fince it is of no more ufe in Nature than if it were nothing at all; that which is purely paffive in its Vol. II. A a Opera NOTES. You'll fay it does this to prove its own Power, and the pleasure attending fuch proof is the ftrongest Motive in these Cafes. I anfwer, that granting this to be fo (which yet is not very probable, as appears from what was obferv'd from the Efay on Consciousness in Note 45.) yet this, as our Author ob. ferves, must be a Motive of its own creating, which, with refpect to Volition, is the fame as none at all. Nay this is the very thing we are endeavouring to prove, viz that the Soul has a power of determining to think or act, and of pleafing itfelf in fuch determination, without any other Motive or Reafon but what is produced by itfelf, and follows that very determination; without any external Caufe whatsoever; in which Power all its Liberty confifts, and the greatest Part of its Happiness, as will appear in the next Section. Nor fecondly, will fuch a Power as this only make us liable to mistake the true Good which is in things (as the Author of the Philofoph. Enquiry and Leibnitz argue) but on the contrary, it often makes true Good or Happiness in thofe things which of themselves had none at all; and improves those things which have, and alleviates thofe which have the contrary Qualities; and of confequence is not an Imperfection, but a very valuable and neceflary Perfection. Our Author does not fuppose us left to an abfolute, blind indifference in all Objects (as Leibnitz often urges) without any Guide or Direction in the Choice of them; which would indeed be an Imperfection; but affirms that the Mind or Man is fenfibly and neceffarily af fected by fome, and informed by his Understanding of the Nature and Effects of others, and fo is fufficiently directed to the Choice of thefe which are in themselves good and agree ble to his Conftitution, and vice verfa; yet ftill with the refervation of a full Power of following or not following that Guide, of neglecting or refufing that Direction: Which Power therefore, even in thefe Cafes, remains fill unaffected. In other Objects, he fhews that the Man is totally indifferent, which yet, by an arbitrary Choice, he can make to be no lefs conftituent Parts of his Happiness. Whence, in the third place, a reply may be form'd to the common Question, What Benefit is there in a Power of choofing freely among things that are really indifferent, and exactly alike? We answer the Benefit of enjoying any one of them; which . Operations is one degree more perfect, but that which has the Principle of its Actions within itself, fince it approaches, as it were, nearer to God, and is more independent, is alfo more of itself, i. e. it seems to be made for its own fake, and chiefly to refpect its future Benefit, and on that account to be more noble and perfect. Nor does it seem poffible for a greater Perfection to be communicated than the fruition of fuch a Principle. The more free any one is, and the lefs liable to external Motions, the more perfect he is: God has therefore multiply'd this kind of Creatures as far as the Syftem and order of his Work allow'd, and decreed NOTES. which Enjoyment a Man could not poffibly have without fuch a Liberty, but must neceffarily hang in perpetual Sufpenfe, without any Choice at all? This Leibnitz owns to be an una voidable confequence of his Opinion [r.] and to avoid this Abfurdity, is driven to a greater, viz. to deny that there are any fuch indifferent and equal things in Nature [s] the contrary to which has been abundantly evinc'd already with respect to both God and Man. Laftly, to the Argument against the Poffibility of fuch a Liberty, fo frequently repeated by the two Authors above mention'd, viz. that Actions done without any Motive, would be Fffects without a Caufe; We reply, in fhort, that it is a plain Petitio Principij, in fuppofing Motives to be the real physical efficient Caufes (and thefe are the only Caufes which can concern the prefent Queftion) of Volition or Action, which we deny and yet are far from fuppofing thefe Acts to be abfolutely without a Caufe; nay we affign them another, and affirm that their only true and proper Caufe is this felf-moving Power, and the only Caufe of this is the Creator who communicated it. On this Subject may be feen Dr. Clarke's Demonftrat. p. 136, &c. 2d Edit. or his Remarks, &c. p. 28, &c. or Chubb's farther Reflections on Natural Liberty. Collection of Tracts, p. 388, &c. [r] Elais de Theodice, p. 161, &c. See bis 4th Letter to Dr. Clarke. decreed that fuch as are paffive in their Operations fhould be fubfervient to thefe. Happiness of the Fa II. Since therefore Happiness, according to the common Notion of it, is granted to arife from a arifes due use of those Faculties and Powers which every from the one enjoys; and fince this Power of determining proper ufe ourfelves to Actions, and pleafing ourselves in culties, them, is the most perfect of all, whereby we are . If the most conscious of our Exiftence and our Ap. therefore proach towards God, our chief Happiness will a Power confift in the proper ufe of it, nor can any thing fing be the be abfolutely agreeable to us but what is chofen. moit no(T.) It is to be confefs'd that many external Ob- ble of all, jects, telt Hap A a 2 of choo the grea Finefs will confift in the Exercise of it, i. e. in Elections. NOTES. (T.) Against this it is objected, 1ft, That the Author here defcribes Free-will to be a Power of choofing this or that without any dependence either on the other Faculties or Attributes of the free Agent, or on the Qualities of external Objects. Anfwer, The Author never faid or imagin'd that Liberty was a power to choofe in all Cafes without any dependence on the other Faculties or the Qualities of Objects, but the direct contrary; viz. that all other Faculties of the Agent were to be confider'd, his Appetites confulted, and the fitness of Objects obferv'd. He exprefly teaches that if a free Agent choose any thing contrary to the natural Appetites without any Cause, he gives himself unneceffary trouble, if any thing above his power to compafs, or impoffible in the Nature of things, he makes himself fo far unhappy. That which the Author maintains is only this, that Goodness is the Agreement of a thing to fome Appetite, and that agreement may either arise from the natural fitness of the Object to the Appetite, or the Appetite's accommodating itfelf to the Object; that God has given us a power in many Cafes, and indeed in the most common Affairs of Life, to accommodate our will to things; that this is done by our choofing, them and whatsoever, we so choose, if we can enjoy it, as long as the Choice continues, will please us; and laftly, that this power is of mighty advantage to us; for we can't expect that things fhould always anfwer our natural Appetites, and therefore fince it is unreasonable all the World fhould jects, many that are offer'd by the Senses, please us; but if we look into the thing more narrowly, this NOTES. fhould be made to accommodate us, it is a great Benefit that God has given us a power to accommodate ourselves to the things as we find them; if we make a right use of this power we may be always happy, for we may always choofe fuch things as we can enjoy, and reject those that can't be had, and if we do fo we may be always pleased. Thus things may become Good or Evil to us by our Choice and our Happiness or Mifery will depend upon it. Now he that would in earnest confute this Notion has but one of these two things to do, either firft, to fhew that there is no fuch Power or Faculty poffible, or 2dly, That there is no advantage in it. I will put the rambling Objections that I have met with in as good a method as I can, tho' they are generally fo little to the purpose, that it is harder to bring them in than answer them. 2dly, Therefore it is urg'd that we know by experience that to make a Man please himself in his Choice, it is not neceffary that he fhould believe that he is not infenfibly and imperceptibly directed to it by fome external Caufe; and the inference from this, if intended against the Author, must be, that therefore a Man's choofing a thing doth not make it pleafing to him: but nothing like this follows; all that can be juftly inferr'd is that whether a choice be free or neceffitated it is fufficient to make the thing chofen agreeable. It were in vain to produce all the Inftances impertinently brought to prove that a neceffitated choice may please us. Yet to fhew how ftrangely fome Authors can wander from the point I will examine one or two of them. First, it is faid, if a Man fhould upon mature Deliberation refolve on a thing, and whilst about to execute it, on a fudden a strong impetuous thought comes into his Mind to do something else, and he follows that and fucceeds, he would conceive an extraordinary Joy; for he muft imagine that God, a good Angel or his good Fortune had prompted him to do it, and therefore it is not his Choice pleases him. I answer, First, it is plain fuch a Man alters his Choice, and makes a new one, and that new one pleases him; if his former Choice continued, he cou'd not have made the new one, this will appear to arife from hence only, that these are as Motives which induce us to exert an one, nor would the doing the thing he is about otherwife fatisfy him. But 2dly, We muft diftinguish between the Choice and the means of obtaining it. When once the Choice is made, the most easy and effectual ways of obtaining the thing chosen please us beft. A Man is to fight a Battle, his choice is to conquer, he thinks of means to execute it. Several ways occur and he pitches upon one, which pleases and is chofen not for itself, but as fubfervient to his defire of Victory. An Angel appears and directs him to another: none can doubt but this will caufe extraordinary joy in him, because it brings him to obtain his Choice by the most certain and infallible means. Now this is fo far from proving that Choice is not the thing that gives goodness to Objects, that it directly proves the contrary. For here the only thing that makes him reject what his reason propofed to him as the belt means to obtain his Choice, is becaufe he has difcover'd a better. On the other Hand, if a General out of treachery should defign to lose a Battle, and it happened in the hurry that he thou'd be forced to do something that gain'd it, he would not please himself in the Action. Here's sa Victory that is good to one and ill to another, and the difference lies plainly in the one's choofing and the other's rejecting it. But 2dly, 'tis objected, that a Janfenift or Calvinist who gives an Álms, and is perfuaded that God infpires him to do fo, is better pleased with himself than a Stoick, who attributes to himself all the Glory of a charitable action. Well what then? Therefore things do not please us because we choose them. No fuch matter. A true Chriftian, call him Fanfenist, or what you will, chocfes to prefer the Glory of God to his own, and therefore he is better pleafed to think the Glory of what he does belongs to God, than to himself, as this is more agreeable to his Choice. In fhort all the Intances I have feen are of the fame Nature, and if there were a thousand of them they all receive the fame answer, they are nothing to the purpose, and prove no more than that Men are best pleased with the most effectual means to obtain their Elections. But 3dly, It is alledged that if the Happinefs of Man conifts in his Choice, God ought to have left him fairly to that Choice, |