been a chasm which refuses to be bridged over. At first, as we have seen, this non-amalgamation left the ruling race free to prosecute its conquests, but, when reverses ensued, the unsubstantiality and hollowness of a Government depending upon force became glaringly apparent. Depending only on its armies and backed by no enthusiasm or patriotism among its subjects, the Porte possessed no power of prolonged resistance. Its armies defeated, there was no resource, save in the acceptance of humil iating terms or the interference of a foreign Power. Hence it happened that notwithstanding the haughty and stubborn attitude of the Ottoman Government, its unsuccessful wars were seldom protracted. National life, however, of some sort was beginning to stir in the Ottoman dominions, and its results were significant. Towards the close of the seventeenth century the tribute of Christian children finally ceased, chiefly in consequence of the new constitution of the Janissaries, which made this means of recruiting them superfluous. The effects of this change, though necessarily slow, were certain. Bosnia, Servia, and Greece had furnished the best elements of that now corrupted corps, and by this means their life-blood had been drained away, and their condition rendered hopeless and prostrate. Allowed to retain their children, though still oppressed with all the weight of the Ottoman religious and fiscal systems, they began to experience the stirrings of national hopes and aspirations and to cast about for an opportunity of liberation from their abject position. The opportunity was slow to arrive, but it was used when it came. The Servian Rayas in the last war with Austria ranged themselves on the side of the invaders, acquired military organization and experience, and under Kara George commenced a period of independence and freedom. Wallachia and Moldavia owed a semi-independence to Russian interference, and Greece became a liberated kingdom after the treaty of Adrianople.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century Ottoman administration administration was everywhere rotten to its core. Complete disintegration seemed imminent; there was no central energy by which individual interests might be generalized and

united. What the corruption at Constantinople was we have seen, but even this was far exceeded by the frightful abuses of the provincial system. The Pachalets were sold to the highest bidder; the purchase-money was often borrowed, and the extortions of the pachas equalled or exceeded by the rapacity of the agents of Armenian bankers. The example was followed by all the subordinate officers, and the wretched provincials groaned under an extortion and oppression which the history of the world has never seen equalled. As long as the revenues were received, the Porte never interfered, and indeed interference was beyond his power. Rebellious feudatories and revolted pachas mocked the central government in three quarters of the empire.* Egypt and Syria became virtually independent; Widdin was for years the independent stronghold of Passwan Oglow; Ali Pacha long defied the sultan in Epirus.

But notwithstanding this long corruption and decay the prophecies of Ottoman dissolution have remained unfulfilled. With the exception of Egypt and the liberated States in Europe the empire of the Porte has retained its integrity; her armies have sometimes gained victories, and even the gloss of European civilization has penetrated to Constantinople. The causes which have contributed to this prolongation of Turkish power are not far to seek. They have consisted in its capacity for resistance (1) to the consequences of internal decay, (2) to destruction from foreign aggression. Earlier barbarian dynasties have usually disappeared with rapidity after the first conquering impulse withdrew its support. The Ottoman empire was founded on conditions so singularly favorable, and aided by an organization so unique, that its work had taken too firm a hold to be more than loosened by the adverse influences which succeeded. Its cohesion refused to be dissolved, though its well-defined symmetry and compactness were lost. It remained a glowing and seething mass which resisted. the fires of corruption through the Cyclopean welding which had produced

* Lord Broughton (cited by Creasy) says of Albania that specimens of almost every form of government might be found in it.

it. It was the complete divergence between the "survival" of former greatness and the new conditions which surrounded it, which caused a pitch of corruption, happily more often anticipated by the disappearance of that which obstructs progress.

More particular circumstances worked towards the same result. By the possession of the Caliphate after Selim's invasion of Egypt, the sultan became the recognized head of the Mahomedan religion. This was more than an honorary title; it put the influence exercised by emperor and pope into the same hands, and when the authority of the former was weakened and despised, the binding associations of their religion still secured to the successors of the Prophet some remains of his former importance. Without this religious support, the disintegration of the empire must have been inevitable; by its means a bond of union was provided, deriving from the zeal and enthusiasm which characterize Mahomedanism sufficient strength to neutralize to some extent the heavy strain put upon the centre of administration by the decrepitude of the secular power. Another circumstance which warded off a complete state of anarchy was the preservation of the same ruling family. From the commencement of Ottoman history no candidate for the throne ever appeared outside the house of Othman. The sanctity of this line of succession was no doubt aided by the possession of the Caliphate and by the early employment of slave ministers, but its source seems to lie deeper still in national feeling and tradition, and it was never violated. The possession of the throne never became the goal of successful intrigue, and the strongest motive to rebellion and civil war was therefore wanting. If once the way to the throne had lain open, the already loosely cemented empire would have been torn asunder, and the ambition of the pachas have been more fatal than their avarice.

These influences were felt even under the most imbecile of the sultans, but more personal causes from time to time arrested the course of decay. A highhanded and remorseless sultan like Amurath IV. for the time restored order and repressed corruption. The

prudence of Sokolli found too few imitators among the later viziers, but the ability and virtue of the Kiuprilis produced a transformation in the empire, the effect of which must have done something to retard the rapidity of decline. The reformations of Selim and Mahmoud were in the main delusive, but the abolition of the feudal system by the former, and the destruction of the Janissaries by the latter, removed some cause of discontent, and made possible some return to military efficiency. Bulwarks such as these would have offered feeble resistance to a general rising of the subject Rayas, who outnumbered the oppressors by five to one. But the danger arising from such a possibility was averted by the mutual jealousies and divisions which existed among the members of this heterogeneous class. The Albanians would ill have submitted to Sclavonic rule, nor would the Sclavs have been the willing instruments of Greek aggrandizement. The Armenians were cut off from concert with their fellow-Christians by the Mahomedan province of Anatolia, which barred the way. Hence the forces which might have caused apprehension were disjointed, and selfish interests and national jealousies either maintained their condition unchanged or made the risings partial, and therefore less fatal to the Turkish empire. Thus Servia became independent, but Bosnia and Bulgaria remained beneath the yoke; Greece won her freedom, but Macedonia and Thrace were left in slavery.

It may be doubted, however, whether any favorable circumstances from within could long have retarded the fall of the Ottoman power in Europe, if circumstances positive and negative had not aided it from without. Duration of empire was guaranteed by the geographical position of the imperial city. Situated at the meeting-point of two seas, the nearer shores of which were Ottoman territory, its sources of supply were boundless, and an attack from the north unsupported by a strong fleet would have been an enterprise full of temerity. Fortified thus by its unique situation, and in no small degree by the prestige and glory of its unrivalled career, Constantinople afforded to the Ottomans the vitality which the rotten Byzantine em

pire before them had derived from the same source. Floods of invasion had beaten against the walls of the Greek capital, and in their recoil had desolated its provinces, but while the city was untaken, its empire, amid weakness and disaster greater than ever seized the Ottoman power, still remained. When it fell the conquering power came from the East, and its Asiatic provinces were subdued, before the invasion from the porth was crowned with success. But the Turkish invasion has been followed by no other immigration of barbarous tribes. The provinces of Anatolia have always been the best secured portions of the empire; they have never opened to an invading army the high road to Constantinople. It is in the continued absence of danger from this quarter that Turkish security has in great measure consisted. Constantinople has remained the cementing link between the European and Asiatic parts of the empire, protected by both, and securing the material integrity of the Ottoman dominion. We have seen how the principle of the "balance of power" had served under Solyman to introduce the Porte at the maturity of its power into the Statesystem of Europe. It remains to trace its influence in supporting it, after its natural term of life had expired. France made the first Turkish alliance, and the same Power continued for long to be the main European influence at Constantinople. The agents of Louis le Grand were always present there, and the negotiations for the treaty of Carlowitz were secretly modified by their means. At that treaty England and France were the mediating Powers, and from that time either one or both took a prominent part in the negotiations which attended the Porte's foreign relations. Severed alike by religious creed and by geographical position from the great questions of Western Europe, and, though declining, not without power and resources, Turkey was regarded as a possible ally which might by its weight opportunely turn the scale. As the Porte grew weaker, these individual interests of the western states were merged in their common apprehension of the East, and a general policy was developed. Russia was rapidly extending her frontier towards the Danube, and Catherine II. un

disguisedly aimed at the possession of Constantinople. The treaty of Kainardji was struck, notwithstanding protests from the west. The annexation of the Crimea gave rise to more serious alarm. France was eager for intervention, but England hung back. Eight years later English interference perverted the independence of Moldavia and Wallachia, although Pitt's proposal to equip a fleet for the Dardanelles was not successful. Jealousy of Russian aggression henceforth directed European statesmanship. By the event which followed the French revolution, and especially by Napoleon's descent on Egypt, England became the Porte's chief protector, though France and even Prussia continued to assume at times a similar attitude. A moral support was thus extended to the corrupt and nerveless Government at Constantinople. The "balance of power" became deified by political fetichism," and the moral basis of international diplomacy was too often overlooked. But whether this policy has been moral or immoral, sagacious or short-sighted, it is not our present question; in any case the result is clear that from the causes which we have traced, Western diplomacy has unnaturally extended the term of Ottoman empire in Europe, which but for this interference must almost inevitably have disappeared.

No explanation of the course of Ottoman history would be complete which left out of account the influences exercised by the Mahomedan religion. Some of these have been already incidentally alluded to, but the importance of the subject justifies and demands a more detailed treatment. Of all the qualities which decide the fate of nations, the most critical and momentous is their power of moral expansion and their aptitude for moral progress. Moral corruption means material decay, and true national welfare is only secured by the unimpeded action and reaction of the finer and coarser tissues of national life. But among the forces which advance or retard morality, religion has always been the strongest, and may in fact be taken as the index and measure of the rest. In treating of the effects of Islam, a distinction must be made between its results on the world's history

and its consequences for the particular nations which embraced it. To confuse these is to confuse the abstract and the concrete. Viewed in the former aspect, it was important chiefly for its insistance of the principle of strict monotheism, and in this way doubtless played its part in the development of the religious ideas. But to the historian, the practical effects of a religion are the most important, and the concrete system in which Mahomedanism consist has always given rise to fatalism, polygamy, slavery, and intolerance. By fatalism national character was affected individually as well as politically. While it fostered reckless bravery in war, it caused a moral apathy and enervation, a want of enterprise and a false security, which has made that bravery futile. In its political consequences it was, if possible, more disastrous still. Defeat in war and the enfeeblement of Government were alike the will of Allah. Resignation was the only true fortitude; attempts at reformation were useless, if not impious, for had not the Koran declared that each nation has its allotted term?" The corrupting effects of polygamy and slavery on that society which recognizes them are certain and inevitable. The slavery may be mild and the marriage laws severe, but the moral corruption will only be diminished, not prevented. Existing in any shape, they choke the free expansion of important elements of national life, and they open the way for moral degradation, which will certainly not fail to make its entry. But to Turkey these institutions have been politically prejudicial. They have served to mark off the Ottoman nation as a population alien to the rest of Europe, as intruders and barbarians, whereas its only true safety consisted in throwing off all estranging and separating influences, and in becoming assimilated to European nations.

But perhaps the most disastrous effect of their religion on the Ottoman power has been the relations which it has involved between it and its Christian subjects. Islam is essentially an aggressive religion. "In the shade of the crossing scimitar there is Paradise," said the Koran, and between the true believer and the infidel, war could only be suspended by conversion of tribute. Thus a condition of inferiority was at once

But

imposed on the Christians who became members of the Ottoman empire. But this was not all. The payment of tribute. might have been rendered insignificant by practical equality, and a gradual fusion of race might have ensued. again the sacred law rendered such a result impossible, and provided for a continued severance of rulers and ruled. All contact or intimacy with unbelievers are strictly forbidden; the Christians lived in a separate quarter of the towns, wore a different dress, were not allowed to bear arms, and might lawfully be treated with indignity and disrespect.* It is true that their religion was tolerated within certain galling limits, but the toleration was contemptuous, and illcalculated to conciliate. Once more; prudent statesmanship would dictate to a conquering race a wise and far-sighted adjustment of the national laws, so as to embrace within their scope all the heterogeneous elements of their dominions. Such a task would be always difficult, but for the Turks it was impossible. Their social system, their laws and their government depended on the Koran and the sacred traditions; they presupposed a Mussulman population; where they noticed Christians at all, they aimed not at fusion but at severance. Under Mahomedan law, equality or assimilation between Ottoman conquerors and Christian subjects was an impossibility. External circumstances widened the gulf. The early sultans were constantly at war with the Christian kings of Europe; iť was therefore necessary to prevent the subject Rayas from creating an unfavorable diversion. The tribute of children was one way of doing this, but it was not the only way, and the motive was strong for turning "contemptuous toleration into virtual oppression." Owing to these circumstances, necessarily resulting from their religion, the Ottomans have continued to be an alien population in the European territory which they have conquered; they have never been supported by the strength which national forces only can afford, and they have been under continual apprehensions of

*Vide a quotation from the "Malteka-ulUbhur," in an article in the Nineteenth Century for December, 1877, by the Rev. Malcolm McColl.

The Phrase is Mr. Freeman's.

the rising of their Christian subjects, who have never failed to make use of any opportunity of severing themselves from their oppressors.

It is thus owing to difference of religion rather than to distinction of race that the Ottoman nation has so signally failed to be amalgamated with its European subjects; it is from the same cause that in the international struggle for existence the Porte has been drawn down by a stagnant morality and retrograde political forms. Nor does the outlook for the future afford any hope of reformation. The Koran is a guide, minute and precise; its directions bind the true believer at all places and in all times. From it and from oral tradition the elaborate system of Mahomedan jurisprudence has been compiled. By Solyman it has constituted an authority without appeal; the last edition of it was published in 1856.* It results from this ossified system of government that political changes are impossible without a modification of religion. Individual sultans may desire them; far-sighted viziers may attempt them; but the deadweight of national apathy, prejudice, and bigotry clogs every forward movement. During the last century the greatest obstacle to change was found in the selfish interests and religious zeal of the Janissaries. But their extermination failed to clear the way. The influential body of the Ulemas, devoted throughout their lives to the study and interpretation of the sacred law, mo

nopolizing education, and comprising almost all the intellect of the country, set their faces steadily against reform. The fanaticism of the wandering Dervishes, if its influence is not immediately political at the present day, serves to leaven the heavy and apathetic populace, and might rouse it into flame. The Government dare not change the letter of the sacred law; they may attempt to transform its spirit; they may profess to return to the true intentions of the Prophet, from the gradual deviations which have hidden them; but in a system, the essential life of which is obedi ence to the letter, they must necessarily fail. Mahmoud II. made the attempt, and he was termed a Giaour. The Hatti-Sherif of Gulhaneh proclaimed reformation, but Europe in vain waited for its effects. As subjects of Christian powers Mahomedans may be an industrious and well-conducted population, as the Tartars of the Russian empire serve to show. As an independent nation, ruling Mahomedan subjects, they may remain without shocking civilization and humanity, as the Persian Monarchy proves; but the European rule of Mahomedans over Christians contradicts every tendency of political, moral, or national progress, and the close of Turkish hostory in Europe must some day be an illustration of the law that the prolonged life of systems or nations must depend upon the ultimate cohesion and mutual adaptation of their members. - Westminster Review.

* Nineteenth Century, December, 1877.

ity, gentry and the public," have been accustomed to see Italian opera announced by at least two rival managers; and there have been seasons in which three theatres for the representation of Italian opera have been opened and kept open at the same time. If the collapse of Italian opera had for the last year or two been anticipated, it is certain that some four or five years ago Italian opera in England was prosperous enough. This was shown, indeed, by