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XII.

Indeed, the archduke's despatches arrived at CHAPTER the very time when the Spanish general, having Marches out strengthened himself by a reinforcement from the of Barlets. neighbouring garrison of Tarento under Pedro Navarro, was prepared to sally forth, and try his fortune in battle with the enemy. Without further delay, he put his purpose into execution, and on Friday the 28th of April, marched out with his 1503. whole army from the ancient walls of Barleta; a spot ever memorable in history as the scene of the extraordinary sufferings, and indomitable constancy, of the Spanish soldier.

The road lay across the field of Cannæ, where, seventeen centuries before, the pride of Rome had been humbled by the victorious arms of Han

Louys XII., p. 171.- Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 75.-D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 32.

According to the Aragonese historians, Ferdinand, on the archduke's departure, informed Gonsalvo of the intended negotiations with France, cautioning the general at the same time not to heed any instructions of the archduke till confirmed by him. This circumstance the French writers regard as unequivocal proof of the king's insincerity in entering into the negotiation. It wears this aspect at first, certainly; but, on a nearer view, admits of a very different construction. Ferdinand had no confidence in the discretion of his envoy, whom, if we are to believe the Spanish writers, he employed in the affair more from accident than choice; and, notwithstanding the full powers intrusted to him, he did not consider himself bound to recognise the validity of any treaty which the other should sign, until first ratified by himself. With

these views, founded on principles
now universally recognised in Eu-
ropean diplomacy, it was natural to
caution his general against any un-
authorized interference on the part
of his envoy, which the rash and
presumptuous character of the lat-
ter, acting, moreover, under an un-
due influence of the French mon-
arch, gave him good reason to fear.

As to the Great Captain, who has
borne a liberal share of censure on
this occasion, it is not easy to see
how he could have acted otherwise
than he did, even in the event of
no special instructions from Ferdi-
nand. For he would scarcely have
been justified in abandoning a sure
prospect of advantage on the au-
thority of one, the validity of whose
powers he could not determine, and
which, in fact, do not appear to have
warranted such interference. The
only authority he knew, was that
from which he held his commission,
and to which he was responsible for
the faithful discharge of it.

PART

II.

Distress of

the troops.

nibal, 16 in a battle, which, though fought with far greater numbers, was not so decisive in its consequences as that which the same scenes were to witness in a few hours. The coincidence is certainly singular; and one might almost fancy that the actors in these fearful tragedies, unwilling to deface the fair haunts of civilization, had purposely sought a more fitting theatre in this obscure and sequestered region.

The weather, although only at the latter end of April, was extremely sultry; the troops, notwithstanding Gonsalvo's orders on crossing the river Ofanto, the ancient Aufidus, had failed to supply themselves with sufficient water for the march; parched with heat and dust, they were soon distressed by excessive thirst; and, as the burning rays of the noontide sun beat fiercely on their heads, many of them, especially those cased in heavy armour, sunk down on the road, fainting with exhaustion and fatigue. Gonsalvo was seen in every quarter, administering to the necessities of his men, and striving to reanimate their drooping

16 Neither Polybius (lib. 3, sec. 24, et seq.), nor Livy (Hist. lib. 22, cap. 43-50.), who give the most circumstantial narratives of the battle, are precise enough to enable us to ascertain the exact spot in which it was fought. Strabo, in his topographical notices of this part of Italy, briefly alludes to "the affair of Canna" (rà gì Kawas), without any description of the scene of action. (Geog., lib. 6, p. 285.) Cluverius fixes the site of the ancient Cannæ on the right bank of

the Aufidus, the modern Ofanto, between three and four miles below Canusium; and notices the modern hamlet of nearly the same name, Canne, where common tradition recognises the ruins of the ancient town. (Italia Antiqua, lib. 4, cap. 12, sec. 8.) D'Anville makes no difficulty in identifying these two, (Géographie Ancienne, Abrégée, tom. i. p. 208.) having laid down the ancient town in his maps in the direct line, and about midway, between Barleta and Cerignola.

XII.

Encamps be

fore Ceri

spirits. At length, to relieve them, he commanded CHAPTER that each trooper should take one of the infantry on his crupper, setting the example himself by mounting a German ensign behind him on his own horse. In this way, the whole army arrived early in the afternoon before Cerignola, a small town on an gnola. eminence about sixteen miles from Barleta, where the nature of the ground afforded the Spanish general a favorable position for his camp. The sloping sides of the hill were covered with vineyards, and its base was protected by a ditch of considerable depth. Gonsalvo saw at once the advantages of the ground. His men were jaded by the march; but there was no time to lose, as the French, who, on his departure from Barleta, had been drawn up under the walls of Canosa, were now rapidly advancing. All hands were put in requisition, therefore, for widening the trench, in which they planted sharp-pointed stakes; while the earth which they excavated enabled them to throw up a parapet of considerable height on the side next the town. On this rampart he mounted his little train of artillery, consisting of thirteen guns, and behind it drew up his forces in order of battle. 17

17 Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 253-255. — Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 5, p. 303.- Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 75, 76.-Zu rita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 27. - Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 256.- Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 16, 17.

Giovio says, that he had heard Fabrizio Colonna remark more than once, in allusion to the intrench

VOL. III.

10

ments at the base of the hill, "that
the victory was owing, not to the
skill of the commander, nor the
valor of the troops, but to a mound
and a ditch." This ancient mode
of securing a position, which had
fallen into disuse, was revived after
this, according to the same author,
and came into general practice
among the best captains of the age.
Ubi supra.

PART

II.

Nemours pursues.

Before these movements were completed in the Spanish camp, the bright arms and banners of the French were seen glistening in the distance amid the tall fennel and cane-brakes with which the country was thickly covered. As soon as they had come in view of the Spanish encampment, they were brought to a halt, while a council of war was called, to determine the expediency of giving battle that evening. The duke of Nemours would have deferred it till the following morning, as the day was already far spent, and allowed no time for reconnoitring the position of his enemy. But Ives d'Allègre, Chandieu, the commander of the Swiss, and some other officers, were for immediate action, representing the importance of not balking the impatience of the soldiers, who were all hot for the assault. In the course of the debate, Allègre was so much heated as to throw out some rash taunts on the courage of the viceroy, which the latter would have avenged on the spot, had not his arm been arrested by Louis d'Ars. He had the weakness, however, to suffer them to change his cooler purpose, exclaiming, "We will fight to-night, then ; and perhaps those who vaunt the loudest will be found to trust more to their spurs, than their swords;" a prediction bitterly justified by the

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While this dispute was going on, Gonsalvo gained time for making the necessary disposition of his

18 Brantôme, Euvres, tom. ii. disc. 8. Garnier, Histoire de France, (Paris, 1783–8,) tom. v.

pp. 395, 396.- Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 244. - St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., p. 171.

troops. In the centre he placed his German auxil- CHAPTER

XII.

iaries, armed with their long pikes, and on each The Spanish wing the Spanish infantry under the command of forces." Pedro Navarro, Diego de Paredes, Pizarro, and other illustrious captains. The defence of the artillery was committed to the left wing. A considerable body of men-at-arms, including those recently equipped from the spoils of Ruvo, was drawn up within the intrenchments, in a quarter affording a convenient opening for a sally, and placed under the orders of Mendoza and Fabrizio Colonna, whose brother Prospero and Pedro de la Paz took charge of the light cavalry, which was posted without the lines to annoy the advance of the enemy, and act on any point, as occasion might require. Having completed his preparations, the Spanish general coolly waited the assault of the French.

forces.

The duke of Nemours had marshalled his forces The French in a very different order. He distributed them into three battles or divisions, stationing his heavy horse, composing altogether, as Gonsalvo declared, "the finest body of cavalry seen for many years in Italy," under the command of Louis d'Ars, on the right. The second and centre division, formed somewhat in the rear of the right, was made up of the Swiss and Gascon infantry, headed by the brave Chandieu; and his left, consisting chiefly of his light cavalry, and drawn up, like the last, somewhat in the rear of the preceding, was intrusted to Allègre.19

19 Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 76. Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Vi

rorum, fol. 253-255. — Ulloa, Vi-
ta di Carlo V., fol. 17.

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