Head of Sir Walter Scott.-A friend has placed in our hands an excellent likeness of Sir Walter Scott, which may be found in the July No. of the New York Mirror for 1835. It shows a large head and a very great developement of brain in the anterior and coronal region. This likeness was drawn by the distinguished artist G. S. Newton, Esq., of London, and has been pronounced by the best judges as remarkably correct. As some anti-phrenologists have seen fit to state that the head of Sir Walter "was not large," we will here copy a description of his head by an American gentleman who obtained this likeness of Mr. Newton, and took a careful survey of Scott while he was sitting for his portrait. This gentleman is not a phrenologist, and was merely describing Sir Walter's looks to a friend. "The most remarkable peculiarity," says he, "of his head, is its extreme depth from sinciput to occiput, which I should think was more than nine inches and a half. I am wrong, however, in saying that this was the most remarkable peculiarity of his head; striking as it was, perhaps the eye would be more certainly and quickly caught by the immense pile of forehead towering above the eyes and rising to a conical elevation which I have never seen equalled in bust or living head. You could not look upon that admirably proportioned head-so enormously developed in its anterior portions-without being convinced that the intellect working within was a mighty one."

Notice of Dr. Gall.-Dr. Elliotson, in his large work on Human Physiology, pays the following just compliment to the labors and merits of Dr. Gall: "The indefatigable industry of Gall during the whole of a long life, constantly observing all persons he met with, and searching after all who were in any mental respect remarkable, travelling as he did to most of the prisons, mad-houses, and hospitals of the continent; examining the habits and heads of brutes innumerable for comparison; engaging M. Niklas, Dr. Spurzheim and others, for a pecuniary consideration, to work under him and examine points for him, in the way of reading, dissecting, casting, moulding, and observing persons, is astonishing; and the success and importance of his researches will, I am satisfied, ensure him a place among the greatest names of the human race, although, like every great discoverer and benefactor, he has been loaded with ridicule and abuse."

Head of Carlyle.-We find in the new work of Miss Sedgwickgiving an account of her tour in Europe-several allusions to Phrenology. In describing Carlyle, the distinguished writer, she says: "His head would throw a phrenologist into ecstacies. It looks like the 'forge of thought' it is; and his eyes have a preternatural brilliancy. He reminded me of what Lockhart said to me, speaking of the size of Webster's head, that he had brains enough to fill half a dozen hats.'”

It is with sincere regret we learn that the health of Dr. Andrew Combe is on the decline; he has been troubled for many years with an affectation of the lungs.

ON THE COMPARATIVE MERITS OF PHRENOLOGY, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF

REID AND STEWART.

In the year 1836, à correspondence took place between Professor Alison, P. Neill, L. L. D., and Mr. Geo. Combe, (all of Edinburgh) in reference to the merits of Phrenology, as compared with the philosophy of Reid and Stewart. This correspondence was called out in consequence of there being two rival candidates for the chair of Logic in the University of Edinburgh, whose claims for election were based on entirely different systems of Mental Philosophy. Sir William Hamilton, who proved the successful candidate, is a thorough-going advocate of the philosophy of Reid and Stewart; while Mr. Combe's views of mental science are well known to be based entirely on the principles of phrenology. As the correspondence alluded to, enters pretty clearly and thoroughly into the comparative merits of the two systems of philosophy, we propose to transfer from Mr. Combe's testimonials the more important portions of this correspondence to our pages. Dr. Alison, who took a part in the discussion, is a Professor of Physiology in Edinburgh, and is well known as an able writer on Medicine. Dr. Neill, who was also engaged in it, is a member of several learned societies and is distinguished for his literary and scientific attainments. He appears as the advocate of phrenology in the following letter to Professor Alison:

According to promise, I shall now, as briefly as possible, yet I trust intelligibly, state my reasons for differing from you in regard to Reid and Stewart's philosophy, and for thinking that the credit of our University is so far from being bound up with that system, that it would, on the contrary, be signally promoted by adopting a mental philosophy founded on the discoveries of Gall. It may appear bold in a person situate as I am to venture to differ on such a subject from you; but after having been rather an attentive pupil of Finlayson and Stewart in 1799 and 1800, VOL. III.-34.

and after reading the best treatises in our language, I was led many years ago, by intimacy with Mr. Forster, Dr. Leach, and Dr. Spurzheim, to examine Gall's system with considerable care; and I have also availed myself of the admirable writings and lectures of Mr. Combe. Now, if it so happen that you have not bestowed attention on the new doctrines, and have not examined the evidence on which they are founded, (which I suspect is the case) then, inferior as I feel myself in all other respects, I have here the advantage of you.

In my humble opinion, then, Reid and Stewart's philosophy is. altogether unsound in its basis. It rests on observations made by each individual on his own consciousness, Now, consciousness gives us no intimation of any thing in mental philosophy, except the state of our own minds at the moment when we attend to our inward condition. Some of the consequences of this important fact may here be traced.

1. We cannot thus discover the existence and functions of the mental organs, because consciousness does not indicate their presence in mental operations.

2. We cannot thus distinguish primitive faculties from mere modes of action of the faculties; i. e. if we only had consciousness to guide us in regard to the philosophy of the external senses, we should be led to describe taste, smell, sight, hearing, and touch, all as modes of action, or modes of impression, of the mind generally, and should never discover that they are separate and distinct senses. In like manner, in regard to the internal faculties, the school of Reid mistakes Memory, Imagination, Conception, and Perception, for primitive powers; while the most indisputable facts prove that these are only modes of action of the real faculties, ascertained by the school of Gall, and called in phrenological language Locality, Coloring, Individuality, &c.; each having a distinct organ, and there being, of course, many kinds of memory.

3. In consequence of this radical defect in the basis of Reid and Stewart's philosophy, it can never, I apprehend, become useful, or afford the foundation for any sound logic. For example, if a metaphysician of the Reid school were rather deficient in organs of Conscientiousness, he might be apt to deny the existence of a moral sense; and so of others. Further, in consequence of reflecting merely on his own consciousness, he must remain totally ignorant of many of the active impulses, such as (if you will excuse me for again using phrenological language, which I find the most precise) Combativeness, Destructiveness, Acquisitiveness, Secretiveness, which strongly prevail in the world of real life, but which may possibly never indicate themselves to the philosopher in the calm retirement of the closet. Hence such metaphysicians can never, by

their mode of investigation, arrive at a correct knowledge of all the faculties; for each philosopher will naturally be inclined to deny the existence of faculties in the organs of which he may himself happen to be rather deficient.

4. Reid's philosophy never can give an explanation of the differences between the mental capacity of one nian and that of another, because it is confined in its basis to the mind of the individual who studies it.

5. It cannot possibly explain the phenomena of insanity, because it totally overlooks the organs, by the diseases of which insanity is occasioned, as now admitted by many eminent physicians and physiologists of the greatest experience in asylums.

6. It cannot be applied to the elucidation of the causes of the tendency, of some individuals to one pursuit, and of others to other pursuits; of some to mathematics and others to painting; of some to hoarding and others to profuseness, &c.; because these differences depend on differences in the relative size and on the activity of certain organs, of which that philosophy takes no cognizance.

7. A sound philosophy ought to expound the whole faculties of man, both affective and intellectual, the relations subsisting between them and the external world, physical and mental, and the method by which they may be best applied in the attainment of good, morally—and of truth, intellectually. The philosophy of Reid can never accomplish these ends; because it never reaches the primitive faculties at all, but deals in generalities about their modes of action.

In consequence of the imperfect analysis of the mind thus presented by this philosophy, we would never have been led to think of educating the faculties, feelings, and affections, as is now, by the lights of phrenology, successfully done from the earliest ages in infant schools, up to grammar schools where the teachers have had the good fortune to become acquainted with phrenology.

I entirely dissent from your conclusion, therefore, that phrenology will merely enlarge the sphere of the philosophy of Reid and Stewart. According to my views, phrenology will rather sweep that away; and if we get something more useful, why should we deplore its being so swept away? When I consider the light, which phrenological books are throwing on the causes and cure of insanity, (so interesting in any discussion about mind) on education, on criminal legislation, I clearly perceive the superiority of the new philosophy, and wish it all success. It is perhaps rather a low consideration, but is an important one, that the writings of Dr. Reid and Mr. Dugald Stewart are no longer in demand in

this country, while new editions, of thousands, of Mr. Combe's works are in constant request.*

Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart admitted in general terms, as Professor Alison does, that a connexion subsists between the mind and the brain; but in their whole doctrines the following considerations are overlooked:

1. The influence of the condition of the brain, as to age, size, health, and temperament, on the mental manifestations.

2. The connexion of particular parts of the brain with particular mental faculties.

3. The influence of the size and condition of each particular part on the mental faculty which it serves to manifest.

A description of the phenomena of mind, omitting these considerations, bears the same relation to mental science which a detail of the phenomena of vision, omitting all notice of the structure of the eye and its laws of action, would bear to optics. Science is perfect only in proportion as it embraces and elucidates the causes and relations of the phenomena of which it treats. Tried by this test, the philosophy of Reid and Stewart is extremely defective; for it omits all practical consideration of the material organs of the mind, on the condition of which depend its power of acting in this life, the degree of its vigor, the soundness of its perceptions, and the strength of its different functions.

Not only is it chargeable with these actual deficiences, but its methods do not admit of their being supplied. Mr. Stewart, as I have said, repeatedly refers to our own consciousness as the grand source of information in mental philosophy, to which Professor Alison adds "inferences as to the mental acts of others;" but neither reflection on consciousness, nor inferences regarding the mental acts of others, will enable us to discover the influence of the brain on the mental faculties. We are not conscious of the influence of the organs on the faculties, and, in observing the action of other men, we do not perceive indications of the influence of their brains. We must go a step farther. We must compare the condition as to size, health, age, and temperament of their brains, and of each particular part of them, with their powers of manifesting the mind and its particular faculties; and, whatever "fallacies" this method may be liable to, no progress can possibly be made in discovering the influence of the organization until this shall be done.

Professor Alison is disposed to admit the connection of the fore part

* We here leave the correspondence between Dr. Neill and Professor Alison, to introduce Mr. Combe's letter which discusses more definitely and fully the points at issue. Mr. C. is, therefore, to be credited for the remaining part of this article. ED.