!

Why e

tions are

not easily chang'd.

fon, or abuse it: this Power feems to be included in the very Notion of created Liberty.

VII. It appears from hence how cautiously Elecvery thing tions ought to be made; for tho' nothing pleases to be cho- us but what is chofen, yet we do not only take defen, and light in choofing, but much more in enjoying the things why Elec- chofen, otherwise it would be the fame thing whatever we choose: we must take care then that our Elections be made of fuch things as we may always enjoy. For if they be of perishable Objects, or fuch as are not in the least answerable to the end of the Elector, he that chooses them muft neceffarily grieve at the Disappointment. He may avoid this, will fome fay, by changing his Election, when the thing chofen perifhes or fails, but it is to be obferv'd that Elections are not chang'd without a Senfe of Grief and Remorfe. For we never think of altering them till we are convinc❜d that we have chofen amifs. When therefore we are disappointed of the Enjoyment of that which we have chofen, we defpair, become miferable, penitent, and confcious of an Evil Choice, and then at last begin to alter our Choice, which cannot be done without an anxious and uneafy Senfe of Disappointment, and the more and longer we have been intent upon any Election, so much the greater Pain it will coft us to be forced to change it. Hence proceeds the Difficulty which we feel in altering Elections; hence many had rather perfift in abfurd Elections than undergo the trouble of altering them: For things please us because we will them, but to reject what we have once willed is contradicting ourfelves, and cannot be done without a very dilagreeable

greeable struggle and convulfion of the Mind: as any one may learn from Experience. (61.)

NOTES.

SECT.

(61.) Any one that attentively confiders the Workings of his own Mind, will foon be fatisfy'd of the Truth of all that our Author here advances; he will obferve what difficulty and re. luctance he feels in receding from what he has once firmly refolv'd upon, tho' perhaps he can perceive no manner of Good in it except what arifes purely from that Refolution. To make a Vifit at a certain time; to walk to any particular place; to recreate ourselves with this or that kind of Diversion; may be Actions in themfelves perfectly indifferent and trivial: but when once propofed, even upon mere whim and caprice, and refolv'd on with as little reafon, they become often as much the Objects of our Hope and Defire, the thoughts of profecuting them give us as great pleasure and fatisfaction, and we are as unwillingly withdrawn from them, and as much difappointed when we fall fhort of the fancied enjoyment of them, as we fhould be in Matters of the laft Importance. Every Man that has taken the leaft notice of what paffes within him, is able to give numberless Inftances of the truth of the foregoing Obfervation: which may ferve to convince us how great the force and power of Volution is, and what excellent fe it may be of in Life. How it fupplies us with courage and conftancy in the most arduous Undertakings, and enables us to furmount the greatest Difficulties: how it qualifies and alleviates our Pain, and augments the Sum of our Happiness; and makes us run contentedly the Round of low and otherwife tedious pursuits, and bear with pleasure the otherwife infupportable load of human Woes. This fhews the great ufefulness and neceffity of fuch a Principle, and will lead us to confider with our Author, in what a cautious manner it ought to be exerted, left it fall upon wrong and improper Objects, and thereby, instead of leffening, increase our Mifery, and become itself the greatest part of it. That this Principle of Liberty, tho' frequently attended with these confequences, is yet a Gift worthy of the most beneficent Donor, mult appear from a general computation of its Good and Evil Effects, with regard to the whole Sy stem, which will be the Subject of the following Sections..

SECT. V.

How Evil Elections are confiftent with the Power and Goodness of

God.

SUBSECT. I.

Propofes the Difficulty, with a Preparative to the Solution of it.

The Evils I. of FreeAgents are

WE

E have fhewn that moral Evils arise from undue Election; that Elections are free; not necef- and that it is not at all neceffary for any one knowfary, and ingly and willingly to purfue the worfe. Moral therefore Evils cannot therefore be excufed by neceffity, as feem to be the natural ones, and thofe of Imperfection are. by God 'Tis plain that created Nature implies Imperfectivoluntari on in the very terms of its being created (fince ly.

permitted

what is abfolutely perfect is very God) either therefore nothing at all must be created, or fomething imperfect. We have fhewn that by the fame Neceflity Natural Evils are annex'd to things naturally imperfect, and that God, agreeably to what infinite Power and Goodness required, permitted no manner of Evil in Nature, the abfence whereof would not have introduced more or greater Evil. Since therefore Inconveniencies attend either the presence or absence of it, God made that which

was attended with the leaft. There are no Evils then which could poffibly be avoided, and therefore they must be look'd upon as neceffary, fince the Imperfection of a Creature did not admit of pure and abfolute Good. But this Neceffity does not appear in free Agents: For the Evils incident to them seem to proceed, not from imperfection of Nature, but free Choice, and are therefore permitted by God voluntarily, fince neither the Nature of Things, nor the Good of the Universe require the permiffion of them: that is, the World would be as well without as with them.

no necef

nor are of

any ad

II. 'Tis to be obferv'd, that God permitted the Moral Eformer kind of Evils because they were infeparable vils have from things; either therefore the things must not fary conhave been created, or their inherent Evils tolera- nection ted; But Evil Elections have no neceffary connec- with a free tion with the free Acts of the Will: neither does Nature, the Nature of Man require that he should choose amiss: nor does any benefit accrue to him from vantage to thefe Elections which could not be obtained with- it. \ out them, as it does in Hunger, Thirft, Fear, and the rest of the Paffions; for without these Affections, as was fhewn, the Animal would foon perish; but no Evil would befal us (nay what Good would not?) if we always attended to Reason, and never chose amifs. Since therefore Man might bring the greatest pleasure to himself, and exercife his faculties by choofing always well, how comes it to pass that God fuffers him to hurt himself and others unneceffarily by Evil Elections? If it be faid that a Power of choofing either Side is contain'd in the very Notion of Liberty; this must be allow'd, but yet there seems to be room enough for the Exercise of Liberty, tho' the Will were confin'd to the choice of what is lawful and convenient; what need is there then of fuch a Power as may extend to the choice of Evil?

III. This

Here then lies the ftrefs of

III. This feems to be the hardest point, the main stress of the Difficulty, viz. Whence come the Diffi- Moral Evils; i. e. thofe that are not neceffary? If culty, viz. they be faid to be neceffary, how are they free? why did If they be not neceffary, why does God permit God per them? The latter feems repugnant to the Goodnefs of God, the former to the Nature of a free which are Agent.

mit those

Evils

neither ne.

ufeful?

We don't know fo

as of ma

fore are

lefs pre

pared for an An

fwer to

pure

IV. It must be confefs'd, that we are less preparcefiary nor ed for a Solution of this Difficulty than the former; for the Nature and Syftems of the Intellectual World are lefs known to us than thofe of the much of ly Material one: Material Objects furround us, and the Nature occupy all the Inlets to Knowledge, and are the onof think ly things that immediately affect our Senfes. They ing Beings intrude upon us with an infinite Variety, and proterial ones duce many and various Senfations in us. But of inand there- tellectual Beings of their Operations, or of the mutual connection between them, we have but very few, and those very obfcure Notions, viz. fuch as arife only from the reflection of our Understanding upon itself, or are collected by the ufe of Reafon deducing one thing from another: For, of all intellectual Beings, our own Mind alone is immediately perceiv'd by us; nor can we (as in Bodies) compare the Notions arifing from it, with them that proceed from other Sources: all our Knowledge therefore of Spirits or thinking Beings is derived from this alone. 'Tis no wonder then if we be very much in the dark in our Reasonings about these and their Operations: and do not fo clearly perceive the neceffity of allowing Free-Will to them, as contrariety in the Motions of Matter; hor fo easily apprehend what Inconvenience would follow from reftraining the exercife of Liberty, as we fee the confequence of taking away the motion of Matter. We know that without Motion the

this Difficulty, than

to the former.

whole