8 XIX. ly pressed by the Neapolitans to visit his new do- CHAPTER minions, soon after the conquest. He now went, less, however, in compliance with that request, than to relieve his own mind, by assuring himself of the fidelity of his viceroy, Gonsalvo de Cordova. That illustrious man had not escaped the usual lot of humanity; his brilliant successes had brought on him a full measure of the envy, which seems to wait on merit like its shadow. Even men like Rojas, the Castilian ambassador at Rome, and Prospero Colonna, the distinguished Italian commander, condescended to employ their influence at court to depreciate the Great Captain's services, and raise suspicions of his loyalty. His courteous manners, bountiful largesses, and magnificent style of living were represented as politic arts, to seduce the affections of the soldiery and the people. His services were in the market for the highest bidder. He had received the most splendid offers from the king of France and the pope. He had carried on a correspondence with Maximilian and Philip, who would purchase his adhesion, if possible, to the latter, at any price; and, if he had not hitherto committed himself by any overt act, it seemed probable he was only waiting to be determined in his future course by the result of King Ferdinand's struggle with his son-in-law." 8 Summonte, Hist. di Napoli, tom. iv. lib. 6, cap. 5. 9 Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 276.- Ábarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 16. – Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. - 5, 11, 17, 27, 31; lib. 7, cap. 14. PART II. He sails for These suggestions in which some truth, as usual, was mingled with a large infusion of error, gradually excited more and more uneasiness in the breast of the cautious and naturally distrustful Ferdinand. He at first endeavoured to abridge the powers of the Great Captain by recalling half the troops in his service, notwithstanding the unsettled state of the kingdom 10 He then took the decisive step of ordering his return to Castile, on pretence of employing him in affairs of great importance at home. To allure him more effectually, he solemnly pledged himself, by an oath, to transfer to him, on his landing in Spain, the grand-mastership of St. Jago, with all its princely dependencies and emoluments, the noblest gift in the possession of the crown. Finding all this ineffectual, and that Gonsalvo still procrastinated his return on various pretexts, the king's uneasiness increased to such a degree, that he determined to press his own departure for Naples, and bring back, if not too late, his too powerful vassal. 11 On the 4th of September, 1506, Ferdinand embarked at Barcelona, on board a well-armed squadron of Catalan galleys, taking with him his young and beautiful bride, and a numerous train of Aragonese nobles. On the 24th of the month, after a boisterous and tedious passage, he reached the port of Genoa. Here, to his astonishment, he was 10 Mariana, Hist. de España, lib. 28, cap. 12. — Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 6, cap. 5. 11 Zurita, Ánales, tom. vi. lib. 7, cap. 6. Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. iv. p. 12, ed. di Milano, 1803. Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 30, cap. 1.- Giovio, Vite Illust. Virorum, p. 280.- Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 9. XIX. Oct. 1. joined by the Great Captain, who, advised of the CHAPTER king's movements, had come from Naples with a small fleet to meet him. This frank conduct of his general, if it did not disarm Ferdinand of his suspicions, showed him the policy of concealing them; and he treated Gonsalvo with all the consideration and show of confidence, which might impose, not merely on the public, but on the immediate subject of them.12 loyalty. The Italian writers of the time express their Gonsalvo's astonishment that the Spanish general should have so blindly trusted himself into the hands of his suspicious master. 13 But he, doubtless, felt strong in the consciousness of his own integrity. There appears to have been no good reason for impeaching this. His most equivocal act, was his delay to obey the royal summons. But much weight is reasonably due to his own explanation, that he was deterred by the distracted state of the country, arising from the proposed transfer of property to the Angevin barons, as well as from the precipitate disbanding of the army, which it required all his authority to prevent from breaking into open mutiny. To these motives may be probably added the natural, though perhaps unconscious reluctance to relinquish the exalted station, little short of absolute PART sovereignty, which he had so long and so gloriously filled. He had, indeed, lorded it over his viceroyalty with most princely sway. But he had assumed no powers to which he was not entitled by his services and peculiar situation. His public operations in Italy had been uniformly conducted for the advantage of his country, and, until the late final treaty with France, were mainly directed to the expulsion of that power beyond the Alps.15 Since that event, he had busily occupied himself with the internal affairs of Naples, for which he made many excellent provisions, contriving by his consummate address to reconcile the most conflicting interests and parties. Although the idol of the army and of the people, there is not the slightest evidence of an attempt to pervert his popularity to an unworthy purpose. There is no appearance of his having been corrupted, or even dazzled, by the splendid offers repeatedly made him by the different potentates of Europe. On the contrary, the proud answer recorded of him, to Pope Julius the Second, breathes a spirit of determined loyalty, perfectly irreconcilable with any thing sinister or selfish in his motives.16 The Italian writers of the time, who affect to speak of these motives with some distrust, were little accustomed to such examples of steady devo 15 My limits will not allow room for the complex politics and feuds of Italy, into which Gonsalvo entered with all the freedom of an independent potentate. See the details, apud Chrónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 112-127. Sismondi, Républiques Italiennes, tom. xiii. chap. 103. Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. iii. p. 235 et alibi. - Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib 6, cap. 7, 9. Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 7. 16 Zurita, Anales, lib. 6, cap. 11. XIX tion; 17 but the historian, who reviews all the cir- CHAPTER cumstances, must admit that there was nothing to justify such distrust, and that the only exceptionable acts in Gonsalvo's administration were performed not to advance his own interests, but those of his master, and in too strict obedience to his commands. King Ferdinand was the last person who had cause to complain of them. Philip. After quitting Genoa, the royal squadron was Death of driven by contrary winds into the neighbouring harbour of Portofino, where Ferdinand received intelligence, which promised to change his destination altogether. This was the death of his son-in-law, the young king of Castile. This event, so unexpected and awfully sudden, was occasioned by a fever, brought on by too violent exercise at a game of ball, at an entertainment made for Philip by his favorite, Manuel, in Burgos, where the court was then held. Through the unskilfulness of his physicians, as it was said, who neglected to bleed him, the disorder rapidly gained ground,18 and on the 6th day after his attack, being the 25th of September, 1506, he breathed his 17 "Il Gran Capitan," says Guicciardini, "conscio dei sospetti, i quali il re forse non vanamente aveva avuti di lui," &c. (Istoria, tom. iv. p. 30.) This way of damning a character by surmise, is very common with Italian writers of this age, who uniformly resort to the very worst motive as the key of whatever is dubious or inexplicable in conduct. Not a sudden death, for example, occurs, without at least a sospetto of poison from some hand or other. What a fearful com |