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THE TRIDENT II D-5 MISSILE WILL CARRY

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WARHEADS. THE FIRST TRIDENT SSBNS EQUIPPED FOR D-5 WILL CARRY

WARHEAD. AS WYS WARHEADS BECOME AVAILABLE FROM RETIRING POSEIDON (C-4) SUBMAR INES AND FROM THE FIRST EIGHT TRIDENTS,

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(U) BEFORE CLOSING, THE CONTINUING INVULNERABILITY OF OUR BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMAR I NES MUST BE EMPHASIZED. AFTER COMPLETING 2,393 STRATEGIC DETERRENT PATROLS SINCE 1960, EVERYTHING WE KNOW AT EVERY LEVEL OF SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONVINCES ME THAT THE SOVIETS CANNOT FIND OUR MISSILE SUBMARINES NOW AND WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FIND THEM FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. ALL WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH OUR SECURITY EFFORTS AGREE WITH THIS ASSESSMENT. THE SITUATICN IS DYNAMIC, AND WE MUST CONTINUE OUR VIGOROUS EFFORTS TO ENSURE WE REMAIN AHEAD OF THE THREAT. THIS SURVIVABILITY OF OUR STRATEGIC SUBMAR I NES EQUATES TO STABILITY IN A CRISIS. SINCE OUR SSBNS CANNOT BE ATTACKED SUCCESSFULLY, NO ENEMY IS LIKELY TO INITIATE AGGRESSION WHEN HIS ATTACK CANNOT DENY OUR CAPABILITY TO RETALIATE EFFECTIVELY. DOE'S SUPPORT OF THE NAVY'S STRATEGIC PROGRAMS IS MOST IMPORTANT TO OUR NATION'S DETERRENT CAPABILITY.

(U) I WOULD NOW LIKE TO ADDRESS TWO RECENT LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS WHICH I BELIEVE HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. THOSE TWO ACTIONS ARE HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION-3, AND OF EVEN MORE CONCERN, HOUSE BILL 3442, BOTH OF WHICH WOULD HAVE THE UNITED STATES CEASE ALL TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS YOU KNOW, FOR THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY REJECTED PROPOSALS CALLING FOR A MORATORIUM ON TESTING. THESE REJECTIONS GREW OUT OF OUR BITTER EXPERIENCE WITH THE LAST MORATORIUM (1958-1961), IN PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S WORDS, "WE KNOW ENOUGH NOW ABOUT BROKEN NEGOTIATIONS, SECRET PREPARATIONS, AND THE ADVANTAGES GAINED FROM A LONG TEST SERIES NEVER TO OFFER AGAIN AN UNINSPECTED MORATORIUM."

(U) HOWEVER, OUR OPPOSITION TO A MORATORIUM GOES DEEPER THAN AN HISTORICAL LESSON WE HAVE PURPOSEFULLY ELECTED NOT TO REPEAT. SPECIFICALLY, TESTING OF EQUIPMENT WHICH INVOLVES OUR VITAL INTERESTS AND SAFETY HAS BEEN INGRAINED INTO OUR ENTIRE TECHNOLOGICAL HERITAGE. , WE KNOW THAT EVEN THE BEST DESIGNED AND CONSTRUCTED DEVICES CAN FAIL TO FUNCTION AT PARTICULARLY CRITICAL TIMES. THAT OBSERVATION IS THE REASON WE TEST ELEVATORS, AIRPLANES, AND AUTOMOBILES. IT IS THE REASON WHY WE TEST NUCLEAR WEAPONS--TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE IN THEIR RELIABILITY AND TO INSURE THEIR SAFETY, THEREFORE, IT SHOULD BE BEYOND DEBATE THAT AS LONG AS WE ARE OBLIGATED TO RELY ON THE RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO SECURE OUR NATION AND ITS VALUES, IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE TO FOREGO TESTING OF THOSE CRUCIAL CAPABILITIES. THE FACT THAT THERE IS DEBATE ON THIS SELF-EVIDENT TECHNICAL POINT SHOWS EITHER THE TECHNOLOGICAL NAIVETE OF SOME WHO OPPOSE TESTING OR THEIR WILLINGNESS TO LET TECHNICAL JUDGMENT BE COMPROMISED BY POLITICAL BIASES.

(U) I REALIZE SOME HAVE ARGUED THAT SINCE, IN THE ABSENCE OF TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, RELIABILITY WOULD BE REDUCED, THERE WOULD BE LESS RELIANCE ON THE NUCLEAR ARSENALS IN THE WORLD, AND THIS WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, THIS THESIS NOT ONLY WOULD BE DANGEROUS IF IMPLEMENTED, BUT IT OVERLOOKS THE FACT THAT THE GENERALLY STABILIZING SYSTEM DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PAST TWENTY YEARS,

INCLUDING THE MAJOR REDUCTION IN THE SIZE AND DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF OUR NUCLEAR STOCKPILE SINCE THE 1950'S, ARE DIRECT PRODUCTS OF OUR TECHNOLOGY AND OUR ABILITY TO TEST THAT TECHNOLOGY, RATHER THAN LEAD TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, WHAT WOULD REALLY HAPPEN IS THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD COMPENSATE FOR WORST CASE ESTIMATES OF UNRELIABILITY BY USING HIGHER YIELDS AND BY DEPLOYING MORE WARHEADS. AS FAR AS NATIONAL SECURITY IS CONCERNED, RELYING ON UNCERTAINTY, ESPECIALLY ON SYMMETRY OF UNCERTAINTY, IS EXTREMELY RISKY.

(U) HJR-3 ARGUES THAT A MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING "WOULD STRENGTHEN OUR EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS." HOWEVER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW A NUCLEAR TEST BAN COULD PROVIDE AN INCENTIVE FOR NONNUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO FORESWEAR THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A GIVEN COUNTRY'S QUEST TO BECOME A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE MUST BE GOVERNED BY TWO PRINCIPAL FACTORS, WHICH ARE UNRELATED TO NUCLEAR TESTING BY THE SUPERPOWERS, FIRST, THE COUNTRY MUST PERCEIVE A NEED TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. SECOND, ONCE HAVING DECIDED TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR OPTION, THE COUNTRY MUST HAVE ACCESS TO THE TECHNOLOGIES AND MATERIALS NECESSARY FOR THE FABRICATION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE. THE PERCEPTION OF NEED IS LIKELY TO BE DETERMINED BY A COMPLEX MIXTURE OF PERCEIVED EXTERNAL THREATS AND SUCH THINGS AS NATIONAL PRIDE AND INTERNAL POLITICAL FORCES. NUCLEAR TESTING BY THE U.S. OR THE SOVIET UNION, FOR THAT MATTER, ADDS LITTLE OR NOTHING TO EITHER FACTOR. A NUCLEAR TEST BAN IN SOME WAYS COULD ACTUALLY ENCOURAGE PROLIFERATION. FOR EXAMPLE, IF A NATION, NOW UNDER THE PROTECTION OF U.S. NUCLEAR GUARANTEES, LOST CONFIDENCE IN U.S. NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, IT MIGHT WELL DECIDE THAT ITS SECURITY INTERESTS REQUIRED THE ACQUISITION OF AN INDIGENOUS NUCLEAR FORCE .

(U) MOREOVER, WE NEED TO REMEMBER THAT A POTENTIAL PROLIFERATOR, WHO CHOOSES TO BE BOUND BY A TEST BAN, COULD STILL PRODUCE UNSOPHISTICATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHOUT TESTING. SUCH AN UNTESTED WEAPON COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY IMPACT IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS EVEN THOUGH THERE WOULD BE SOME UNCERTAINTY IN THE YIELD AND PERFORMANCE OF SUCH A WEAPON. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT EVEN IN 1945 WHEN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WAS STILL IN ITS INFANCY, THE UNITED STATES DID NOT TEST THE FIRST NUCLEAR WEAPON USED IN WAR.

(U) HR-3442 ARGUES THAT A "MUTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS CESSATION OF THE TESTING OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD GIVE A POSITIVE INDICATION OF A SINCERE DESIRE BY BOTH NATIONS TO END THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.“ THIS INDICATION, IT IS FURTHER ARGUED. "WOULD PROVIDE THE PROPER CLIMATE FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, WE KNOW FROM EXPERIENCE WHAT WILL HAPPEN WHEN WE ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS NOT VERIFIABLE, THE UNRATIFIED THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY PROVIDES A CASE IN POINT. BECAUSE OF IMPRECISIONS AND LIMITATIONS IN OUR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, WE CANNOT ACCURATELY ASSESS THE YIELDS OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS. NEITHER CAN THE SOVIETS ACCURATELY ASSESS OUR YIELDS. AS A RESULT OF THE MORASS OF UNCERTAINTY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE SPENT THE PAST DECADE EXCHANGING WHITE PAPERS ACCUSING EACH OTHER OF EXCEEDING THE PERMITTED 150 KILOTON THRESHOLD. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW SUCH A SITUATION, WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY BE REPEATED FOLLOWING A MORATORIUM, WOULD SERVE TO FOSTER AN IMPROVED CLIMATE BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS. NOT BEING SURE WHERE THE PROPERTY LINE LIES AND NOT BEING SURE HOW TO MEASURE IT HAS NEVER MADE FOR NE IGHBORLY RELATIONS.

(U) HJR-3 FURTHER ARGUES THAT A MUTUAL MORATORIUM ON MUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING WOULD PROMOTE THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED

STATES BY CONSTRAINING THE UNITED STATES' NUCLEAR ARMS
COMPETITOR, THE SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER, INHERENT IN THIS ARGUMENT
IS THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION
RELY EQUALLY ON TECHNOLOGY TO ACHIEVE THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY
OBJECTIVE. BUT THIS ASSUMPTION IS ALMOST CERTAINLY WRONG, AS THE
FOLLOWING POINTS WILL ILLUSTRATE

(U) SECURITY: IN THE CLOSED SOVIET SOCIETY, THE SECUR ING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE ACHIEVED QUITE EFFECTIVELY THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF SUMMARY POLICE POWERS, CENSORSHIP, AND SIMILAR METHODS WHICH OUR SOCIETY WOULD FIND ABHORRENT. IN CONTRAST, WE HAVE ELECTED TO PROVIDE THE REQUISITE SECURITY FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH TECHNOLOGICAL MEANS, MANY OF WHICH ARE INTEGRAL TO THE WEAPON DESIGNS. OUR APPROACH, WHILE IN CONCERT WITH OUR SOCIETAL VALUES, IS NOT WITHOUT COSTS. ONE OF THOSE COSTS WOULD BE A GREATER TENDENCY TOWARD DETERIORATION IN A NO-TEST ENVIRONMENT,

SAFETY: THE UNITED STATES--AND NO DOUBT THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL--EXERCISES CARE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCE NO NUCLEAR YIELD EVEN IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT. FOR US, SAFETY IS NOT A MATTER OF COST TRADEOFFS; IT IS AN ABSOLUTE. AS SYSTEMS, STRATEGIES, AND THREATS CHANGE, THE REQUIREMENT FOR SAFETY REMAINS IMMUTABLE. OUR CONCERN FOR SAFETY HAS LED US TO INCORPORATE FEATURES WITHIN THE WEAPON DESIGN ITSELF WHICH, WITHOUT CAREFUL TESTING, COULD BE AT CROSS-PURPOSES WITH THE OPERABILITY OF THE WEAPON. WE LEARNED THIS LESSON WELL WHEN A FEATURE

WAS INCORPORATED INTO STOCKP ILED WEAPONS DURING THE 1959-1960 MORATORIUM. A SUBSEQUENT STOCKPILE CONFIDENCE TEST REVEALED THAT THE SAFETY FEATURE WOULD HAVE PRECLUDED DETONATION EVEN IF THE WEAPON HAD BEEN CALLED ON TO PERFORM ITS MILITARY MISSION.

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