a judicious, yet natural arrangement of the most affecting circumstances, by a proper selection of the most suitable tropes and figures, it enlivens the ideas raised in the imagination to such a pitch, as makes them strongly resemble the perceptions of the

* Chap. VI.

Of the cause of that pleasure we receive from affecting objects or representations.

senses, or the transcripts of the memory. The question, then, with which we are immediately concerned, doth obviously recur, and seems, if possible, more mysterious than before: for how can the aggravating of all the circumstances of misery in the representation, make it be contemplated with pleasure? One would naturally imagine, that this must be the most effectual method for making it give still greater pain. How can the heightening of grief, fear, anxiety, and other uneasy sensations, render them agreeable?

BESIDES, this ingenious author has not adverted, that his hypothesis, instead of being supplementary to Fontenelle's, as he appears to have intended, is subversive of the principles on which the French critic's theory is founded. The effect, according to the latter, results from moderating, weakening, softening, and diminishing the passion: according to the former, it results from what is directly opposite, from the arts employed by the orator for the purpose of exaggerating, strengthening, heightening, and inflaming the passion. Indeed, neither of these writers seems to have attended sufficiently to one particular, which of itself might have shown the insufficiency of their systems. The particular alluded to is, that pity, if it exceed not a certain degree, gives pleasure to the mind, when excited by the original objects in distress, as well as by the representations made by poets, painters, and orators: and, on the contrary, if it exceed a certain degree, it is on the whole painful, whether a

Sect. I.

The different solutions hitherto given by philosophers, examined.

wakened by the real objects of pity, or roused by the exhibitions of the historian or the poet. Indeed, as sense operates much more strongly on the mind than imagination does, the excess is much more frequent in the former case than in the latter.

Now, in attempting to give a solution of the difliculty, it is plain, that all our theorists ought regularly and properly to begin with the former case. If in that, which is the original and the simplest, the matter is sufficiently accounted for, it is accounted for in every case, it being the manifest design both of painting and of oratory, as nearly as possible, to produce the same affections which the very objects represented would have produced in our minds: whereas, though Mr Hume should be admitted to have accounted fully for the impression made by the poet and the orator, we are as far as ever from the discovery of the cause why pity, excited by the objects themselves, when it hath no eloquence to recommend it, is, on the whole, if not excessive, a pleasant emotion.

BUT if this celebrated writer intended to assert, that the discovery of the oratory; that is, of the address and talents of the speaker; is what gives the hearer a pleasure, which, mingling itself with pity, fear, indignation, converts the whole, as he expresseth it, into one strong movement, which is altogether delightful: if this be his sentiment, he hath indeed advan