Actions

are abfo

X. If it be granted that this is the Nature of If this be our Elections, there is no doubt but all our Acti- fo, all our ons are really and truly neceffary. For as to the proper Actions of the Will, to will or fufpend the lutely neAct of Volition, the Men whom we are speaking of, ceflary. give

NOTES.

Thought or Motion: this is generally directed by, and an immediate confequence of Volition, on which account feveral Authors have confounded them together; but tho' they be properly both Acts of the Mind, yet they are certainly distinct ones; the Willis an ability of choofing fome particular Thoughts or Motions, Agency is a power of producing thefe Thoughts or Motions pursuant to the act of choice, or of putting that choice in execution. A careful diftinction between these will help us to judge of all fuch Authors as have either ufed them promifcuoufly or been content to treat of the laft only, as most of those Perfons have that are cited in the 14th and following Pages of the Philofophical Enquiry.

Thefe two laft then being the only active Powers, or rather the only Powers at all, are the only proper fubjects of Liberty: to which again it is variously apply'd. With regard to the Will, fome content themselves with afferting its Freedom from external Compulfion only, from being forced contrary to its own bent and inclination. And indeed it would be very ftrange to fuppofe it otherwife: For to fay that it may be drawn a contrary way to that which the Mind prefers and directs, is to fay, that it may tend two contrary ways at once, that a Man may will a thing against his Will, or be oblig'd to will what at the fame time he does not will: but then fuch a Freedom as this equally belongs to the two former Powers, which cannot be forced to perceive or judge otherwife than they do perceive or judge, otherwife than as Objects appear, and their own Natures require; it may be apply'd to any thing the most neceffary, nay the more neceffary the better. Others therefore have contended for an abfolute exemption of the Will from all imperceptible Byafs or Phyfical Inclination, from all internal ncceffity, arifing either from its own frame and conftitution, the impulfe of fuperior Beings, or the operation of Objects, Reafons, Motives, which appear'd to them the very effence of human Liberty, the fole Foundation of Morality. And indeed thefe feem to be the only Perfons that speak out, and to the Point, as shall be shewn in the following Notes,

Lastly,

give up Liberty with refpect to these, while they affert that it does not belong to them. For they are of Opinion that when any thing is proposed by the Understanding to be done, we either will it, or fufpend the Act of Volition concerning it, according to the profpect of Happiness or importunity of the Uneafinefs which appears to the Mind, in the prefent State and Circumftances; by these therefore our Election, according to them, is determin'd,

XI. But

NOTES.

Laftly, a great many will confine their Idea of Liberty to Action only, and define it to be a power of either actually taking up or laying down a Thought, of beginning Motion or ftopping it according to the preference of the Mind or Will. But if this be all the Liberty we have, 'tis of small confequence, fince we are confcious that in fact all fuch Actions, fuppofing the Organs to be rightly difpofed, follow the deter mination of the Will; and alfo, that in reason they are no farther moral, nor we accountable for them than as they do fo; we must therefore go up higher than this before we come at any valuable Liberty; and the main Question will be, Whether Man is free to think or refolve upon; to will or choose any thing propofed, as well as to exert his other Faculties in confequence of fuch Refolution, Will, or Choice. This is the only Point worth difputing, and wherein all Moral Liberty must confift; and indeed if it be not here 'tis no where. For if the Mind be abfolutely determin'd to choose in a certain manner in any given Circumftances, its other fubordinate Faculties will immediately operate, and the feveral Actions which depend thereon all follow by neceffary confequence. Nay, upon this Hypothefis there is properly no fuch thing as choice or Action in Man; but all are Paffions propagated in a chain of neceffary Caules and Effects. And indeed all who fuppofe any external Determination of the Will (meaning always a neceflary and irrefiftible one) whether they place it in the Defire of Good, Anxiety for the abfence of it, or the laft Determination of the Judg ment, are involv'd in the fame confequence, how many Steps foever they may take to remove the Difficulty. For it is equal to me, if what I call my Choice or Action be neceffary, whereever that Neceflity be placed. 'Tis the fame thing whether I

be

ons are

on.

XI. But when the Election is made, if we can That hueffect what we will, then they fay we are free, in man Actirefpect of fuch Actions, not from neceflity, but free, not only from Compulfion; for it is plain that no- from Nething but our will is wanting to the exertion of ceffity, but them, and fuppofing us to will them, they necef- Compulfifarily follow. For instance, when nothing hinders a Man from walking but his own Will, fuppofing this Volition, it cannot be conceiv'd but that he muft walk, nor can he reft while this continues. If therefore, according to them, all acts of the Will are neceffary (as being determin'd from without, viz. by the convenience or inconvenience of things or circumstances) the actions of the inferior faculties will be no lefs neceffary, for they will depend on the fame circumftances and acts of the Will, which, as they are neceffary, thefe actions will

NOTES.

be acted upon and over-ruled by one immediate Caufe, or drawn on by feveral fucceffively. Suppofe, v. g. that I am neceffitated to obey the laft refult of my own Judgment. From the Existence of things follow certain Appearances, thofe Appearances caule certain Perceptions, thefe Perceptions form a Judgment, this Judgment determines the Will, and this Will produces Action. All this is fix d and inevitable, every Link of the Chain is equally neceffary, and 'tis all one to me on which my Determinations hang: Tis as good to take them from the first as last, from the Exiflence of outward Objects as from my own Will; fince the fuppofed choice or action is in reality as much out of my power, or as incapable of being alter'd or prevented by me, as the exiftence of external things. 'Tis eafy to obferve how destructive this and the like Schemes muft prove, as well of Morality as Liberty, both which must stand and fall together, and can, I think, only be fecured effectually upon the Principles laid down by our Author; of which in their proper place.

See alfo Mr. Chubb's Reflections on Natural Liberty. Colletion of Tracts, p. 379, . or Notes 45, 48, 59:

According to

will be neceffary alfo. (43.) Tho', according to them, therefore, there be no Compulfion of the Will, yet there is Neceffity, from which Neceffity nothing in the World will be free; nay a great many of them openly profefs to believe that this is the Cafe.

XII. Now, from this Hypothefis, which they extend to the Divine as well as Human Will, the their Opi nion there following Corollaries feem deducible. First, that is no con- nothing in Nature could be done otherwise than it tingency in is. For, the whole Series of things being as it things, were connected together by Fate, there's no Room anything for Chance or Liberty, properly fo call'd: Contingency then is removed out of Nature.

nor could

be done

otherwife than it is.

XIII. Se

:

NOTES.

(43) To call an Action neceffary, is properly fpeaking to affirm, that it is no Action: For by the Word Action we mean an immediate effect of what is metaphorically tiled a Self-moving Power or the exercise of an ability which a Being has to begin or determine a particular train of Thought or Motion. Now the Idea of this Power in any Being, and of fuch ́exercise of it, is directly repugnant to that of Neceffity, which supposes the Thought or Motion to be already begun or determined, and to be obtruded on this Being by fomething else, and confequently implies a Negation of any fuch Self-moving Power in this Being, or of its exercife by this Being in the Cafes above mentioned. To be an Agent (fays Dr. Clarke,*) fignifies to have a Power of beginning Motion, and Motion cannot begin neceffarily, becaufe Neceffity of Motion fuppofes an Efficiency fuperior to, and irrefiftible by the thing moved, and confequently the beginning of Motion cannot be in that which is moved neceffarily, but in the fuperior Caufe, or in the efficiency of fome other Caufe ftill fuperior to that, till at length we arrive at fome Free Agent" Where, tho' the Doctor's Definition of Agency feems to be imperfect, that Word generally including the power of beginning reflex Thought as well as Motion (which are two diftinct Species of Action, and proceed from different Powers, tho' they be often confounded together and comprehended

6

* Remarks on the Philofophical Enquiry, p. 6.

under

derstand

XIII. Secondly, That nothing more can be un- By Evil derstood by wicked or wrong made Elections, than they un-i that they are prejudicial to the Elector or fome o- nothing thers; which Senfe is very remote from the vulgar more than one; for in that Evil Elections are blamed, not for hurtful. being hurtful, but for being hurtful without Neceffity, and because they are made otherwife than they ought to have been: In this Hypothefis then there

is

NOTES.

under the fame general term) yet it fhews us an evident contradiction in thefe two Words neceffary Agent, in either Senfe: Unless he uses the Word Agent in both Senfes together, and then his Reasoning will be falfe, fince what is acted on and determin'd by another in regard to its Will, or Thought, and in that Senfe mov'd by a fuperior Efficiency, may yet have a power of beginning real corporeal Motion (which is a quite different fort of Action) in confequence of fuch pre-determin'd Will, or Thought, and in that fenfe be an Agent, tho' not a moral one. But what ever the Doctor might mean by the Word Agent, his Argument will hold in either of these two Senses separate, viz. that nothing can be faid to act either in thinking or moving, which does not properly begin the train of Thought or Motion, but is put into Thought or Motion by fomething else, and alfo, that every thing cannot be fo put either into Thought or Motion; and therefore that there must be fome firft Caufe of both.

And will not the fame Argument hold equally for fome first Caufe of Existence? If the Doctor can fuppofe a firft Cause of all Thought and Motion (as he does here, and we think very reafonably) why may he not alfo fuppofe a firft Cause of all Existence; and fo entirely exclude that antecedent Neceffity which he has often Recourse to as a kind of fupport of the exiftence of the first Caufe, but is oblig'd to exclude from its Will and Actions? Is it harder to conceive how an Eternal Independent Being, or Firft Caufe, may exist without any antecedent Neceffity, than how it can will or act without any?

But to return to the chief Defign of this Note. We fee how neceffary it is to fix the precife meaning of the Word Action in a Controverfy of this kind, and if the Signification of it as laid down above be allow'd, then neceffary Action is the fame as paffive Action, or beginning a thing and not beginning it at the fame time, and in the fame refpect; in which terms every one perceives it to be a contradiction.