All of this production support and construction is where we reduced the technology base, and this is where the laboratory directors are screaming bloody murder. They say you just can't reduce that tech base any further. It is very difficult here to finitely say, "This is SDI. This is inertial fusion. This is tech base research for other things." They overlap. They contribute to each other. Fundamentally, the development of the physics principals just can't be reduced any more. We delayed the waste treatment and transfer facilities, in some cases moved out a little bit slower to minimize the impact on it here because this is important. We are committed to it and we just can't walk in and say, "Well, I am not going to worry about security or the environment.” Some of these are show stoppers, if you will. The States will close us down if we don't do some of these environmental things. DEFENSE PROGRAMS FY 87 APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST IN CONCLUSION: • STRONG CHALLENGE TO MANAGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX -GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS -IMPROVED COORDINATION AND STRATEGIC -ENHANCED SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY -ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE • STRONG NATIONAL DETERRENT POSTURE MUST BE MAINTAINED DEFENSE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT STRATEGY Mr. FOLEY. So, in conclusion then, sirs, just a brief summary. It is going to be a severe challenge to manage the nuclear weapons complex. Gramm-Rudman came along after I did and that complicated the prob lem. I say without any question at all, that we have improved coordination and planning with DOD. That isn't happenstance. We are making a concerted effort to get on with the blue ribbon task force's recommendations here. We have institutionalized meetings with our lab directors and our field managers. We brought them all in and said, "If there was ever a day, for example, when someone showed up once a year with a basketful of money and said that I will be back next year, those days are long gone." We have to do a better job of our strategic planning. We have to be able to lay out the impact, the different cuts, and changes in our pro gram as we go along. We haven't done that very well in the Department of Defense programs, in particular, and we are going to do that better. We have that all laid out. In the area of enhanced safeguards and security, I have an evaluation team that goes out and reports directly to me, nobody else. I send them on out for a couple of weeks at each one of our installations in accordance with a schedule. One of the things we do is we run a force-onforce. We evaluate them. We pulse the system and see whether or not we could break in and get some nuclear material or simulate a weapon and get it on out of there. We find that it is getting tougher and tougher for our evaluation teams to have any success unless, in some cases, they make use of a simulated insider or a couple of them, or go to some degree where you presume you have cooperation of some number of people from the inside. Even that is becoming more difficult. So anyone who tried to break in and get anything has a very high likelihood of failure without any question. Environmental compliance is upon us whether we like it or not. The Secretary is committed to it. I am committed to it. We have made mistakes along the line. We are smarter now than we were 40 years ago. The environmental requirements are much higher now than they were in years gone by and we have to live with that. We are committed to it. Secretary Herrington is. As I say, he has appointed a new assistant secretary to go out to survey, get a prioritized order on how we are going to do all these different things, and now we have to get on with it. Strong national deterrent posture must be maintained. We all agree with that. There isn't any question about that. That concludes my presentation. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have. Chairman HATFIELD. Thank you, Admiral Foley. I think we will proceed to complete the panel and then we will pose the questions. [The statement follows:] STATEMENT OF SYLVESTER R. FOLEY, JR. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to make my first appearance before you in support of the FY 1987 Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Activities Appropriations request of $8.2 billier. This request includes about $600 million for the Naval Reactor Program which Admiral Mckee will discuss. As the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, I am responsible to Secretary Herrington for the Department's nuclear weapons research, development and testing, weapons production, nuclear materials, defense waste management and safeguards and security programs. I would like to share my personal views and discuss the severe challenges we face to effectively plan and execute our critical National Security Program. The Department's funding request for FY 1987 reflects this Administration's commitment to a strong national defense capability while recognizing the need for fiscal restraint. I will briefly describe the Defense Programs mission, the essential programs, and the thrust of our policies to achieve our goals. My programmatic Deputy Assistant Secretaries will be available to provide testimony or answer questions related to their specific plans supporting this effort. It is our responsibility to provide and maintain this Nation's Nuclear Weapons Complex with sufficient capacity and capability to support national policy objectives and to assure a prudent level of flexibility ir national security options. Nevertheless, I am committed to the long-term goals of this Administration to reduce and eventually eliminate ruclear weapons as instruments of war. In the near term we must maintain a strong national deterrent posture. Congressional support over the years has been the key to successful execution of our responsibilities within Defense Programs. The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense jointly assess nuclear weapons requirements to assure essential new weapon deliveries are made within the necessary fiscal constraints of today's environment. Further we must accommodate other critical activities such as safeguards and security and environmental compliance within those same fiscal constraints. Our budget request for FY 1987 therefore specifically supports the following: Meet the weapons production requirements provided by the President's annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. Continue to support the national Strategic Defense Initiative Program. Assure the continued availability of nuclear materials in the near- ano long-term. Conduct a vigorous and balanced research, development, and testing program. Continue safe management of radioactive waste and make progress in implementing final disposal actions. Accommodate increasing requirements associated with safeguards and security and assure environmental and safety compliance are maintained. Continue to restore, revitalize, and maintain Department of Energy facilities to meet essential current and future requirements. Our very best efforts are required to manage these programs as effectively and efficiently as possible. Sound business practices and the careful review of requirements to meet essential program needs are the primary objective of Defense Programs management. I stress the word "essential" because we must make tough choices among competing programs and each choice must be absolutely necessary. In regard to the FY 1986 impact of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation, ! personally share the Administration and the Congressional desire to ccrtro? the budget deficit; however, this legislation will have a significant but manageable impact on our priority program activities. We are working closely with the Department of Defense and the National Security Council to adjust our production and research, development and technology programs to achieve a balance with requirements for new weapons development and deployment of new systems. In spite of our best efforts the reduction of $352 million will impact some key production and research efforts. Because of the reductions in FY 1986, we must adjust our plans in order to mitigate impacts in FY 1987 and beyond. Our Defense Programs priorities reflect the primacy giver to overall national security objectives related to meeting the needs reflected in the Stockpile Hemcrardum and to research in support of the Strategic Defense Initiative. We need to continue to maintain a strong research and development technical base to support the future while continuing to revitalize our research and development facilities. It is also vitally important to maintair and modernize our production plants to operate effectively and efficiently, as we ensure productier capacity necessary to meet operational schedules. Finally, we must continue to make progress to assure facilities and materials are secure and safe from potential adversary actions and that environment and safety concerns are quickly detected and corrected responsibly and cost effectively. Defense Programs is requesting an Appropriations of $7.6 billion which will allow growth of about 10 percent after adjusting for inflation and GrammRudman-Hollings. In the research, development, and testing program, the increase is primarily attributed to research to support the Strategic Defense Initiative, which focuses on nuclear driven directed energy weapons concepts. Inertial fusion weapons activities will also be integrated into the technology base. Increases in weapons production/workload are associated with eight different types of nuclear warheads and bombs for the Department of Defense and to maintain weapons currently in the stockpile. These increases also provide for underground nuclear tests, an essential part of our research, development, and engineering program. Testing is needed to evaluate and |