rily both do and fuffer, not what he himself, but what the determining Caufe has effected in him: NOTES. But being relative to Appetite that is to be reckon'd the best Creature by us, which has the ftrongest Appetites and the furett means of fatisfying them. And tho' the fubftance in Creatures is chiefly to be regarded as contributing to their Perfection, yet we have no way of measuring the Perfection of the feveral Sub, ftances but by their Qualities, that is by their Appetites, whereby they become fenfible of Good and Evil, and by their Powers, whereby they are able to procure thofe Objects whence they receive that Senfe of things which makes them happy. Tis plain therefore that whatever Syftem we fuppofe in Nature, God might have made another equal to it, his infinite Wisdom and Power being able to make other Creatures equal in every respect to any we know, and to give them equal or ftronger Appetites, and as certain or more certain ways of fatisfying them. We fee in many Cafes that very different means will answer the fame End. For Example, a certain Number of regular Pyramids will fill a Space, and yet irregular ones will do it as well, if what we take from the one be added to another and the fame thing may be done by Bodies of the moft irregular and different Figures in the fame manner: and therefore we may very well conceive that the answering of Appetites, which is all the natural Good that is in the World, may as well be obtained in another Syftem as in this, if we fuppofe that where the Appetites are chang'd, the Objects are alfo fuited to them, and an equal Agreeableness among the Parts of the whole introduced; and in an infinite Number of poffible Worlds I do not fee why this may not be done in infinite Ways by infinite Power and Wifdom." If then it be acknowledged that there might have been infinite other Worlds, or even but one, equal to this in all refpects as to goodness, there cou'd be no Obligation in Nature on God to create one rather than the other, and therefore nothing cou'd make one more agreeable to him, that is better, than another but his Choice. We muft either own that there cou'd be no fuch World at all, or that God muft for ever deliberate which of the poffible Worlds he fhould choofe, or elfe his Determination must proceed from his own arbitrary choice, and he must be allow'd the Liberty to please himself by choofing. In fhort it is eafy to fee that Men who propofe fuch Schemes wou'd drive all Liberty out of the World, and pin down God in But this Goodness (which is fuppofed to be in things antecedent to the Divine Election, and to determine NOTES. in all his Actions to a fatal neceflity. They allow no Caufe but what is neceffarily either Agent or Patient, which if it be to allow a God, 'tis fuch an one as is a mere Machine, and can neither help himself nor his Adorers. 'Tis plain if this were fo there could be no fuch thing as moral Good or Evil in the World, the very Effence and Idea of it is loft, and we fhould be no more obliged to a God that acts neceffarily for the good we receive from him, than we are to the Sun for the benefit of its Light and Heat. I know 'tis urged that where there is no external motive to determine the Will, there only Chance mult do it, which is to admit an effect without a Caufe. I answer that it is the Nature of a free Agent to be the Caufe of its own Actions, without being impell'd by any thing without itfelt. The choofing a thing gives it the goodness to this Being, and it chooses a thing, not because it was antecedently an Object apt to please it, but because it intends to make it fo. When it is objected that fuch an Agent chooses without reafon, I answer, itself is the reafon to itself of its acting, that is it acts to exercife its Faculties, the exercife of which causes the fenfe of Pleasure; and where there are feveral ways of exercising its Faculties and all indifferent, to show the Dominion over its own Actions, that is its Liberty, it takes the way it chooses; nor is it lea fonable to expect it fhould lie idle till it find a Reason why it fhould act one way rather than another, when in truth there is no fuch Reafon, the Objects being to the Agent abfolutely indifferent, and therefore amongst infinite poff b'e Worlds, there was no Reafon poffible or imaginable to determine God to make this rather than any other befide his Will; he chofe it, and therefore it pleases him, and he may destroy it when he will, and that will likewife please him. If it be ask'd is there then nothing Good or Evil in respect of God? I anfwer there is, viz. the acts of his own Will ; they please him, and whilst that Will cont nues, every thing which croffes it, or tends that way, is Evil or difpleafing to him. Thus it is his Will that we fhould have freedom of choice in many things; and he has fet certain limits to our Choice to prevent our hurting ourselves or others by choosing amifs. Therefore it would be contrary to our Nature to take away the ufe of Free-will from us, and fince it is his will to give cause he whole determine it) is fomewhat External, with regard to the Will of God; if therefore that be the Caufe which determines the Election, it follows that the act of Election and every thing that depends upon it is neceffary, But if VII. But if things be good and agreeable to things are God for this only reafon because he has chosen to good be- make them fo, he himself will be at liberty, his has chofen whole Work will be free. The World will be to make produced, not by neceffity, but choice; neither them, his will it be impoffible to be effected, tho' it be in itfelf unprofitable to the Deity, for he will have a complacency in his own Choice. And from hence it fufficiently appears of how great Importance it is, that all the Goodness of the Creatures fhould depend on the Divine Election, and not that upon the Goodness of them, for we fee that by this means Fate is deftroy'd and Liberty establish❜d. Work will be free. External VIII. Fifthly, If he expected no advantage, things are you'll fay, from the Objects of his Choice, why in them- fhould he choose them? Is it not more probable felves ab- that he fhould do nothing at all, than bufy himfolutely felf in things that are like to be of no benefit? I answer, indifferent to God, but he has a complacency in his Choice. NOTES. give us fuch a Nature, 'tis likewife his will to continue the use of our Freedom: It would likewife be contrary to the Will of God for us to use our Freedom to mifchieve our felves or others, and therefore we conceive that every one who thus mifufes his Freedom incurrs the displeasure of God. But then 'tis plain that in all acts which we conceive pleafing or difpleafing to the Deity, we derive the Reafon of their being fo from the Confideration of their agreeableness or oppofition to his Will: and we derive the Knowledge of that will from nothing but the Manifeftation God has made of it, either by the Nature that he has been pleased to give the Creatures, or elfe by Revelation. So that after all we have no measure of Good or Evil, but the Will of God. I anfwer, That it is no more trouble to him to will things than not to will them; and hence it comes to pass that when he wills them, they exift; when he retracts that Will, they drop into nothing. Which reason, as it fuppofes an indifference of things in refpect of God, fo it afferts his Liberty to produce or not produce them, and proves that that will be agreeable to him which he fhall choose. But we have a better yet at hand, viz. that God chose to create external things that there might be fomething for him to delight in without himfelf. For every one receives Satisfaction from the Exercife of his Powers and Faculties. (53.) Now God NOTES. (53) This reafon is very confiftent with what our Author had deliver'd in C. 1. §. 3. par. 9, 10. where he afferted, that the end and intent of God in creating the World, was to exercife his feveral Attributes, or (which is the fame thing) to communicate his Perfections to fome other Beings: which Exercife or Communication could proceed from no other Caufe befide his own free Choice; and therefore he must be abfolutely and phyfically indifferent to it, in the fame refpect as Man was Thewn to be indifferent towards any Action [2] only with this disparity, that Man, as a weak inperfect Agent, may easily be imagin'd to will Abfurditiesor Contradictions, but God cannot be fuppofed to will or act either inconfiftently with his Nature and Perfections,, or with any former Volition (as our Author observes in the 12th and following Paragraphs) and confequently cannot be faid to be indifferent to fuch things (as fome have misunderstood our Author) any more than he is indifferent towards being what he is. Leibnitz urges farther [.] that it could not be in any fenfe indifferent to God whether he created external things or not, fince his Goodness was the Cause (according to our Author himself in the place above cited) which determin'd him to the Creation. But what do we mean by his Goodness here? Is it any thing more than an intent to exercise his Attributes, or an Inclination to communicate his Happiness [a] See Note 45, and 49, and Ole Theol. Nat. p. 246. [b] Remarques, P. 473. ་ God is invested with infinite Power, which he can exercise innumerable Ways, not all at once indeed for NOTES: Happiness or Perfection And is not this the very Determi- Exercise, |