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(U) THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BUDGET, UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THIS SUBCOMMITTEE, SUPPORTS NAVY REQUIREMENTS IN STRATEGIC AND NON-STRATEGIC WARFARE. THE NAVY STRATEGIC WARHEAD REQUIREMENTS ARE DEDICATED SOLELY TO THE STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCE. THE NAVY NON-STRATEGIC WARHEAD PROGRAMS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR STRIKE WARFARE (ASHORE TARGETS), ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE, ANTI-AIR WARFARE, AND MARINE CORPS BATTLEFIELD WEAPONS.

(U) THE NAVY HAS EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM TO REVITALIZE OUR NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARFARE CAPABILITIES. THIS PROGRAM WAS INITIATED IN 1980 BY THE NAVY AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BECAUSE THE DETERRENT VALUE OF EXISTING NAVY NON-STRATEGIC WEAPONS HAD BEEN ERODED SIGNIFICANTLY BY THE GROWING SOVIET

NUCLEAR THREAT. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS THREAT TO OUR NAVY IS
EVIDENT IN THE LARGE NUMBER OF AIR- AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED
ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILES IN THE SOVIET NUCLEAR INVENTORY. IN
SPITE OF THIS THREAT, THE NAVY MUST MEET ITS GLOBAL COMMITMENTS
IN SUPPORT OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY--THE NAVY ELEMENT OF
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY. THE MARITIME STRATEGY REQUIRES
THAT U.S. NAVAL FORCES OPERATE IN FORWARD DEPLOYED REGIONS,
WHICH INCLUDES AN EVER PRESENT UNCERTAINTY OF NUCLEAR ATTACKS
ON OUR FLEET BY SOVIET LAND-BASED AND AT-SEA FORCES. THE NAVY
THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE (TNW) MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS DESIGNED
TO REMOVE ANY INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIETS TO USE THE IR NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AT SEA. THIS PROGRAM REQUIRES HARDENING OUR SHIPS AND
AIRCRAFT AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SUCH AS BLAST,
RADIATION, AND ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE. IT REQUIRES A
COMPREHENSIVE THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE TRAINING PROGRAM. IT
ALSO REQUIRES THAT THE NAVY SELECTIVELY MODERNIZE ITS AGING
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ENSURE THAT THEY ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST THE
THREAT. THESE IMPROVEMENTS COMBINE TO DETER SOVIET USE OF

NUCLEAR WARFARE AT SEA BY RAISING THE LEVEL OF UNCERTAINTY THAT

SUCH ATTACKS WOULD SERVE THEIR WAR AIMS,

IT IS NOT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY TO BUY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AUTOMATICALLY AS REPLACEMENTS FOR SYSTEMS BEING RETIRED. WE REQUIRE A CLEAR CASE FOR THE UTILITY OF EACH WEAPON. NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NOT SERVE AS SUBSTITUTES FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHERE IMPROVED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WILL SUFFICE. WE WILL PROCURE ONLY THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH PROVIDE A UNIQUE AND SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY CAPABILITY, FOR EXAMPLE, TWO YEARS AGO, THE NAVY STUDIED THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN AIR-DELIVERED STAND-OFF NUCLEAR WEAPON FOR AN ANTI-SHIP ROLE.

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THE POINT IS THAT THE NAVY NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS WELL-DEFINED, IN CONSONANCE WITH DOD POLICY, AND INTEGRATED WITH THE NAVY'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY,

ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN

THE NAVY'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY IS THE TOMAHAWK NUCLEAR
LAND ATTACK CRUISE MISSILE, OR TLAM/N. TOMAHAWK IS PLANNED FOR
SSN-637 AND SSN-688 CLASS ATTACK SUBMAR I NES; DD-963 AND DDG-51
CLASS DESTROYERS; CGN-9, 38 AND CG-47 CLASS CRUISERS; AND BB-El
CLASS BATTLESHIPS. THESE SHIP AND SUBMARINE CLASSES WILL BE
CAPABLE OF CARRYING ALL TOMAHAWK VARIANTS IN ANY DESIRED MIX.
TLAM/N WILL GREATLY ENHANCE THE NAVY'S DE TERRENCE POSTURE BY
DISTRIBUTING NAVY RETALIATORY STRIKING POWER ACROSS A LARGE
NUMBER OF NAVAL PLATFORMS. THIS WILL INCREASE THE NUMBER OF
WARSAW PACT TARGETS THAT ARE PUT AT RISK AND GREATLY COMPLICATE
SOVIET DEFENSIVE EFFORTS. TOMAHAWK COMPLEMENTS THE POWER OF
THE CARRIER AIR WING AND MULTIPLIES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
FORCE AT SEA. TLAM/N WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE NCA'S ABILITY
TO DE TER STRATEGIC CONFLICT AND WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL
SURVIVABLE ASSETS FOR THE NUCLEAR RESERVE FORCE. TLAM/N

REACHED INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (IOC) IN JUNE, 1984. AT PRESENT DELETED

NAVY SHIPS AND SUBMARINES ARE CERTIFIED TO CARRY TLAM/N. WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, DELETED TLAM/N MISSILES WILL BE DEPLOYED IN

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SHIPS AND SUBMARINES.

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TLAM/N, THE NAVY HAS NOT DEPLOYED A NEW NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON SINCE 1964. MOST OF THE EXISTING NAVY NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE DESIGNED IN THE NINETEEN FIFTIES, DEPLOYED IN THE EARLY SIXTIES,

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THE DOE BUDGET BEING CONSIDERED BY THIS SUBCOMMITTEE ALSO SUPPORTS DEVELOPMENT OF THE W81 WARHEAD FOR THE NUCLEAR VERSION OF THE STANDARD SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE, SM-2(N). THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY SUBMITTED A REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE SM-2(N), AS REQUIRED BY THE FY86 DOD AUTHORIZATION CONFERENCE, IN DECEMBER 1985. DUE TO APPROPRIATION OF LESS THAN ONE-THIRD OF THE FY8E BUDGET REQUEST, THE NAVY WAS REQUIRED TO RESTRUCTURE THE SM-2(N) PROGRAM. THE DOE BUDGET SUPPORTS THIS RESTRUCTURED EFFORT. THE REQUIREMENT FOR THIS NUCLEAR SELF-DEFENSE MISSILE IS VERY REAL.

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THE SM-2(N) IS A DETERRENT
SYSTEM AND HAS A UNIQUE, WELL-DEFINED ROLE

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IT DETERS SOVIET USE OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT SEA BY INCREASING THE PROBABILITY THAT SUCH AN ATTACK ON THE U.S. FLEET WOULD FAIL.

ANOTHER KEY WARFARE AREA IS ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

(ASW). SOVIET SUBMARINE IMPROVEMENTS INCLUDE MORE DAMAGE RESISTANT DOUBLE HULL DESIGNS, TITANIUM HULL CONSTRUCTION, DEEPER OPERATING CAPABILITIES, AND TORPEDO COUNTERMEASURES,

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IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THESE FASTER, QUIETER, AND MORE SURVIVABLE SOVIET SUBMAR INES, NEW ASW WEAPONS ARE REQUIRED.

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THE ASW STAND-OFF WEAPON (ASW SOW), NOW NAMED SEA LANCE, IS A NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SUBMAR I NE-LAUNCHED ROCKET, AND IS REQUIRED TO REPLACE SUBROC,

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(U) IN FY 1988, THE CONGRESS FULLY SUPPORTED THE NAVY'S REQUESTED FUNDING FOR THE SEA LANCE (ASW SOW) RDT&E. HOWEVER, THE CONGRESS AUTHOR I ZED ONLY $10 MILLION AND APPROPRIATED ONLY $5 MILLION OF THE $16 MILLION REQUESTED BY THE DOE FOR CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES TO PRODUCE THE SEA LANCE NUCLEAR PAYLOAD. IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE DOE PROGRAM KEEP PACE WITH THE NAVY'S SEA LANCE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, AND WE REQUEST YOUR SUPPORT OF THE FUNDING THAT DOE HAS REQUESTED IN FY 1987 FOR SEA LANCE (ASW SOW) CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS.

FOR OUR ASW AIRCRAFT FORCES, A NEW AIR-DELIVERED NUCLEAR DEPTH BOMB IS REQUIRED. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THIS MODERNIZED DEPTH BOMB, LIKE THE B57 IT REPLACES, WILL HAVE A STRIKE CAPABILITY AS WELL. THE NAVY AND THE DOE ARE IN THE EARLY STAGES OF A PHASE 2A STUDY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS BOM WILL BE A VARIANT OF THE SEA LANCE (ASW SOW) WARHEAD OR OF THE BEI WARHEAD. IT IS EXPECTED THAT IF THE PHASE 2A STUDY CALLS FOR A COMMON ASW/STRIKE BOMB, IT WILL SUPPLANT THE OLDER B43, B57, AND B61-2 AND -5 TACTICAL STRIKE BOMBS AND B57 DEPTH BOMBS

THIS COMMONAL ITY SHOULD ALLOW SMALLER AIRCRAFT CARRIER LOADOUTS THAN WOULD OTHERWISE BE POSSIBLE WITH SEPARATE TACTICAL STRIKE AND DEPTH BOMBS, THEREBY REDUCING OVERALL STOCKPILE NUMBERS OF FLEET STRIKE AND DEPTH BOMBS. BOTH OF THESE NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SEA LANCE (ASW SOW) AND THE NUCLEAR DEPTH BOMB, HAVE AN INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (10C)

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SHIFTING NOW TO STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, THERE ARE EIGHTEEN POSEIDON C-3 SUBMARINES, AND EACH SUBMARINE CARRIES SIXTEEN MISSILES. EACH C-3 MISSILE IS LOADED WITH

DELETED W68 WARHEADS. THE W58 BUILDING PROGRAM IS LONG COMPLETED; THE LAST W68 WAS DELIVERED TO THE NAVY IN 1975. DOE

IS, HOWEVER, CONDUCTING A RETROFIT PROGRAM FOR THE WES BECAUSE THESE C-3 MISSILES WILL BE USED IN POSEIDON SUBMARINES THROUGH THE 1990S. DELETED

THESE WARHEADS ARE BEING MODERNIZED WITH SAFETY AND FIRING CIRCUIT MODIFICATIONS.

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THE

W76 WARHEAD TODAY SUPPORTS THE TRIDENT I (C-4) MISSILE. TWELVE POSE I DON SSBNS, ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO CARRY THE C-3 MISSILE, HAVE BEEN MODIFIED TO CARRY SIXTEEN C-4S, EACH WITH A PAYLOAD OF W76 WARHEADS. THE FIRST EIGHT TRIDENT SUBMARINES, FIVE OF WHICH ARE NOW MAKING PATROLS, WILL EACH CARRY 24 C-4 MISSILES. THE EIGHTH TRIDENT SUBMARINE WILL BE DELIVERED THIS MAY.

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THE TRIDENT II (D-5) MISSILE IS NOW IN ITS THIRD YEAR OF FULL-SCALE ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT. DOE IS DEVELOPING THE WARHEAD FOR THIS MISSILE.

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THE D-5 WILL PROVIDE OUR

W88

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SURVIVABLE, SEA-BASED STRATEGIC FORCE WITH GREATLY IMPROVED
DE TERRENT CAPABILITY. D-5 WILL FIRST BECOME OPERATIONAL WHEN

U GOES TO SEA IN THE NINTH TRIDENT SUBMARINE FROM ITS HOME

BASE AT KINGS BAY, GEORGIA. ALL SUBSEQUENT NEW CONSTRUCTION TRIDENTS WILL BE D-5 EQUIPPED.

(U) THE ORIGINAL EIGHT TRIDENTS WILL BE BACKFITTED WITH THE D-5 SYSTEMS DURING OVERHAUL, BEGINNING IN THE EARLY 1990S, AND THE SUBMARINE BASE AT BANGOR, WASHINGTON, WILL BE EQUIPPED TO SUPPORT D-5 BY 1994 AS WE PROCEED TOWARD AN ALL D-5 TRIDENT FORCE.

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