once to spare ourselves a tedious and humiliating haggle which can end only in one way, for the last demand of Irish demagogism must and will be the dissolution of the Union. Mr. Morley has perhaps hardly taken in the fact that among the Irish on both sides of the Atlantic political incendiarism is a trade. Irish secretaryship, the home secretary- of imperial policy, it would be better at ship, and the premiership could afford, and with an anxiety proportioned to his consciousness that, as he said, Ireland was the difficulty of his administration. We must therefore be permitted to believe that the temporary reinforcement of public justice in Ireland during outbreaks of murderous anarchy caused by agitation or distress, and when the ordinary law has become evidently insufficient, though it may not be the highest pinnacle of statesmanship, is not the lowest depth of ignorance, carelessness, or folly. That force, while necessarily used to restrain disorder, is no remedy for an economical malady, is a truth as certain and as fruitful as that the strait waistcoat necessarily used to control madness in its paroxysms is no remedy for a disease of the lungs. To talk of English government and misgovernment of Ireland is misleading in fact, though indispensable to the theory that Ireland has no faults of her own thing to an English member of Parlia ment who wishes to do well to Ireland is the quality of the men sent to represent it in the House of Commons; hardly a man of business among them; and not three who are prepared cordially to cooperate together for any one common object." "Would it mend matters," asks Cobden, "if such men were sitting in Dublin instead of London?" For the Galway contract Irish members were only too ready to co-operate; to that job for more than one session all worthier objects were sacrificed, and for the sake of it all natural and honorable connections were disregarded. Let it be shown that in one a theory not easily accepted by those who on the other side of the Atlantic have seen the Irish unanimously supporting slavery, and forming, under the vile leaders whom they invariably choose, the regular rank and file of American corruption. When England won elective govMr. Morley's own policy for Ireland is ernment for herself, that is in 1832, she not stated in these volumes, but we may won it for Ireland also. Ireland has a divine that he would like to govern Ire- much larger number of representatives in land through leaders of Irish opinion. the House of Commons than Scotland, So should we all if it were possible: un- and for a long time she held the balance fortunately it is even less possible now between the parties. But Mr. Morley than it was when Peel's Coercion Bill was has to record Cobden's verdict on the brought in. O'Connell was not strong on character and conduct of Irishmen at the side of truth or honor; nor was he Westminster. "The most discouraging the offspring of a high political civilization. Cobden says of him, that though they were on friendly terms he never shook hands with him or faced his smile without a feeling of insecurity; and that as for trusting him on any public question where his vanity or his passions might interpose, he should as soon have thought of an alliance with an Ashantee chief. Still O'Connell was a real power; through the priesthood, which was devoted to him, he commanded all Ireland, the division which now exists between the priest party and the Fenians or Nationalists not having commenced in his time; if he made terms he was able to keep them; he had comparatively little need of further agita-instance, during its long tenure of power, tion to sustain his popularity, nor did any competitor threaten his demagogic throne. His successors are men who are at the most leaders of a section with another section against them; not one of them has or ever has had a tithe either of his ability or of his power; every one of them subsists solely by agitation, and can, therefore, never afford to bring it to a close; if he did, a more dynamitic rival would immediately pluck him down. Government can only degrade itself by these alliances; degradation was about the only There is a sense, indeed, in which Irefruit of alliance even with O'Connell. In land may be said to be misgoverned by truth, if compliance with the demands of England, but in which England also misIrish demagogism is to be the principle | governs herself. Were it not so, a power the Liberal party has refused to entertain any reasonable proposal for the benefit of Ireland supported by the body of Irish members. Unless this can be done, we are entitled to say that Ireland through the representatives of her choice has misgoverned England fully as much as England has misgoverned Ireland, to say nothing of the entirely evil and everincreasing influence of the Irish vote over the city constituencies on this side of St. George's Channel. which has coped with the world in arms more. The explanation is said to be his would not be showing mistrust of itself, career; but not only was his best army and almost quailing before the menaces of raised before men knew that he was a the Irish Land League and its American great guerilla chief, but his career, though confederates. Two difficulties at this marked by one almost miraculous success, crisis are pressing on the nation. One is was by no means a successful one. He an economical difficulty peculiar to Ire- was beaten in Rome, beaten at Mentana, land, and consisting mainly in the mul- beaten, or at least utterly unsuccessful, in tiplication of an unprosperous peasantry France. He failed entirely as legislator, on an unproductive country under the in- his dictatorship in Naples produced no fluence of a Church which does not teach civil fruit, and we can remember no great prudence, and in its own interest discour- measure in Italy in which he ever took ages emigration. The other is a political any very prominent part. His seclusion difficulty, extending to the affairs of the in Caprera in fact, though voluntary, was whole kingdom, and felt especially in mo- the result of a sound instinct. That Italments of national peril, or where, as in ians should love him for his action in dealing with the Irish question, forecast Italy, for his defence of Rome, for his and a steady course of systematic and marvellous overthrow of the Bourbon dyresolute action are required. It consists nasty, a feat which stands alone in hisin the weakness of a supreme government tory, for his still more marvellous surrenvested in a body far too large for united der for the sake of Italy alone of the council, and distracted in itself by faction, kingdom he had won, is intelligible established and consecrated under the enough; but why did other peoples love name of party. The inability of the him? Patriotism does not necessarily House of Commons, as at present elected endear the patriot to strangers, nor does and organized, to govern the country, has all mankind always honor the deliverer of been pressed upon the attention of the part of it. German love for Hofer was nation by these calamitous and humiliat-limited, nor did Europe worship William ing events not less forcibly than by any- the Silent. It was not any thought that thing immediately connected with the Garibaldi gave out. He must have had Irish question. Even this hideous struggle of civilization with murderous anarchy may in the end bring more good than evil to the nation if the proper moral be drawn. GOLDWIN SMITH. From The Spectator. THE CHARM OF GARIBALDI. GARIBALDI had been dead politically for years before he left this world to find in the next, let us hope, that St. Peter did once exist - and the interest of his career is now mainly historical. It may be condensed into the question, Why did this man, with no claim of birth, no education, and no great power of thought, so enchant the European democracy that he was, for a quarter of a century, a perceptible force in Europe, that he was deeply reverenced by millions who had never seen him, and that, though he had no wealth, he was the single private man in Europe, in an age when private war is extinct, at whose bidding an army would spring up from the ground? If, in 1880, he had landed in Illyria, as he half threatened, he would have had ten thousand followers, and have instantly, by his mere name, have attracted twenty thousand En practical ability in large measure, but his memorable sayings have been few, and his letters must seem, even to Southerners, mere words, while to Northerners they have in them a kind of feminine screaminess which is to them detestable. glishmen who think him one of the grandest figures in history cannot read a line of his with pleasure. Even Mazzini thought his marvellous colleague a kind of "inspired idiot," while to Englishmen, among whom perhaps he had as many believers as among Italians, he seemed like a grand child. The English were certainly not attracted by his religious creed, which was simply that priests are liars, or by his political creed, which, in spite of the high political sense he showed in Italy, was, so far as could be ascertained, too nearly summed up in the frightful motto painted on the banners of the Legion with which he advanced to the assistance of the French, "Patatras, Patatras, Patatras." Nor do we think that his grand faculty of command, his sway over all who served immediately under his banner, quite explains it. The gloomy Wallenstein had that in almost equal measure, and excited no general enthusiasm; and Mahommed, who had that even in larger measure, who was believed in by men among whom he ate and lived under circumstances of ter rible hardship, was hated by all but his devotees. Cromwell, who had also this ascendancy, was unknown outside his island; and the enthusiasm for Napoleon, who also had it, was outside France and Poland limited to individuals. That Garibaldi was followed often by trained soldiers belonging to various nationalities, that he was never disobeyed, that it never occurred to any one whom he led to think of him as less than dictator, is full evidence to the innate royalty in him; but it does not explain his nearly world-wide charm. And lastly, we do not see that the very usual explanation, that the democracy loved him because he was the soldier of democracy, will bear careful examination. Garibaldi was scarcely a consistent democrat. He believed in republics, provided the house of Savoy was not present; when it was, he accepted kings. Hundreds of his own followers sighed over his royalism in Italy, and though republicans followed him to the last, it is more than probable that any other man who had done the things he did would have been written out of the lists of the faithful republicans of Europe. That his feeling for the house of Savoy was most beneficial to Italy may be absolutely true- certainly we shall not dispute it but it was not consistent with the scheme of thought which the Continent recognizes as democratic. French peasant, even in his own heart, doubted her sincerity or her gift, or thought that she could betray France, or doubted that her impelling force, so far as it was not strictly supernatural, was other than self-devotion for his sake. It was so also with Garibaldi. Nobody felt distrust of him, or rivalry towards him, or suspicion about him. Friend or enemy, detractor or worshipper, no European doubted that Garibaldi desired the good of mankind, to the utter forgetfulness of self, and would, if once in motion, go forward to secure it, uninfluenced by any bribe, undeterred by any danger, unfettered by any fear. When he handed over southern Italy to Victor Emanuel, without conditions, there were men among his own friends who felt an electric shock of rage; but the most irritated among them never suspected that Garibaldi had been influenced by any motive, except his own idea of what was best for Italy, strengthened, perhaps, by the inborn feeling of a Nizzard for the house of Savoy. That quality of disinterestedness excites in men reverence to all who possess it, and it has repeatedly been a main constituent in the power of statesmen, and when seen in a great hero, a man who has done marvellous things in a marvellous way, who has, so to speak, walked up to the lion and rent him with his hands alone, who has personal dignity in its highest form, Wherein, then, lay the charm? We and a face the ablest French caricaturist think it lay in the two words "unselfish- could make only heroic, it develops revness " and "heroism," which, when found erence to passion. We will not think so together under circumstances in which ill of human nature as to think men reboth can be fully perceived, exert over gard disinterestedness as in itself so wonthe masses of mankind a sort of super-derful as to testify to something supernatural charm, till they are content to natural in the man who displays it; that believe, without either seeing or knowing. is only a cynical view. Rather it is selfTo the multitude, in all European coun- devotion which they regard as at once so tries, Garibaldi was a figure nearly resem- marvellous and so beautiful, and the disbling that which Joan of Arc must have interestedness as its perfect, because vispresented to the peasantry of northern ible and comprehensible test. They found France, -a being so heroic as to be al- it in its supreme degree in Garibaldi, and most more than mortal, incapable of fear, found it, too, in a man who was not a incapable of mistake, incapable of final saint, but a born warrior, a man who dedefeat, yet seeking nothing, asking noth-lighted in adventure, and who, in battle, ing, desiring nothing, utterly self-devoted to them. They knew, or believed, that Garibaldi cared only for them, and what he thought their wrongs; and that once in motion he would go forward steadily, moved, as Joan of Arc was moved when she obeyed her "voices," by some internal impulse, apart from a reasoning process, until he was victorious or slain. Charles the Seventh's courtiers might doubt the maid, or question her gifts, or attribute to her mixed motives; but no had that serenity which cannot belong tues; but if he did not seek money, he | plated the immediate annexation of the sought power, power as of a born king. It was kingdom of the two Sicilies. They thought It seems a strange and even absurd the Piedmontese had annexed more territhing to say, but we have never been able tory than they could manage; they dreaded to resist an impression that circumstances, the action of the Neapolitans in a united and, perhaps, the age, spoiled Garibaldi's Parliament; and they feared that if Na career. His character would have fitted ples were attacked, either Austria or him best for the part of a new religious France might strike a serious blow in leader. With a little more knowledge defence of the menaced State. and a faith, that royal nature of his would resolved, therefore, to wait. The governhave made of converts devotees, and he ment of Turin offered Francis the Secwould have founded a sect which might ond peace, with an understanding that have made Italy Christian, or have changed peace should last his lifetime, if only he the whole character of the peasantry of would adhere in general policy to northFrance. The feeling he excited in his ern Italy, and the revolutionary party followers was precisely that evoked by were informed that the time was not progreat religious teachers, and like that, pitious. The sincerity of this attitude appeared to be independent of any alter- has been doubted, but there seems no ation from events. Mentana no more reason to disbelieve that it was honest, broke his influence than Ohod broke the and that the rulers of north Italy really influence of Mabommed, and he was as contemplated an arrangement under which fully believed to be a democrat after he south Italy would have become a base had crowned Victor Emanuel, as Mr. for both Austrian and French intrigues Wesley was believed to be a Churchman against them. Francis the Second could after he began ordaining his own preach- not have maintained himself without exers. We can imagine Garibaldi controll-ternal help, while he could have given to ing a vast religious organization almost any great power he favored the dominion without orders, raying out devoted mis- of the Mediterranean. His policy, theresionaries to the ends of the earth, and infusing new fervor into them in strange, half-unintelligible epistles, which, after all, resemble nothing so much, in their half-poetic, half-angry screaminess, as some of Mahommed's Suras. That he would have been greater in that capacity we cannot say, perhaps it is enough to have enfranchised eleven millions. But he certainly would have been more intelligible to posterity, which will be sorely puzzled to account for a man apparently without a mind, in whom three nations at least believed, who took a kingdom as a passenger in a railway train, and with all Italy at his feet lived an unmeditative anchoret on a little island in the Mediter ranean. From The Economist. GARIBALDI AND ITALY. ALL Liberal Europe laments the death of General Garibaldi; but it may be questioned whether many Englishmen, even while honoring his memory, precisely understand the character of the service which he rendered to Italy and the world. He twice prevented Italy from being divided into two halves. It may be taken as certain that in 1860 neither Victor Emanuel nor Count Cavour contem fore would have been to become the humble friend either of the Hapsburgs or the Bonapartes; and as he would have been aided by the pope, the whole force of north Italy would have been exhausted in the effort to prevent attack from the south. The fleet must have been greatly increased, the army must have been kept on a permanent war footing, and Italy must have been crushed with taxation, without gaining a real place among the powers of Europe. It was under these circumstances that General Garibaldi, aware of his own hold over the population, and of the utter rottenness of the Neapolitan kingdom, resolved to strike a great blow. He is said to have been Cavour's agent, and no doubt he had Cavour's permission to undertake an enterprise in which success might be valuable while failure could compromise no one, but the audacity of the conception was his own. With one thousand men, collected from all the nations of the world, he landed at Marsala, in Sicily, defeated the royal troops, and crossing back into Naples, attacked the monarchy in its capital. The enterprise was almost a mad one, for King Francis, besides the royal army, had eight thousand good Swiss, who could, and would, have destroyed Garibaldi's little force. The general, however, had understood his enemies exactly. Though he did not re ceive either then or ever much active aid from the Neapolitans, they were favorable to his cause; the king's forces were honeycombed with treachery, and on his advance all active opposition faded away. The Swiss received no orders, owing probably to some intimation from Cavour that he would endure no intervention of foreigners; the Neapolitan soldiers did not act; the court fled to Gaeta; and within three weeks Garibaldi was dictator of Naples, and the unity of Italy, of which even Cavour despaired for the moment, had become possible. A situation of permanent danger had been prevented by an act of supreme audacity, such as only a man confident alike in his cause and in his skill would have ventured to attempt. He unreservedly surrendered his conquest to the king, and from that moment, though the Italians still had to wait for Rome, Italy was made. The advantage to Italy of this surrender was enormous. Not only was the chance of civil war averted, but her supply of men for the army was quite doubled, while her control of a population of twenty-eight millions enabled her to deal with rival nations as a first-class power, the defeat of which would involve a grand disturbance throughout the Mediterranean. The taxation of Italy, no doubt, was not lightened, while, owing to the low state of civilization in Naples, her civil difficulties were greatly increased; but then the object for which the taxes were borne and the civil difficulties encountered was, in the imagination of the people, adequate. They were to live in Europe as Italians, and not as north Italians, as without either Rome or Naples they would quite accurately have been described. An adequate object is often worth more to mankind than adequate means, and the Italians, with a historic country to defend, have built up a strong army, have borne exceedingly high taxation, and have collected a fleet sufficient to make them a serious power within the Mediterranean. With the conquest of Naples, however, the danger was not over. So absolute was Garibaldi, so entirely were the people devoted to him, that it was open to him to declare Naples a republic, and to resist its amalgamation with north Italy. The Neapolitans, who had much local feeling remaining, would have supported him, the inhabitants of the provinces recently annexed to Piedmont would have marched on him with reluctance, and it is very doubtful whether if Victor Emanuel had employed force either Austria or Whether the power will be wisely exerFrance would not have interposed a veto. cised is as yet undetermined. Italy has At all events, terms might have been even now scarcely gained full indepenmade, and the republican fanatics round dence in foreign policy, and in her search Garibaldi implored him to make the at- for a firm alliance has tended to become tempt. Garibaldi himself must have hes- a more or less highly considered depenitated. Though without ambition himself, dant of Austro-German diplomacy. The he enjoyed the exercise of power, he was effect of this has been that she has em devoted to folly to his friends, and he had barrassed France without securing much issued some important decrees, notably good either for herself or for the world. one about the land tenure, which it was She was nearly powerless during the certain that the northern Italian govern- Berlin negotiations, she did not help ment, with its traditional regard for prop-| Europe in the debate with Turkey about erty, would not support. There was for the cessions to Greece, and she rather some weeks every danger that the risks provoked than resisted the imprudent attendant on two governments in the French aggression upon Tunis, which peninsula would continue, and would be must for years to come directly decrease greatly exasperated as regarded domestic French strength, and by embroiling her affairs, though not perhaps as regarded with the sultan must limit her efficacy in foreign influence, by the fact that one of the settlement of the Eastern question. them was republican. The Liberal party In Egypt, too, she has been a marplot in north Italy, though willing to accept rather than a pacificator, and has fomented the house of Savoy, was not devoted to trouble out of jealousy of the ascendancy any dynasty, was deeply infected with of Great Britain and France. It is quite republican leaven, and was disposed to possible, however, that this attitude is believe that a policy of modified feder- temporary. Nations are guided in the alism, afterwards called "the regional long run by their interests, and the perpolicy," would be more in accordance manent interests of Italy must lead her in with the genius of Italy than an adminis- the end either to a close alliance with trative unity. The self-denial of Gari- Austria, which would help to protect that baldi, however, ended the complication. | power against both Germany and Russia, |