and be inherent in Objects, fo as to render them agreeable or difagreeable, antecedent to the Election, the Happiness of this Agent will also depend upon them; and unless the whole Series of things be fo order'd, that nothing can happen contrary to his Appetites, he must fall fhort of Happiness. For his Appetites will be difappointed, which is the very thing that we call Unhappiness. But if Objects derive their agreeableness or difagreeableness from the Choice, 'tis clear that he who has his Choice may always enjoy the thing chosen, (unless he choose Impoffibilities, &c.) and never have his Appetite fruftrated, i. e. be always happy. Not that all things are indifferent with refpect to this Power, for it admits of fome Limitations, as was obferv'd, by chocfing beyond which it must neceffarily fail of Happiness.

An imperfect un

derfland

ing is fuf

between

XXI. Twelfthly, It is to be obferv'd that Agents, whofe Felicity depends upon the agreement of external Objects to their Appetites, ftand in need of a perfect and almoft infinite Knowledge to ficient for his happicomprehend distinctly all the relations, habitudes, neis, if he natures and confequences of things; if they come do but difhort of it, it is impoffible but that they must often finguish fall into pernicious Errors, and be disappointed of poffibilitheir Defires, that is be often miferable: Hence ties, and anxiety and difquiet of Mind muft neceffarily a- impoffibirife, and they would be agitated with continual lities, doubts and uncertainty, left what they choose things, agreeable should not prove the best. Thefe Agents then and difawere either to be created without a profpect of Futu- greeable rity, or to be endow'd with a perfect Underftan- to the ding; if neither were done, they muft of neceffity confult be very miserable; for we can fcarce conceive a his Abili greater Mifery than to be held in fufpenfe about is. Happiness, and compell'd to choose among Objects not fufficiently known, in which nevertheless

fenfes, and

Tho' Li

berty would be a preju

a Mistake would be attended with unavoidable Mifery. There's none but is fufficiently apprehensive how anxious, how folicitous, how miferable it must be to hang in such a doubt as this; but if the agreeableness of things be fuppofed to depend upon Election, a very imperfect understanding will ferve to direct this Agent, nor need he to comprehend all the natures and habitudes of things: for if he do but diftinguifh poffible things from impoffible, those things which are pleasant to the Senfes from them that are unpleasant, that which is agreeable to the Faculties from what is difagreeable, and confult his own Abilties, viz. how far his Power reaches; (all which are easily discover❜d) he will know enough to make him happy. Nor is there need of long deliberation, whether any thing to be done be the very beft; for if the Election be but made within these bounds, that will become the best which is chofen.

XXII. He that enjoys the Principle of pleafing himself in his Choice cannot reasonably complain of Nature, tho' he have but a very imperfect Understanding; for there will always be Objects edice to o- nough ready to offer themselves within these gents, yet bounds, upon which he may exercife his choice, it is a fure and please himself: that is, he may always enjoy founda- Happiness. Tho' Free-will then be of no ufe, as Happiness was faid before, to an Agent capable of being de

ther A

tion of

to this, whose

ence depends not on Ob

jects, but

Election.

termin'd only by the convenience of external things, nay, tho' it be pernicious, as only tending to pervert Reafon and produce Sin; yet to an Agent whofe convenience does not depend upon the things, but the choice, it is of the greateft Importance, and as we have feen, the fure and only Foundation of Felicity. And from hence it appears how valuable and how defirable fuch an active Principle as this would be.

clear e

XXIII. All this feems to be coherent enough, Thefe clear enough, and easy to be understood, tho' fome things are may look upon it as a little too fubtle. It remains nough, that we enquire whether this be a mere Hypothefis tho' they without any Foundation in fact, or there be really may apSuch a Principle to be found in Nature. (51.) SUBSECT. fubtle.

NOTES.

(51) For an Explanation of our Author's Principle of Indifference, above what has been faid in Note 49 and will be en. larged on in Note 59. we fhall only obferve here, that most of the objections brought by the Author of the Philofophical Enquiry, p. 69, &c. are built upon the old blunder of confounding this Indifference as apply'd to the Mind, in refpect of its Self-determining Powers of willing or acting, with another, which is falfly referr'd to the paffive Powers of Perception and Judgment. With refpect to the former Faculties all things are phyfically indifferent or alike, that is, no one can properly affect, incline or move them more than another; with regard to the latter, most things are not indifferent, but neceffarily produce Pleasure or Pain, are agreeable or difagreeable, whether we choose them or not: Our Author is to be understood only in relation to the former, in this and the following Sections, tho' he often uses general terms.

pear to be

a little too

Godis fuch

as this.

SUBSE C T. IV.

That there is an Agent who is pleas'd with Objects only because he choofes

I.

them.

E have feen in the former Subfection,

Wthat fome things are adapted to the Ap

an Agent petites by the conftitution of Nature itself, and on that account are good and agreeable to them; but that we may conceive a Power which can produce Goodness or Agreeableness in the things, by conforming itfelf to them, or adapting them to it: hence things please this Agent, not because they are good in themfelves, but become good because they are chofen. We have demonftrated before, how great a Perfection, and of what ufe fuch a Power would be, and that there is such a Power in Nature appears from hence, viz. we must necessarily believe that God is invefted with it.

Because nothing external is either

before

Election.

II. For in the firft place, nothing in the Creation is either Good or Bad to him before his Election, he has no Appetite to gratify with the Engood or joyment of things without him. He is therefore bad to him abfolutely indifferent to all external things, and can neither receive benefit nor harm from any of them. What then fhould determine his Will to act? Certainly nothing without him; therefore he determines himself, and creates to himfelf a kind of Appetite by choofing. For when the Choice is made, he will have as great attention and regard to the effectual procuring of that which he has

chofen,

chofen, as if he was excited to this Endeavour by a natural and neceffary Appetite. And he will efteem fuch things as tend to accomplish these Elections, Good; fuch as obftruct them, Evil.

Will is the

III. Secondly, the Divine Will is the Caufe of Because Good in the Creatures, and upon it they depend, his own as almost every one acknowledges. For created Caufe of Beings have all that they have from the Will of Goodness God; nor can they be any thing else than what in the he willed. 'Tis plain then that all thefe are con- Creatures: formable and confonant to his Will, either efficient or permiffive, and that their original Goodness is founded in this Confonancy. And fince all things proceed from one and the fame Will, which cannot be contrary to itself, as it is reftrain'd within its proper bounds by infinite Wisdom, 'tis alfo certain that all things are confiftent with each other, that every thing contributes as much as poffible to the preservation of itself and the whole System; which we must reckon their fecondary Goodness. All the Goodnefs then of the Creatures is owing to the Divine Will, and dependent on it, for we cannot apprehend how they could be either Good or Evil in themselves, fince they were nothing at all antecedent to the act of the Divine Will and they were as far from being good with regard to God himself, till upon willing their Exiftence he by that act of Election both conftituted them Good in relation to him; and by an unity of Will made them agreeable to one another. 'Tis evident that the Divine Will was accompanied in this, as in all other Cafes, by his Goodness and Wildom; but it proceeds immediately from his Will that things please God, i. e. are Good. For many things are not agreeable to his Goodness and Wisdom purely because he did not will them, and while he does not will any thing, it cannot be good.

From