« PrécédentContinuer »
OUR GOAL IS TO STOCKPILE WEAPONS WHICH ARE BOTH OPERABLE AND SAFE. TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL AND TO INSURE THAT THE TWO OBJECTIVES ARE NOT IN CONFLICT, WE MUST CONTINUE TO TEST OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER REALISTIC CONDITIONS--COMPUTER SIMULATIONS AND COMPONENT TESTING WILL NOT SUFFICE.
COLLATERAL DAMAGE REDUCTION:
WE HOLD THAT REDUCING POTENTIAL COLLATERAL DAMAGE, IF DETERRENCE WERE TO FAIL, IS NOT ONLY A MORAL IMPERATIVE; IT ALSO IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO DETERRENCE ITSELF. A DETERRENT POSTURE WOULD BE LESS CREDIBLE IN A CRISIS SITUATION IF AN ADVERSARY THOUGHT WE MIGHT NOT RETALIATE BECAUSE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXCESSIVE DESTRUCTION. THIS CONCERN ON OUR PART TO REDUCE COLLATERAL DAMAGE IS REFLECTED IN HOW WE DESIGN OUR WEAPONS.
MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS/TARGET BASE: THIS FINAL ASPECT OF ASYMMETRY IS COMPLICATED. BUT IT GOES TO THE HEART OF THE ISSUES OF THE RELATIVE IMPACT OF TEST BANS ON THE US AND USSR. IN THE CASE OF THE US,
THUS, FOR THESE HARD TARGETS TO BE POTENTIALLY PLACED AT RISK, OUR DESIGNERS HAVE HAD TO CONSIDER HIGHER YIELDS.
IN CONTRAST, THE SOVIETS ARE NOT CONFRONTED WITH A HARD TARGET BASE--EXCEPT FOR OUR MISSILE SILOS AND A FEW OTHER FACILITIES. MOREOVER
WILL GIVE THE SOVIETS AN EDGE UNDER ANY TEST BAN REGIME INCLUDING ONE ESTABLISHED BY A VERIFIABLE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY. THIS WOULD EVEN BE MORE TRUE IN A REGIME ESTABLISHED BY A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.
(U) IN CONCLUSION, THERE ARE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN THE WAY THE US AND USSR RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPON TECHNOLOGY TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THESE DIFFERENCES, ANY BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING OR ANY THRESHOLD ON TESTING WILL AFFECT THE SECURITY OF THE TWO SOCIETIES IN DIFFERENT WAYS. AS THE PARTY WHICH HAS HISTORICALLY RELIED MOST ON THE CUTTING EDGE OF TECHNOLOGY TO ACCOMPLISH ITS GOALS, AMERICAN INTEREST WILL BE MUCH MORE ADVERSELY IMPACTED THAN THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. THUS, AS LONG AS WE ARE OBLIGATED TO RELY ON THE RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES OF OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO SECURE DE TERRENCE, NUCLEAR TESTING AND A STRONG DE TERRENT POSTURE WILL REMAIN INSEPARABLE. CONSEQUENTLY, EVEN IF VERIFICATION WERE NOT A CONCERN--AND IT IS--AN EXTENSION OF THE NUCLEAR BAN TEST REGIME AT THIS TIME WOULD NOT SERVE OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST.
LET ME SUMMAR IZE BY SAYING THAT THE DOE PROGRAM HAS RESPONDED HEROICALLY TO THE INCREASED REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAST FEW YEARS, BUT I FEEL THAT WE ARE OPERATING WITH A HIGHER LEVEL OF RISK THAN I AM COMFORTABLE WITH. THE ONE-TRACK PRODUCTION
SYSTEM IS BEING STRAINED, WITH LITTLE BACKUP, AND AGING FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT STILL NEED MODERNIZATION, THE AVAILABILITY OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL, PARTICULARLY REACTOR PRODUCTS, IS DELETED VULNERABLE BOTH POLITICALLY AND TECHNICALLY, AND NO RESPONSIVE RESERVE CAPACITY EXISTS. IN THE AREA OF RD&T THE PRESENT FUNDING REQUEST SUPPORTS THE DOE SDI ACTIVITY AND PREVENTS FURTHER EROSION OF THE BASE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, AND BOTH ARE ESSENTIAL, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF BOTH WHAT WE DO KNOW AND WHAT WE DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE SOVIET PROGRAM.
(U) THIS YEAR'S DOE BUDGET REQUEST, IF FULLY APPROVED, IS BARELY ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, AND THUS DESERVES THIS COMMITTEE'S FULLEST SUPPORT. BECAUSE OF THE MARGINALITY OF THE PROGRAM, I BELIEVE WE MUST LOOK FARTHER IN THE FUTURE. THERE ARE MANY CONSIDERATIONS, BUT LET ME NARRCN DOWN TO TWO CONCRETE ITEMS.
(U) IN THE AREA OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, THE DOD/DOE LONG RANGE RESOURCE PLANNING GROUP (STARBIRD STUDY) RECOMMENDED, IN 1980, A FIFTEEN PERCENT INCREASE IN R&D MANPOWER FROM 7400 IN 1980 TO 8500. PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE IS CONTINUING, REACHING 8150 IN 1985, AND PLANNED TO REACH 8400 IN 1985. HOWEVER, THE STARBIRD STUDY DID NOT ANTICIPATE THE INCEPTION OF A NEW PROGRAM, THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI), IN WHICH THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY HAS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE WHICH CONSTITUTES AN UNFORESEEN EXPANSION OF ITS ONGOING RESPONSIBILITIES. IN ORDER FOR DOE TO SUPPORT THIS ESSENTIAL ACTIVITY, THE LEVEL OF EFFORT IN THE CORE PROGRAM HAS ACTUALLY DECREASED IN THE LAST FEW YEARS; THIS LOSS DIRECTLY IMPACTS THE DOD BY REDUCING DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES FOR OUR FUTURE WEAPON SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, I FEEL THAT THE STARBIRD STUDY MANPOWER GOAL OF 8500, TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE
development decision in the early 1990's. Hopefully, between now and then the SDI Program can support an arms control environment wherein we can begin to reduce nuclear weapons immediately and not wait until a development decision is made.
We have tried to build a strategy into our arms control negotiations to assist us in that direction. Part of that strategy was my presenting a program last June to the Soviets and answering their questions about the SDI Program. The intent was to try to lay out officially to them what we are doing and why we consider our SDI efforts to be peaceful and, in fact, more stabilizing.
The area that we get into a lot of difficulty with is this nonnuclear kill mechanism. I am sure this committee is concerned because there is a nonnuclear emphasis on the program. That is our clear objectivewhether it makes sense to continue to do some kind of SDI-related nuclear testing in the face of this emphasis.
I believe the answer really lies in a broader question than just strategic defense. I believe that that lies in the fact that we are now developing a third generation of nuclear weapons. They are no longer only merely explosive devices, like the first generation which was, of course, the original version of the fission bomb, the second generation being the hydrogen bomb, and the third generation being one where the bomb pumps a device and causes very, very selective destruction somewhere else. In light of the evolution of these weapons, we need to determine the threat of the third generation to our offensive forces today, as well as any strategic defense we might build in the future.
Senator JOHNSTON. May I interrupt to ask, does that nuclear-directed energy weapon violate the weapon-in-space clause of the ABM treaties?
General ABRAHAMSON. Obviously, it would depend on how one deployed such a thing. By the way, the first related space treaty was the UN Outerspace Treaty. It said that any weapon of mass destruction could not be deployed in space. Actually, it was broader, although it is my understanding that that definition is generally accepted to be a nuclear weapon.
The various architectures that we are looking at are the kinds where you would use a popup system and keep them on the ground until needed or until an appropriate time in a flight structure.
That is not always easy. We are looking at what that means and what those could be. But we are looking at it not only from our viewpoint, but also from the Soviet viewpoint if they had those kinds of systems and put them either in space or on the ground.
Senator JOHNSTON. If you had it orbiting, would it or would it not violate the ABM in your view?
General ABRAHAMSON. It is not the ABM Treaty that we are talking about here.
Senator JOHNSTON. It is the UN Treaty? General ABRAHAMSON. We are talking about the outerspace Treaty. The ABM Treaty says, and actually, I am sorry, I said that incorrectly. If there is any deployment of mobile systems to counter ICBM's, that
it is the UN Treaty about the outerspar correctly
would be a violation of the ABM Treaty. It wouldn't be merely because it was nuclear.
Senator JOHNSTON. The Outerspace Treaty says, “Weapon of mass destruction.”
General ABRAHAMSON. The Outerspace Treaty says that we will not place a weapon of mass destruction in space.
Senator JOHNSTON. This would not violate that?
General ABRAHAMSON. Whether it applies to ABM purposes or other purposes, offensive purposes.
Senator JOHNSTON. And this direct-energy weapon would not violate the Outerspace Treaty in your view?
General ABRAHAMSON. So long as it were not based in space. If it were based in space, it would; yes, sir.
SDI WORK AT THE NATIONAL LABORATORIES General ABRAHAMSON. I would like to highlight some of the kinds of work that we do with the various national laboratories. I think the key point here-and it has already been made is that the scientists and the technical people at our national laboratories are really some of our best and most creative people in this country, not only in the areas of nuclear weapons, but in many, many areas that are related to these efforts.
Therefore, they are a valuable team for us. For example, at Los Alamos they are doing work on nuclear-directed energy and their specialty is a device called, [deleted].