NECESSITY FOR TESTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator JOHNSTON. I have heard it said that we need to have nuclear tests for, first, reliability, and second, safety. I can see a lot of reasons to test, but those two reasons didn't seem appropriate to me because of reliability; you ought to be able to predict exactly where that curve is on a given bottle of tritium so you know when it loses its punch.

Second, it is not a question of safety in the sense it might blow up if you don't test it, is it?

General DAVIS. Sir, we are concerned about our confidence in the reliability of the stockpile. While we can predict how long the tritium will last, we don't know what is going to happen to the rest of the system. Tritium is only a minor part of what is in there.

You also have plutonium in there, and in some of them you have uranium as well as many other reactive materials.

So we are saying that while we know the general lifetime of tritium and we can replace it, there are other things in there that are

Senator JOHNSTON. Probably the conventional explosives are more important.

General DAVIS. That is part of the problem; yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. Is safety a problem at all?

General DAVIS. No, sir; I don't think safety is a problem.

Senator JOHNSTON. No reason to test?

General DAVIS. No, sir; I would say for safety purposes, the weapons are reliable today.

Chairman HATFIELD. In fact, General, is not only one of your [deleted] proposed tests for reliability?

General DAVIS. I beg your pardon, sir.

Chairman HATFIELD. Isn't just one test out of the [deleted] scheduled for 1987, primarily a test for reliability?

General DAVIS. Sir, since 1980 I believe we have had about [deleted] stockpile reliability tests, [deleted].

Chairman HATFIELD. Out of how many total tests?

General DAVIS. I think we average about [deleted] a year, sir.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, if I may amplify on that. I don't want to leave the impression that we don't have a requirement to test for safety of the overall weapons system, because we certainly do.

For example, as General Davis says, [deleted] tests out of the total year are specifically earmarked for stockpile testing.

Senator JOHNSTON. That is reliability though, isn't it?

Mr. FOLEY. Some of it is safety also, and one of the reasons that we have the high explosive on it, whether or not it works. We can't tell if these things are going to work in some cases until you put it all together and you

Senator JOHNSTON. That is reliability again though. I am talking about safety. It might blow up prematurely in the stockpile.

[Chart deleted.]

Mr. FOLEY. These are the total number of tests that we have. That gives you a feel for the particular test, the physics experiments, SDI,

and the rest. In terms of safety, there is absolutely a need because we keep fixing.

One of the concerns we have is our people. For example, in the submarines, as Admiral McKee talked about, when you are sitting alongside weapons you want to know that there isn't going to be any radioactivity on and you don't know what the effects of this thing might be. You must do some nuclear tests in safety. Reliability, yes, but also safety.

Senator JOHNSTON. To explode the nuclear device for safety?
Mr. FOLEY. Yes, sir: do the fixes work.

Senator JOHNSTON. For reliability.

Mr. FOLEY. The use control devices are reliability, but it is also safety.
Senator JOHNSTON. The what control?

Mr. FOLEY. It is pretty difficult to separate the safety and reliability to know that it is going to be safe, but also that the devices that make it safe are reliable.

Senator JOHNSTON. Now the safety devices, you don't have to explode the weapon to test those, do you?

Mr. FOLEY. Not all of those; no, sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. Any of them?

Mr. FOLEY. I Would have to take that question for the record and go back and check.

[The information follows:]

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY MEASURES

Certain nuclear weapon safety measures and devices do not require nuclear tests to verify their effectiveness. Generally, those which do not intrude into the nuclear system but are confined to the arming, fuzing, and firing systems do not require nuclear testing. However, certain other major safety measures intrude into the nuclear system and most definitely require nuclear tests. An example of this would be the use of insensitive high explosives in a weapon. Looking to future improvements, some concepts that combine enhanced safety and command and control features are buried in the nuclear system and would likely require nuclear tests.

Senator JOHNSTON. It is no big deal. Those who say you have to test safety, I think are wrong. There are all kinds of reasons to test-reliability, et cetera, but not safety.

General DAVIS. I will tell you one thing though, Senator, they won't get any safer if you don't test. The major improvements that we have made in the safety of those weapons over the years have required nuclear testing.

Chairman HATFIELD. Gentlemen, I don't want to debate on semantics, but I have some questions regarding the letter from Dr. Bradbury to the House Foreign Affairs Committee which relates to this question of necessity for testing for reliability.

I think we ought to spell out more clearly, either if we have to redefine our terms or if we have to expand upon past understanding, because there are some obvious difference of opinion expressed by some I would call experts on the necessity of testing for reliability along the line you are laying out today, or as I hear you, the interrelatedness between reliability and safety or the inexorable tie that exists.

So I will have some additional questions to further amplify on that for the record.

General DAVIS. Yes, sir; we will be happy to respond.

"ESTIMATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY, AND HEALTH; SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY

LABORATORY MANPOWER LEVELS

88

General DAVIS. This is our full-time equivalent manpower at the weapons laboratories. Sir, since about 1969 through 1980 we had about a 40-percent decrease in FTE's. DOE has asked for a substantial increase in fiscal year 1987.

You can see that part of it goes for environment, safety and health, and safeguards and security, as well as SDI and weaponization. I guess part of our concern, is something called the weapon technology base.

In there you have the metallurgists, computer programmers, and so forth, and there is very little left for that small group of scientists that look out into the 1990's and the year 2000 for our exploratory device designs.

Senator JOHNSTON. Did you say exploratory device design?

General DAVIS. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. What is that?

General DAVIS. That is the guy, sir, in layman's terms, which is all I know, who looks ahead and says, "Hey, what might we come up with in the year 2000 that would be more effective; smaller, safer, whatever?"

Chairman HATFIELD. Is that a third generation, though, that you are talking about?

General DAVIS. Yes, sir; partly.

BENEFITS OF TESTING

• STOCKPILE TODAY IS 1/3 SMALLER THAN IN 1967
• AGGREGATE EXPLOSIVE POWER IS 1/4 OF 1960
LEVEL-GREAT REDUCTION IN COLLATERAL DAMAGE
• NOT ONLY SMALLER-MORE SAFE-MORE SECURE
• DETERMINE NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS-BUILD
EQUIPMENT TO SURVIVE

• MAINTENANCE OF A VIABLE R&D BASE

• SOLID DETERRENT-HIGH CONFIDENCE IN RELIABILITY OF STOCKPILE

BENEFITS OF TESTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

General DAVIS. The biggest advantage we have, sir, is our brains and our ability to look ahead. We need that group out there looking ahead. I might as well take this next one on head on. [Laughter.]

We read a lot in the paper about test bans, and I think the American public loses track of the benefits of testing. Since about 1967, the size of the stockpile has gone down from [deleted] warheads, down to about [deleted].

Just as important, the megatonnage has been reduced by 75 percent of the 1960 level. Sir, that is significant, because when you think of collateral damage and the damage that we could do to targets that we are not shooting at, it is rather significant.

We made them safer and smaller. We have insensitive high explosives. [Deleted.]

[Deleted.]

General DAVIS. It is important that we better understand the nuclear weapons effects so that we can build and modernize our equipment to survive on the nuclear battlefields.

We have just a great bunch of scientists, sir, down there at the national labs and, like I said, I am not a scientist, but I recognize and appreciate talent. I have been working with them for a couple of years and they have my utmost respect and confidence.

We have a deterrent in which not only the United States has confidence, but also our allies.

Chairman HATFIELD. General, I want to commend you on this qualitative analysis. We get so many quantitative comparisons made between we and they with red and blue bars that it is good to get a qualitative understanding of some of this comparison which does not always show up in the pure numbers game.

General DAVIS. I have one more chart, sir, if I may, or were you trying to cut me off? [Laughter.]

Chairman HATFIELD. No; you must have been in a classroom, too, at one time.

TESTING MORATORIUM COULD

RESULT IN:

• LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN RELIABILITY OF STOCKPILE • STOCKPILE (AND MEGATONNAGE) INCREASE TO COMPENSATE FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN RELIABILITY

• NO DESIGN/SAFETY/SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS (BECOME STAGNANT)

• MASSIVE BUILDUP OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

• LOSS OF CONFIDENCE OF OUR ALLIES

• LOSS OF OUR R&D EXPERTISE-SOVIETS MAINTAIN THEIRS

• LOSS OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN AN AGING STOCKPILE

IMPACT OF A TEST MORATORIUM

General DAVIS. Sir, I am very concerned about a test moratorium. We say we will lose confidence in the reliability of the stockpile.

Our stockpile is about 13 years old. It is like taking a 13-year-old Chevy, putting it in your garage, putting it up on blocks, and saying, "You know you can change the tires, you can keep it full of gas, check the oil, the spark plugs and everything else, and then 10 years from now, go out in that garage, turn the key, and see if it starts."

Sir, as a soldier, that bothers me. I don't know that it is going to work.

Chairman HATFIELD. If you take care of it along the way and give the new battery some juice and everything like that?

General DAVIS. Yes, sir; but you didn't let me start it over the years. You see, I don't know whether it is going to start or not.

Chairman HATFIELD. I had a great aunt who had a car like that and it started at the time I inherited it. Excuse me, I should have cut you off before this one. [Laughter.]

General DAVIS. There is a danger, sir. I mentioned the decrease in the megatonnage of the stockpile. Here again, as a soldier, if you tell me that it may not do what it is supposed to do 10 years from now, I may say, "Well, heck, I may have to shoot a bigger one or I may have to shoot two to get the job done."

Senator JOHNSTON. General, what percentage of your tests are with the nuclear-directed energy weapons and what percent from your regular weapons?

General DAVIS. Sir, I would like to let General Abrahamson handle that, with your permission. I have a breakout here.