Idaho Calcined Solids Storage Question: What is the plan to construct a vitrification facility at Richland and Idaho. Describe the status of construction of the Calcined Solids Storage at Idaho? Answer: Under current planning assumption, the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) will be constructed at Richland starting in FY 1989 and is expected to be in operation by FY 1996. It will perform the same function as the vitrification plant of the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), which is currently under construction and is expected to begin hot operation in FY 1990. Maximum benefit is being gained by technology transfer from DWPF to HWVP. Waste at Idaho is stored in immobile form, calcine, in facilities with a design life of 500 years. After DWPF and HWVP are in operation, decisions will be made on the final disposition of the calcined waste in storage bins at Idaho. Physical construction of the seventh set of solids storage bins is expected to begin in July 1986. The present status of the project is design 97 percent complete and procurement 13 percent complete. Hanford Waste Disposal Question: Please explain how the B-Plant facility would affect plans for waste disposal and the timetable for the vitrification facility at Hanford. Answer: B-Plant is an essential facility to prepare Hanford defense waste for disposal. The waste consists of liquid, sludge, and salt cake and is stored in large underground tanks. B-Plant will be used to separate Hanford defense waste into two streams. One stream, comprising over 90 percent of the waste volume, will consist of a decontaminated salt solution which will qualify as low-level waste. It will be incorporated in grout and disposed of by shallow land burial on site. The other stream, while relatively small in volume, will contain over 99 percent of the radioactivity. It will be delivered to the vitrification facility and incorporated in glass for subsequent disposal in a Federal repository. Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant Question: Please provide the funding provided for the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant, HWVP, for FY 1984, FY 1985, FY 1986, FY 1987 and describe the activities funded. How much is anticipated in FY 1988, FY 1989, and thru FY 1994? Answer: The following table provides the funding by fiscal year ($ in millions). The activities funded are for process development, equipment development, and conceptual facility design. In the last 2 years, emphasis has been on technology transfer from the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) which is being built at Savannah River to perform a comparable function. DWPF is about 6 years ahead of HWVP so that vital experience is being obtained and incorporated in HWVP. Another important current activity is coordination with the Federal repository effort to assure acceptance of the HWVP product in the repository. The following table provides the estimated funding for HWVP by fiscal year ($ in millions). These estimates are very tentative until conceptual design activities are complete. Question: What is the current plan for the initiation of construction for HWVP? (Include the estimated key dates and funding required over the construction period.) Answer: The current plan is for a HWVP design-only project in FY 1988 and a construction project in FY 1989. The design-only project will provide for effort by the architect-engineer to refine the design and improve the cost estimate. The current estimated construction cost is $630 million. Key dates are: Question: How much funding is needed to complete Answer: The funding of $9.6 million is adequate for completion of conceptual design, which is a prerequisite for construction. Conceptual design is scheduled for completion in the first quarter of FY 1988 and could not be accelerated materially by additional funding. Question: With funding in FY 1987 and beyond at your full capability, how soon could construction begin on HWVP? Answer: The start of HWVP construction cannot be materially accelerated by increased funding in FY 1987. Shuttle Disaster Question: Please describe the impact of the recent disaster at the NASA program on the DOE verification and control program. Answer: The Challenger disaster is not expected to have a significant effect on DOE's satellite instrumentation program. Instrumentation payloads are delivered by DOE to DELETED for integration and testing on the space vehicle, DELETED delivery are DELETED based on projected launch dates. Consequently, any effect on DOE will depend largely upon how long the shuttle program has to stand down, and whatever action, if any, the DELETED regarding satellite production rates if shuttle launches are delayed for an extended period. Inflation Allowance Question: Please describe why there is no need for an allowance for inflation in the verification and control program. Answer: A 5 percent allowance for inflation is included in the Verification and Control Technology (V&CT) program is FY 1987 budget request. This allowance, however, is not specifically identified as such in the summary table of changes, but is included in the major programmatic areas. Thus, the proposed changes from the FY 1986 adjusted appropriation represent a mixture of the 5 percent inflation allowance and program increases or decreases. Verification and Control Technology Funding Question: Please provide the funding for the various functions under Verification and Control in FY 1984, FY 1985, FY 1986 and FY 1987. Answer: The functional breakdown of the Verification and Control Technology program for the years requested is as follows: (In Million of Dollars) DELETED FY Intelligence Coordination Question: Please describe the coordination role of the office with regard to an intelligence gathering capabilities of the Department. Answer: The Department of Energy has no independent role in the collection of foreign intelligence. That activity is performed by other members of the Intelligence Community. My office does coordinate the intelligence analysis activities within the Department and coordinates all Intelligence Community activities at the Department of Energy National Laboratories. Verification and Control Technology Personnel Question: How many people are employed in this function in FY 1984, FY 1985, FY 1986, and FY 1987? Answer: The Verification and Control Technology program is managed by the Office of International Security Affairs under the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Affairs and by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. The personnel strengths for FY 1984 through FY 1987 are 60, 64, 66, and 66. Question: Please describe the relationship of the analysis of nuclear terrorism intelligence performed in safeguards and security. Answer: Nuclear terrorism intelligence analysis conducted within the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence supports security policies and procedures developed and instituted by the Office of Safeguards and Security to protect DOE installations, activities, property, information, and employees. Foreign intelligence received by DOE from any source, is factored as appropriate into intelligence analysis of nuclear terrorism. This analysis in turn is considered in determining the overall potential threat from terrorists, and managing the risk to DOE facilities. This is a matter of extremely high DOE priority. Detection Activities Question: Please describe the improvements in detection activities and the need to replace outdated systems. Answer: The detection technology development activity in the Verification and Control Technology (V&CT) program is an ongoing effort to develop, update, and maintain state-of-the-art technology in the arms control and treaty verification arenas. Further, by the pursuit of advanced technical concepts, we try to anticipate future requirements in order to be time and subject responsive to arms control, verification, DELETED There are several examples of improvements in detection capabilities and replacement of outdated systems evidenced in this program. First, nearly a decade ago, DOE developed the equipment for onsite inspection provisions under the Peaceful Nuclear Explosives Treaty (PNET) protocol. To a large measure, this equipment is no longer supportable. Modernization is currently underway to incorporate logistically supportable and reliable state-of-the-art technology into an improved Local Seismic Network, packaging and field deployment provisions, and fabrication of additional CORRTEX units to fulfill DOE PNET protocol responsibilities. Second, DOE's Regional Seismic Test Network (RSTN) began full operation in 1982 based on late 1970's technology for the National Seismic Stations. The technology was developed as essentially a prototype capability for an in-country seismic system during negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The technical objectives for the RSTN have been adequately met and the engineering experience gained during the RSTN's operation will be used in designing the deployable seismic verification system (DSVS). In FY 1987, efforts will be focused on the design and system specification of a DSVS for use in in-country regional seismic monitoring. DELETED Question: How many satellite-borne sensors were delivered in FY 1985 and planned for FY 1986 and FY 1987? Answer: DELETED |