in this Senfe, the Perfon is alfo faid to die; but tho' the Perfon may be thus call'd a refult from both, yet the Perfonality must determin only in one: That is to say it must be either his Soul thinking after fuch a particular manner, by the ufe of fuch particular Organs; or else it must be the Body only, fo peculiarly modify'd, as to distinguifh the Thoughts of one Man, from those of another. But then this is not the Adequate, tho' it is the ufual Notion of PerJon; for ftill the Perfonality may be preferv'd, if the Self-confcioufnefs is fo, in the feparation of Life or Soul from the Body. The difference between these two Notions is only this, the one places Perfonality in the fame Self-consciousness, the other more reftrainedly, and indeed more improperly, in the fame manner of being Self-conscious. 2ly, By the Creation of this Person of Man, must be understood, according to the Mofaic History, the breathing or infufing Soul or Life into his Body; for Man is faid to be made at fome diftance of time from the Creation of the Earth, out of which his Body was taken; but the præexifting Parts of his Body, hinder not this subsequent Act, from being properly call'd his Creation; because that, in which his Perfonality con→ fifts, was then made out of nothing. Therefore 3dly, By reviving the fame Man, must be be understood the re-infufion of the fame Life or Soul into that fame Body; I menti on the fame Body, as an Article of reveal'd Religion; for, according to the Sense I have given of Perfon, I do not think the fame Body requifite, in order to make the fame Perfon live again; but only to make him the fame Perfon, under fome of the fame Circumstances he was in, when alive before, (which I think rationally accounts for' the defign of the Refurrection) because I am perfuaded he will continue the fame selfconfcious Being, when strip'd of his Body. However Eftibius must grant that the fame Life or Soul, is abfolutely requifite to make up the fame Perfon; who will be the fame after the Refurrection, notwithstanding his Coeleftial Body, as much as he is now the fame, thro' all the gradual Changes of his prefent Body. From hence we may easily collect what fort of a Resurrection, I do not fay Eftibins, but his Hypothesis makes; it plainly makes a re-creation, and that cannot be of the fame Perfon. For, in Order to have the fame Perfon live in any two different States, I maintain it abfolutely neceffary, that he continue the fame felf-confcious Being, thro' the intermediate State, whatever it be, which leads him from one to the other. For what was his first Creation more than enlivening his Body? And what is his fecond less than reviving of it? But now the fame Action repeated, does not bring back into Being the fame Perfon, who in any point of Time or Duration, had quite loft his Being: For Life, according to this Notion, is only an accident to the Body in which it is; but it is demonstrative, or rather self-evident, that Accidens non migrat de Subjecto in Subjectum; and if the fame Life which is in my Body, cannot poffibly be communicated to any other Body; then neither can it be recommunicated to my own when loft, tho' but for a Moment; for, in that Moment, it must exist without it's Subject, which is impoffible an Accident fhou'd do. This is plain in all parallel Cafes; a white Body for instance turn'd to any other Colour, can never regain the fame Numerical Whitenefs, tho' we suppose every particle of it to be exactly difpos'd as it was before; but only a Colour of the fame fpecies or kind, but now a Specific Refurrection, is indeed no Refurrection at all; fuppofing the numerical Body that is now enliven'd do then revive, it may re-affume the Title of Man, and fo the fame kind of Being is restor'd, but it is not the fame Peter or John reviv'd, nor can any individual be restor'd from not being, without a Contradiction. Eftibius Eftibius feems to have been fomewhat aware of this Confequence, when he talks of Life centring in God, and fo returning to Man; but this, as I have faid, is only an unintelligible piece of Cant, if he wou'd have it to return to God, in any other fenfe than all extinct Accidents do; which indeed is in no Senfe at all; for how, or in what proper Senfe that which centers in nothing, can center in him whofe effential Character is I am, Eftibius will never fatisfy the World; and therefore having fo often inculcated the not being, and the ceafing to be of Human Soul, he must confefs that the centring again in God are meer Words, which carry no Senfe or Idea with them, and much lefs are they explanatory of the Author's Senfe. It is certain all Life was originally in God; but let Eftibins fhew me what difference there is between his Intermediate Staté, and that preceding the Creation; or between the Life return'd to God, and that which was never communicated by him; and then let him prove that reviving of Man, is not a new Creation; or elfe let him make a new Creation confiftent with the identical and individual Nature of the Perfon; and when he has done that, I fhall crave leave to withdraw this Article; but till then, let him quote as much as he pleases out of Scripture, I must charge charge upon him the most pernicious fort of Deifm, that which denies all future Rewards and Punishments. And tho' he shou'd reply, that these are only fubtle Metaphyfical Notions, of Perfon, Identity, &c. Yet I must continue the Charge; for are they true? If fo, the Mifchief is furely there this only fhews it lies the deeper, and there is no Mischief lies fo deep, but fome will dive into it. But truly I think the Confequence does not lie fo far beyond the common reach; it requires no great depth of Reafon for a Man to be altogether unconcern'd for his Body while it lies in the Grave; and the cafe is much the fame, as to the reviving of it; for it is not I that carry guilt with me into the other World; my Sins are blotted out, with my Being I am neither concern'd in that Action of God Almighty upon my Body, whereby he will revive it, nor can he make thofe new-liv'd Particles remember that they liv'd in a former World, if annihilation of Life intervenes; for in that State of new Being they can remember no farther backward, than that Being extends: Or if he fhou'd imprefs upon them all their former Guilt, it is not I that remember the Fact, but a new Person, punish'd with the Remembrance of what I did; I my felf being no more concern'd |