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integrity which have been the hallmark of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program since its inception.

We have had a wide margin of superiority over the Soviets in all aspects of submarine warfare. Though the Soviets outnumber us, we have been able to count on technical superiority to help even the odds. The Soviets have now substantially closed that gap, and are near technical parity in undersea warfare. Last year I told you they had introduced four new attack submarines in the last three years. We now know that the latest has substantially reduced our performance margin. For years we have had the best people and the best submarines, but if this trend continues, the principal difference may only remain in the skill of the operators.

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Many will probably view these reports of Soviet improvement with suspicion are they really that good? Others have asked how the Soviets could achieve their present levels of performance when many intelligence indicators predicted this would not happen until the next decade. Why were we "surprised"?

My

Well, the Soviets are that good, and we are not surprised. principal feeling after the first intelligence briefing on the new Soviet boats was one of great disappointment, because it was clear that we were party to the event. In the mid-1970s, the Soviets saw what the 688 Class could do and immediately redoubled their efforts to catch up. The product of that effort is now at sea and operating well.

Even so, we are not yet too late. 688s will have a tough time with the best of the new Soviet submarines, but they will still be able to handle them for a while. It is with the next

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Soviet generation in mind that we have laid the groundwork for

SEAWOLF.

More has been done to tailor SEAWOLF to specific military

She will be

requirements than any submarine since NAUTILUS. quieter, faster, and more powerful than any of her predecessors. The Naval Reactors Program is developing a propulsion plant which will deliver significantly more power at about the same size and weight as our existing plants. The SEAWOLF reactor will be more efficient and quieter at all speeds than any preceding plant. She will also have significantly improved secondary machinery.

We need SEAWOLF as soon as possible. Our initial intention was to seek a Fiscal Year 1987 authorization for the first of the class, but fiscal pressures and the technical challenge inherent in the design made it clear that a Fiscal Year 1989 authorization was better. The present schedule will get her to sea in Fiscal Year 1995, and we are on schedule. Contract design will be completed this fall, and competition for detailed design will follow. The design of all major propulsion plant equipment is well along, as is the test program that supports design decisions for long lead components. Fiscal Year 1987 advance procurement funds are needed for equipment, including the reactor plant, which is critical to meeting the ship construction schedule.

We are proceeding at a very deliberate pace for the sake of economy and technical conservatism. We are spending more time in

submarine.

the design. and development phase of SEAWOLF than for any prior To put that in perspective, consider the crew who will man the ship. SEAWOLF's first Commanding Officer is currently a junior Lieutenant. He has probably just qualified in submarines. His Executive Officer is probably an Ensign. The CPOs are Second or Third Class petty officers. The rest of the officers and crew are still in high school and college.

At the same time, we are mindful of the difficult budget

situation this year. Major uncertainties have been inserted into

the process.
The choices will be hard, but arbitrary pro-rata
cuts are not the answer. Some things are inherently more
important than others. Safety and operational effectiveness
deserve special attention. Like any good banker, we should
invest our available funds in those things that provide the
greatest return.

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And no matter how tight things get, we can't afford to neglect the future. SEAWOLF is a critical investment one which must be made now. We are late, but not yet too late to preserve our advantage. We must support what we have set in motion. Otherwise, we will concede superiority in one of the few areas where we now hold an unequivocal advantage. Even more, we may also put our entire strategic and tactical investment in nuclearpowered ships at risk.

A man who owns a fine home cannot afford to skip his insurance

payments he puts at risk not only his most important

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investment, but also perhaps his way of life, all for relatively small short-term savings. The same thing can happen to the

nuclear Navy.

Congress has always recognized this, and has

supported the Program well.

Naval Reactors Development Budget Request

The Fiscal Year 1987 budget contains the funds I need to do my part toward getting SSN-21 to sea. In Fiscal Year 1987, our Advanced Fleet Reactor work begins to coalesce, with continued development of new fuel concepts and the procurement of prototype reactor components. Many of these components will be tested for acceptable noise performance in dedicated laboratory facilities

prior to their installation for testing in an operating reactor

plant.

The eight prototype naval reactor plants are essential to the design, development, and proving out of new concepts instrumental to improving naval reactor plant performance. Only by operating resulting developmental items in a controlled, land-based

environment can we prove them sufficiently to warrant a committment to shipboard use. Servicing the prototype plants is necessary to continue their safe and effective operation -- these plants are also one of the essential elements in training the Navy's nuclear plant operators.

The

Our Fiscal Year 1987 budget request includes $529.8 million for Operating Expenses, a fourteen percent increase over my Fiscal Year 1986 appropriation, as adjusted by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Roughly a third of the increase is due to escalation. remainder comes from the need to do greater amounts of servicing on more prototype plants, replacing significant equipment for the Advanced Test Reactor in Idaho, and continuing to build the Advanced Fleet Reactor prototype core and components.

Capital Equipment requirements in Fiscal Year 1987 are $51.7 million, a growth of $26.4 million. The majority of this increase is to replace a scientific computer system at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. Fiscal Year 1987 Construction funding has decreased $34.2 million from Fiscal year 1986, due to completion of the Materials Facility and Modification sand Additions to Prototype Facilities construction projects. The details of the request by major area are:

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The Advanced Fleet Reactor, which will power the next generation of attack submarines, will be a higher power reactor incorporating the latest quieting techniques. The majority of the Advanced Fleet Reactor effort involves reactor development work, which will include: completion and qualification of component and system designs and fabrication of the prototype core and components; completion of the final design for the core instrumentation, reactor vessel and closure assembly and associated reactor equipment; shock test of a full size dummy core module; and preparation for component and system testing.

An extensive technology effort is carried out to develop and test materials, nuclear fuels and poisons, computer programs, design concepts, and manufacturing techniques; obtain and evaluate data from operating plants and ensure reactor plant safety. Development of improved materials and higher density fuel and poisons is of central importance to achieving high power, longer life cores and better reactor components. Improved materials, fuels and poisons allow designers new approaches to optimize core depletion rates while minimizing adverse material conditions. An acceptable design requires an optimum balance between the competing requirements of performance,

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