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HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED THAT THE PROGRAM EMPHASIZE NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. CLEARLY, THE SOVIETS ARE UNDER NO SUCH CONSTRAINT ABOUT PURSUING SUCH RESEARCH, OR USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS (NDEWs) IN THEIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. THE CURRENT ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) SYSTEM NOW DEPLOYED AROUND MOSCOW USES NUCLEAR WARHEADS. THE SOVIETS HAVE DONE RESEARCH ON NDEW

SOME EARLIER THAN OUR OWN.

BECAUSE OF THIS, A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT ASPECT OF OUR RESEARCH ON NDEW IS TO UNDERSTAND ITS FEASBILITY IN COUNTERING UNITED STATES RETALIATORY FORCES, AND IN A COUNTERDEFENSIVE MODE AS IT MIGHT BE USED BY THE SOVIETS TO DESTROY SPACE-BASED ELEMENTS OF UNITED STATES SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS AND A FUTURE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEM.

ALSO, NDEWS MAY BE USEFUL AS PART OF A FUTURE BALLISTIC

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MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM. A NDEW WOULD USE A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TO POWER NARROW, INTENSE BEAMS OF ENERGY IN SELECTED DIRECTIONS TO DESTROY ATTACKING MISSILES OR REENTRY VEHICLES AT DISTANCES HUNDREDS OR THOUSANDS OF MILES IN SPACE. IN CONTRAST TO THE APPROACHES OF SOME EARLY ABM SYSTEM DESIGNS, WHICH USED TRADITIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THERE WOULD BE FAR FEWER

EXPLOSIONS AND THEY WOULD BE IN SPACE, SO THAT WE WOULD EXPECT NO DAMAGE TO PEOPLE OR STRUCTURES ON THE GROUND. A NDEW MIGHT BE GROUND-BASED AND POPPED UP INTO SPACE AS NEEDED RATHER THAN BASED IN SPACE.

IN SUMMARY, THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM HAS ALWAYS CONTAINED EFFORTS CARRIED OUT JOINTLY BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TO EXPLORE THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF NDEW. IN THE PAST, FUNDING FOR NDEW HAS BEEN APPROXIMATELY 10-15 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SDI BUDGET. DOD AND DOE ARE SEEKING INCREASED FUNDING FOR NDEW RESEARCH, BUT THIS WILL NOT EXCEED THE USUAL PORPORTION, SINCE THE ADMINISTRATION IS ALSO SEEKING

FUNDING TO INCREASE THE OVERALL SDI RESEARCH.

THE SDIO REQUESTS THAT CONGRESS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE DOE REQUESTS TO ALLOW THE COMPLETION OF CRITICAL FEASIBILITY TESTS IN TIME TO IMPACT OUR DECISION TIME FRAME.

AS PART OF THIS SUPPORT, I REQUEST THAT THE CONGRESS ASSIST US IN PROVIDING A FUNDS TRANSFER BETWEEN SDIO AND DOE TO ALLOW US TO HAVE CONSISTENT RESEARCH MILESTONES. A DISCUSSION OF THIS SPECIFIC ISSUE IS PROVIDED IN APPENDIX A.

APPENDIX A

RECENTLY, THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTED A MESSAGE TO CONGRESS PROPOSING THE TRANSFER OF $62 MILLION FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY IN FISCAL YEAR 1986 TO ACCELERATE RESEARCH ON NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY CONCEPTS. THE PURPOSE OF THE LETTER WAS TO EMPHASIZE THE URGENCY OF THIS PROPOSED ACTION, PROVIDE SUPPORTING INFORMATION, AND REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE IN EFFECTING THIS FUNDING TRANSFER.

IN THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, OUR KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY TECHNOLOGY HAS ADVANCED SIGNIFICANTLY. THIS KNOWLEDGE HAS INCREASED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY RESEARCH TO THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE PROGRAM. OUR NEW UNDERSTANDING IS A RESULT OF THE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS MADE IN THE NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY TECHNOLOGY AND THE RESULTS OF SDI ARCHITECTURE STUDIES WHICH SHOWED THE DRAMATIC IMPACT, ESPECIALLY IN THE THREAT AREA, THAT AN ADVERSARY'S NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPON (NDEW) COULD HAVE ON NATIONAL SECURITY. IT IS VITAL THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S LEVEL OF EFFORT ON SDI RESEARCH BE INCREASED DURING FISCAL YEAR 1986 AND BEYOND SO THAT THE FEASIBILITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS TECHNOLOGY, PARTICULARLY THE POTENTIAL THREAT IT POSES IF DEVELOPED BY THE SOVIETS, CAN BE PROPERLY

CONSIDERED IN FUTURE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE PROGRAMMATIC DECISIONS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS TECHNOLOGY BE SYNCHRONIZED WITH THE EXPECTED MATURATION OF SDI TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS.

OTHERWISE, PROGRAMMATIC DECISIONS WILL BE BASED ON AN INADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY FEASIBILITY.

TO KEEP PACE WITH SDI TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT, THE $62 MILLION TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY WILL BE USED TO ACCELERATE NDEW RESEARCH TO DETERMINE THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY AND THE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS OF NDEW CONCEPTS. THIS DETERMINATION WILL PROVIDE DATA AND EXPERIMENTAL CAPABILITY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO ASSESS SOVIET DEFENSIVE AND COUNTER-DEFENSIVE THREAT CAPABILITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT NO LATER THAN THE EARLY 1990's A DATE AT WHICH WE BELIEVE MANY CRITICAL SDI TECHNOLOGIES WILL BE COMING TO MATURITY. THIS INFORMATION IS CRITICAL TO THE ARCHITECTURE OF A POTENTIAL UNITED STATES STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEM.

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TO AVOID ANY INCREASE IN THE FEDERAL DEFICIT, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS MAKING $62 MILLION AVAILABLE FROM WITHIN THEIR OVERALL FISCAL YEAR 1986 SDI BUDGET OF $2,759 BILLION. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PROMPT CONSIDERATION AND APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST.

SDI AS A NONNUCLEAR OPTION

Chairman HATFIELD. Gentlemen, thank you very much again for a very eloquent presentation.

Senator Johnston, do you have any questions you wish to ask?
Senator JOHNSTON. I don't think so, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman HATFIELD. All right.

Senator Cochran.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, just an observation. When I first was one of those that decided to support the President's initiative and appropriate the funds for the SDI and began discussing this decision. with constituents, one of the most appealing aspects of it from a political standpoint was that it was a nonnuclear program.

The fact that we are now seeing the effort made to develop the nuclear-directed weapons and do research in this effort makes it a tougher sell from a political standpoint for those of us who are trying to defend the program and defend the President's efforts in this area.

I don't know that there is anything that can be done about it. I am not saying that that means that we ought to stop supporting the program or that I am going to stop supporting the program, but it makes it a lot more difficult and that just ought to be recognized.

I think we are going to put a great deal more effort in the explaining of this, the education process, so that it is understood that we are not talking about the nuclear weapons that explode in the conventional way and create the fallout and nuclear winter and all the rest and that we are escalating the nuclear weapons programs into outerspace.

It is just very frightening. It is very frightening to the people of this country, and younger people, particularly, who were beginning to be excited about an alternative to the traditional nuclear arms race.

This puts it back into the category of a traditional nuclear arms race in some minds and it has to be worked on if you are going to keep getting support from the Congress for the program.

Senator JOHNSTON. May I ask a question?

Chairman HATFIELD. Senator Johnston.

Senator JOHNSTON. General, how would you rate your candidates for possible development in the early 1990's? I understand that the groundbased laser is the best candidate at this time?

EIRS PROGRAM

General ABRAHAMSON. No, sir. Actually, there are simpler candidates which are such things as some of the mechanical kill devices. If you recall, back in 1984, remember, we intercepted a missile with a nonnuclear device which was, of course, ideal, and what we would like to do-we demonstrated the feasibility of that concept then.

Since that time we have embarked on now bringing that system down, making it very small and making it very inexpensive. In fact, the cost goal for each of those is less than $1 million per round. Obviously, we can't produce even a nuclear weapon at that kind of a price.

That is called the EIRS Program. It can't exist by itself. It has to have a command and control system and it has to have a means by dealing with decoys. But in terms of the weapon, that is probably one of the very early area systems that could provide protection to populations. It would not be just a simple terminal system that would defend our missile fields, for example, alone.

Senator JOHNSTON. These would be shot from the orbiting satellite?

General ABRAHAMSON. No, sir; they would be shot from the ground. Now there is an equivalent of that which we are making very fine progress on and this is, again, a similar interceptor. However, it is now based in space.

The one that is based in space can allow you to get at the boost phase which we consider to be so critical.

So, if I were going to rate the two weapons that would be the earliest of all, I would rate those two more standard kinds of systems which are clearly nonnuclear and, again, sir, I echo that point.

I agree with you wholeheartedly. After that

Senator JOHNSTON. Those are kinetic energy systems?

General ABRAHAMSON. That's right; those are two kinetic energy devices.

Senator JOHNSTON. One fired from the ground and one from orbit? General ABRAHAMSON. That is correct.

Senator JOHNSTON. You would have to have the orbiting for the boost phase?

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. Do you have a fast-burning rocket on the

General ABRAHAMSON. On the ground one; yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. Is that the EIRS Program, ground based?

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir; EIRS, which has been awarded to Lockheed Corp. now as a single contract. It is an experimental vehicle just like everything else is in the program.

Senator JOHNSTON. Can they reach out to intermediate phase?

General ABRAHAMSON. Right now, most of the work is not being done on the rocket. Most of the work is being done on how to bring the cost down for the interceptor itself.

However, with fairly standard rocket technology, we believe that even just one site in the North Central United States could cover most of the North American Continent.

I am not sure that is the best deployment scheme, but that gives you a feel for how fast you can get out and cover a very, very large distance.

Senator JOHNSTON. Thank you.

Chairman HATFIELD. Thank you, Senator Johnston.

FISCAL YEAR 1986 SUPPLEMENTAL FOR SDI

Chairman HATFIELD. General Abrahamson, there is another matter that I would like to raise at this point.

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