DELETED (U) THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BUDGET, UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THIS SUBCOMMITTEE, SUPPORTS NAVY REQUIREMENTS IN STRATEGIC AND NON-STRATEGIC WARFARE. THE NAVY STRATEGIC WARHEAD REQUIREMENTS ARE DEDICATED SOLELY TO THE STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCE. THE NAVY NON-STRATEGIC WARHEAD PROGRAMS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR STRIKE WARFARE (ASHORE TARGETS), ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE, ANTI-AIR WARFARE, AND MARINE CORPS BATTLEFIELD WEAPONS. IN (U) THE NAVY HAS EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM TO REVITALIZE OUR NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARFARE CAPABILITIES. THIS PROGRAM WAS INITIATED IN 1980 BY THE NAVY AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BECAUSE THE DETERRENT VALUE OF EXISTING NAVY NON-STRATEGIC WEAPONS HAD BEEN ERODED SIGNIFICANTLY BY THE GROWING SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS THREAT TO OUR NAVY IS EVIDENT IN THE LARGE NUMBER OF AIR- AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILES IN THE SOVIET NUCLEAR INVENTORY. SPITE OF THIS THREAT, THE NAVY MUST MEET ITS GLOBAL COMMITMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY--THE NAVY ELEMENT OF NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY. THE MARITIME STRATEGY REQUIRES THAT U.S. NAVAL FORCES OPERATE IN FORWARD DEPLOYED REGIONS, WHICH INCLUDES AN EVER PRESENT UNCERTAINTY OF NUCLEAR ATTACKS ON OUR FLEET BY SOVIET LAND-BASED AND AT-SEA FORCES. THE NAVY THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE (TNW) MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO REMOVE ANY INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT SEA. THIS PROGRAM REQUIRES HARDENING OUR SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SUCH AS BLAST, RADIATION, AND ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE. IT REQUIRES A COMPREHENSIVE THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE TRAINING PROGRAM. IT ALSO REQUIRES THAT THE NAVY SELECTIVELY MODERNIZE ITS AGING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ENSURE THAT THEY ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST THE THREAT. THESE IMPROVEMENTS COMBINE TO DETER SOVIET USE OF NUCLEAR WARFARE AT SEA BY RAISING THE LEVEL OF UNCERTAINTY THAT SUCH ATTACKS WOULD SERVE THEIR WAR AIMS. IT IS NOT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY TO BUY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AUTOMATICALLY AS REPLACEMENTS FOR SYSTEMS BEING RETIRED. WE REQUIRE A CLEAR CASE FOR THE UTILITY OF EACH WEAPON. NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NOT SERVE AS SUBSTITUTES FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHERE IMPROVED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WILL SUFFICE. WE WILL PROCURE ONLY THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH PROVIDE A UNIQUE AND SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY CAPABILITY. FOR EXAMPLE, TWO YEARS AGO, THE NAVY STUDIED THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN AIR-DELIVERED STAND-OFF NUCLEAR WEAPON FOR AN ANTI-SHIP ROLE. DELETED THE POINT IS THAT THE NAVY NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS WELL-DEFINED, IN CONSONANCE WITH DOD POLICY, AND INTEGRATED WITH THE NAVY'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY. ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NAVY'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY IS THE TOMAHAWK NUCLEAR LAND ATTACK CRUISE MISSILE, OR TLAM/N. TOMAHAWK IS PLANNED FOR SSN-637 AND SSN-688 CLASS ATTACK SUBMARINES: DD-963 AND DDG-51 CLASS DESTROYERS; CGN-9, 38 AND CG-47 CLASS CRUISERS; AND BB-E1 CLASS BATTLESHIPS. THESE SHIP AND SUBMARINE CLASSES WILL BE CAPABLE OF CARRYING ALL TOMAHAWK VARIANTS IN ANY DESIRED MIX. TLAM/N WILL GREATLY ENHANCE THE NAVY'S DETERRENCE POSTURE BY DISTRIBUTING NAVY RETALIATORY STRIKING POWER ACROSS A LARGE NUMBER OF NAVAL PLATFORMS. THIS WILL INCREASE THE NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT TARGETS THAT ARE PUT AT RISK AND GREATLY COMPLICATE SOVIET DEFENSIVE EFFORTS. TOMAHAWK COMPLEMENTS THE POWER OF THE CARRIER AIR WING AND MULTIPLIES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FORCE AT SEA. TLAM/N WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE NCA'S ABILITY TO DETER STRATEGIC CONFLICT AND WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SURVIVABLE ASSETS FOR THE NUCLEAR RESERVE FORCE. TLAM/N PRESENT DELETED REACHED INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (IOC) IN JUNE, 1984. AT DELETED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TLAM/N, THE NAVY HAS NOT DEPLOYED A NEW NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON SINCE 1964. MOST OF THE EXISTING NAVY NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE DELETED THE DOE BUDGET BEING CONSIDERED BY THIS SUBCOMMITTEE ALSO SUPPORTS DEVELOPMENT OF THE W81 WARHEAD FOR THE NUCLEAR VERSION OF THE STANDARD SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE, SM-2(N). THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY SUBMITTED A REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE SM-2(N), AS REQUIRED BY THE FY86 DOD AUTHORIZATION CONFERENCE, IN DECEMBER 1985. DUE TO APPROPRIATION OF LESS THAN ONE-THIRD OF THE FY86 BUDGET REQUEST, THE NAVY WAS REQUIRED TO RESTRUCTURE THE SM-2(N) PROGRAM. THE DOE BUDGET SUPPORTS THIS RESTRUCTURED EFFORT. THE REQUIREMENT FOR THIS NUCLEAR SELF-DEFENSE MISSILE IS VERY REAL. DELETED THE SM-2(N) IS A DETERRENT SYSTEM AND HAS A UNIQUE, WELL-DEFINED ROLE DELETED IT DETERS SOVIET USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT SEA BY INCREASING THE PROBABILITY THAT SUCH AN ATTACK ON THE U.S. FLEET WOULD FAIL. ANOTHER KEY WARFARE AREA IS ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW). SOVIET SUBMARINE IMPROVEMENTS INCLUDE MORE DAMAGE RESISTANT DOUBLE HULL DESIGNS, TITANIUM HULL CONSTRUCTION, DEEPER OPERATING CAPABILITIES, AND TORPEDO COUNTERMEASURES, DELETED IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THESE FASTER, QUIETER, AND MORE SURVIVABLE SOVIET SUBMARINES, NEW ASW WEAPONS ARE REQUIRED. DELETED THE ASW STAND-OFF WEAPON (ASW SOW), NOW NAMED SEA LANCE, IS A NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED ROCKET, AND IS REQUIRED TO REPLACE SUBROC, DELETED (U) IN FY 1986, THE CONGRESS FULLY SUPPORTED THE NAVY'S REQUESTED FUNDING FOR THE SEA LANCE (ASW SOW) RDT&E. HOWEVER, THE CONGRESS AUTHORIZED ONLY $10 MILLION AND APPROPRIATED ONLY $5 MILLION OF THE $16 MILLION REQUESTED BY THE DOE FOR CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES TO PRODUCE THE SEA LANCE NUCLEAR PAYLOAD. IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE DOE PROGRAM KEEP PACE WITH THE NAVY'S SEA LANCE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, AND WE REQUEST YOUR SUPPORT OF THE FUNDING THAT DOE HAS REQUESTED IN FY 1987 FOR SEA LANCE (ASW SOW) CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. FOR OUR ASW AIRCRAFT FORCES, A NEW AIR-DELIVERED NUCLEAR DEPTH BOMB IS REQUIRED. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THIS MODERNIZED DEPTH BOMB, LIKE THE B57 IT REPLACES, WILL HAVE A STRIKE CAPABILITY AS WELL. THE NAVY AND THE DOE ARE IN THE EARLY STAGES OF A PHASE 2A STUDY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS BOMB WILL BE A VARIANT OF THE SEA LANCE (ASW SOW) WARHEAD OR OF THE BE1 WARHEAD. IT IS EXPECTED THAT IF THE PHASE 2A STUDY CALLS FOR A COMMON ASW/STRIKE BOMB, IT WILL SUPPLANT THE OLDER B43, B57, AND B61-2 AND -5 TACTICAL STRIKE BOMBS AND B57 DEPTH BOMBS THIS COMMONALITY SHOULD ALLOW SMALLER AIRCRAFT CARRIER LOADOUTS THAN WOULD OTHERWISE BE POSSIBLE WITH SEPARATE TACTICAL STRIKE AND DEPTH BOMBS, THEREBY REDUCING OVERALL STOCKPILE NUMBERS OF FLEET STRIKE AND DEPTH BOMBS. BOTH OF THESE NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SEA LANCE (ASW SOW) AND THE NUCLEAR DEPTH BOMB, HAVE AN INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (10C) DELETED DELETED SHIFTING NOW TO STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, THERE ARE EIGHTEEN POSEIDON C-3 SUBMARINES, AND EACH SUBMARINE CARRIES SIXTEEN MISSILES. EACH C-3 MISSILE IS LOADED WITH DELETED W68 WARHEADS. THE W68 BUILDING PROGRAM IS LONG COMPLETED; THE LAST W68 WAS DELIVERED TO THE NAVY IN 1975. DOE DELETED WITH SAFETY AND FIRING CIRCUIT MODIFICATIONS. THE DELETED W76 WARHEAD TODAY SUPPORTS THE THE TRIDENT I (C-4) MISSILE. TWELVE POSEIDON SSBNS, ORIGINALLY DELETED THE TRIDENT II (D-5) MISSILE IS NOW IN ITS THIRD YEAR OF FULL-SCALE ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT. DOE IS DEVELOPING THE WARHEAD FOR THIS MISSILE. W88 DELETED DELETED THE D-5 WILL PROVIDE OUR SURVIVABLE, SEA-BASED STRATEGIC FORCE WITH GREATLY IMPROVED DETERRENT CAPABILITY. D-5 WILL FIRST BECOME OPERATIONAL WHEN IT GOES TO SEA IN THE NINTH TRIDENT SUBMARINE FROM ITS HOME BASE AT KINGS BAY, GEORGIA. ALL SUBSEQUENT NEW CONSTRUCTION TRIDENTS WILL BE D-5 EQUIPPED. (U) THE ORIGINAL EIGHT TRIDENTS WILL BE BACKFITTED WITH THE D-5 SYSTEMS DURING OVERHAUL, BEGINNING IN THE EARLY 1990S, AND THE SUBMARINE BASE AT BANGOR, WASHINGTON, WILL BE EQUIPPED TO SUPPORT D-5 BY 1994 AS WE PROCEED TOWARD AN ALL D-5 TRIDENT FORCE. |