The same thing here. If third-generation weapons are beginning to be effective or could be in the future, we need to see if they could use them against us for our space defense systems, for other space systems, or our strategic warning system, or could they be used against our strategic forces in a Soviet version of SDI?

Obviously, if you are examining that you just naturally take a look at it in terms of, can it be used for our system and would it be of some significant advantage?

That does not take away from the objective that the President has laid out. He has said, "Let's see if we can make this nonnuclear." The large majority of the money is going into trying to make it nonnuclear. However, obviously, we are not trying to do it in a closed mind fashion. We are trying to look at it to see if there are those advantages.

NUCLEAR-DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS

The only thing that I would like to say is that there are really several basic areas of tests. I talked to you briefly about the x-ray laser. [Deleted.]

The hypervelocity pellet is the one that I mentioned at Los Alamos which is in the same category, and then we are doing work in the microwaves, particle beams, and an optical laser [deleted].

That is the one that I would like to have Lieutenant Colonel Davis talk to you about. I think this, at least, gives you some understanding of a generalized schedule where we are trying to be able to be in a position to say, "Could they use these effectively against us?" or "Could we, or should we, employ them in an SDI system?"

Senator JOHNSTON. May I ask about the hypervelocity pellets?
General ABRAHAMSON. [Deleted.]

Senator JOHNSTON. Why would you use the nuclear weapon? [Deleted.]

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir. [Deleted.]

Senator JOHNSTON. Then the dust looks kind of like the shotgun effect.

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir; the right way to think about it is that it is a shotgun.

Senator JOHNSTON. So it covers a big area?

General ABRAHAMSON. That still depends on how effective we can make this. [Deleted.]

Senator JOHNSTON. Thank you.

Chairman HATFIELD. Does that complete your statement?

General ABRAHAMSON. I Would like to introduce Lieutenant Colonel Davis. I would like him to give you at least what we know about the Soviet side of the equivalent of the programs which I think would be valuable.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES

Colonel DAVIS. Sir, at the request of General Abrahamson, a small intelligence working group was formed with representatives from the DOE national laboratories, the Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA, and the SDI Office. With the caveat that all intelligence [deleted].

[Deleted.]

Chairman HATFIELD. Thank you very much.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES A. ABRAHAMSON

MR. CHAIRMAN IT IS A PLEASURE TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI) AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S (DOE) ROLE IN THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM. THREE YEARS AGO PRESIDENT REAGAN EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION THAT FREE PEOPLE SHOULD LIVE SECURE IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THEIR SECURITY DID NOT REST UPON THE THREAT OF RETALIATION TO DETER A SOVIET NUCLEAR ATTACK. AT THAT TIME HE

DESCRIBED THE THREAT POSED BY INCREASING SOVIET NUCLEAR ARSENALS, AND HE PROPOSED BOLD STEPS, EMBODIED IN A NEW INITIATIVE, TO ADDRESS THAT THREAT. THIS INITIATIVE CALLED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND INTENSIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM TO PURSUE THE ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY THAT HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE BY INTRODUCING A DEFENSIVE COMPONENT TO OUR DETERRENT POSTURE.

THE GOAL OF THE SDI IS TO CONDUCT A VIGOROUS PROGRAM OF RESEARCH ON EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES IN SEARCH OF A BETTER BASIS FOR A CREDIBLE DETERRENCE AND STRENGTHEN THE STABILITY OF PEACE THROUGH STRATEGIC DEFENSE. WE ENVISION THAT SUCH A PURSUIT WILL OFFER INCENTIVES TO THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN WITH US TO REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY OR EVEN ELIMINATE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES. THE DOE IS HELPING US SUPPORT THIS GOAL IN TWO BASIC WAYS.

FIRST, THERE IS REIMBURSABLE SUPPORT TO DOE LABORATORIES FOR PERFORMING DIRECT SDIO MISSION ORIENTED WORK. EXAMPLES OF THIS WOULD BE THE RESEARCH ON THE FREE ELECTRON LASER (FEL) CONDUCTED AT THE LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY AND THE NEUTRAL PARTICLE BEAM EXPERIMENTS AT THE LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY. THE SECOND CATEGORY IS A DOE-FUNDED SUPPORT THAT FALLS WITHIN ITS CLASSIC ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESEARCH.

THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS GOAL IS FOR SDIO TO INVESTIGATE A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM BASED LARGELY ON NON-NUCLEAR

TECHNOLOGY.

THE FACT THAT SDIO IS SUPPORTING SOME MODERATE LEVEL

OF EFFORT IN A NUCLEAR PROGRAM MAY AT FIRST APPEAR AS A

PARADOX.

IT IS NOT, AND I WILL CLEARLY EXPLAIN OUR NEED FOR DOE WORK AND KNOW-HOW LATER IN MY TESTIMONY. FIRST, HOWEVER, LET ME

DEFINE THE SDI MISSION.

THE MISSION GIVEN TO ME BY PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS TO PROVIDE

BY THE EARLY 1990's THE DATA BASE REQUIRED TO MAKE AN INFORMED
DECISION, ON THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF DEPLOYING A BALLISTIC
MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM, THAT COULD ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF BOTH
THE UNITED STATES AND HER ALLIES. FOR SUCH A DEFENSE SYSTEM TO
BE USEABLE, IT MUST CONFORM TO RATHER STRINGENT STANDARDS. IT
MUST BE SURVIVABLE, ROBUST, AND COST-EFFECTIVE-AT-THE-MARGIN.
SUFFICE IT TO SAY SURVIVABILITY IS VERY HIGH ON OUR AGENDA. то
DEVELOP SURVIVABLE SYSTEMS ONE MUST HAVE A REALISTIC GRASP OF
POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSES OR COUNTERMEASURES TO ANY BALLISTIC

MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM WE MIGHT DEPLOY. TO ADDRESS THIS, SDI HAS
SET UP, THROUGH ITS COUNTERMEASURES OFFICE, TWO TYPES OF
SO-CALLED "RED TEAMS". A SET OF TECHNICAL RED TEAMS ARE USED TO
CHALLENGE THE DESIGNS OF SPECIFIC DEVICES OR SYSTEMS, SUCH AS THE
BOOST-PHASE SENSOR AND TRACK SYSTEM (BSTS). THE BLUE TEAM DOING

THE ACTUAL DESIGN MUST THEN RESPOND TO THIS POSTULATED, YET
TECHNICALLY REALISTIC SOVIET COUNTEMEASURE. ANOTHER TYPE OF RED
TEAM IS A "SOVIET" RED TEAM. IT WOULD TAKE US FAR AFIELD OF
TODAY'S AGENDA TO GO INTO DETAIL ABOUT THE SPECIFICS OF HOW THESE
RED TEAMS OPERATE AND IMPACT SDI SYSTEM DESIGNS AND
ARCHITECTURES. WHAT IS IMPORTANT FOR TODAY'S HEARING IS THAT ANY
SOVIET SYSTEM CAPABLE OF DESTROYING OR SEVERLY DEGRADING A
U.S.BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM MUST BE STUDIED VERY
CAREFULLY AND IN GREAT TECHNICAL DETAIL. THE NUCLEAR DIRECTED
ENERGY CONCEPTS IN GENERAL AND THE X-RAY LASER IN PARTICULAR, AS
A COUNTER DEFENSIVE THREAT, FALLS SQUARELY INTO THIS CATEGORY.

THE SOVIETS HAVE BASICALLY THREE POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO OVERCOME A BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM AND THEREFORE TRY TO ASSURE THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF A FIRST STRIKE ATTACK. THEY COULD TRY TO OVERWHELM OR SATURATE OUR DEFENSE BY BUILDING A WHOLE NEW FLEET OF FAST BURNING MISSILES, PROBABLY AT VERY GREAT COST. THEY COULD ATTEMPT TO DECOY OUR DEFENSIVE SYSTEM SO THAT WE COULD NOT EASILY FIND THEIR REAL RV's. THIS CAN BE COUNTERED BY USE OF INTERACTIVE DISCRIMINATION SCHEMES SUCH AS NEUTRAL PARTICLE BEAMS, AND/OR X-RAY LASERS, AND KINETIC ENERGY METHODS. FINALLY, THE MOST COST-EFFECTIVE METHOD, AT LEAST TO INITIATE A STRIKE, WOULD BE TO DIRECTLY ATTACK OUR DEFENSIVE SPACE-BASED ASSETS.

WITH THESE FACTORS IN MIND, ONE CAN MORE EASILY UNDERSTAND THE ROLE THAT NUCLEAR RESEARCH PLAYS IN BALLISTIC MISSILE

DEFENSE. THESE REASONS HAVE BEEN OUTLINED JOINTLY BY SECRETARY WEINBERGER AND SECRETARY HERRINGTON AND ARE STATED BELOW.

1. TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTERDEFENSIVE NUCLEAR-DRIVEN SYSTEMS THAT AN ADVERSARY MAY DEVELOP FOR USE AGAINST FUTURE U.S. SURVEILLANCE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

2.

TO UNDERSTAND THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY AND IMPACT THAT SUCH CONCEPTS MIGHT HAVE ON OUR DETERRENT FORCES IF UTILIZED IN

SOVIET DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

3. TO EXPLORE NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY OPTIONS AS BALLISTIC

MISSILE DEFENSE POSSIBILITIES IF NEEDED.

ONE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT SDI IS A PROGRAM THAT IS FULLY COMPLIANT WITH THE VARIOUS TREATIES (INCLUDING THE 1972 ABM TREATY ENTERED INTO BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION).