mal economy, "particular purposes" are answered by "particular contrivances," that "as ends vary," so do “means vary." Now what is the inevitable and violent presumption from these premises? Clearly this; that in those cases where structure has not or cannot be ascertained, the same law prevails that every case of difference of function is accompanied by a difference of organization. This presumption can only be rebutted by hostile instances; such instances, however, do not But Professor Smith, instead of adapting his argument to this strong presumption, maintains, in effect, that, because we cannot point out in the brain, precise metes and boundaries, it is not a congeries of organs, notwithstanding the great diversity and dissimilarity of its functions. That is, he maintains, impliedly, that though the ends vary, the means do not vary. He himself speaks of some of the functions of the brain as being more unlike than the "aeration of the blood or the effusion of bile." And yet he holds that these functions are performed by the same organ. A fact more improbable and anomalous, according to his own showing, than it would be for the liver not merely to secrete the bile, but to aeriate the blood; or, for the lungs not merely to aerate the blood, but also to secrete the bile!

2

In the same connection he represents the phrenologist as maintaining that the difference of endowment in the various parts of the brain, is owing to "difference of position merely" in the cerebral matter. And he opposes him with the remark that it is in the highest degree incredible that "the same cerebral atoms, under precisely the same arrangement," should, by difference of opinion merely, become endowed with such different functions. Were such the teachings of phrenologists, they would deserve rebuke. But there exists not a single sentence in any phrenological work ever published that can be so construed as by implication, even, to convey such an assertion. Let Professor Smith, if possible, convict us of error.

How came the professor by the above proposition? Does he mean to express it as a matter of fact that the brain is composed of "the same cerebral atoms under precisely the same arrangement," or does he mean it as a matter of inference from a fact previously stated, namely, that “no anatomist can detect a difference of structure?" If the former be his meaning, it is unwarranted; if the latter, it is illogical. To maintain the former, he must be able to show that the atomic structure and arrangement have been ascertained, and that they are as he states them to be. But can he show this? If his statement that “no anatomist can detect a difference of structure," does not sufficiently negative the question, the professor certainly gives us the answer on page 204, where he says that VOL. III.-23

"the brain from its infinitely delicate and curious structure, is, to our dull perception, very nearly a terra incognita." To maintain the latter, he must show logical consistency between his premises and conclusion But is he prepared to maintain that because we know not the atomic structure and arrangement of the brain, that therefore the structure and arrangement are uniform throughout? This would indeed be strange in a great logician, such as Professor Smith purports to be. And yet to either the erroneous assertion or the illogical reasoning, he is certainly bound.

The fact is that all this talk about atomic structure and arrangement, metes and boundaries, is irrelevant and delusive; for, firstly, investigation has not yet revealed the atomic structure and arrangement of any organ of the animal economy; and, secondly, by organic structure has the functions of no part ever been discovered. Anatomy has, in relation. to function, never done more than corroborated the results of physiological inquiries. So that, after all the professor has said about the matter, a review of facts will bring us to the undeniable conclusion that, as regards those points on which he lays so much stress, we are, in relation to the brain, on the same footing precisely as in relation to the other parts of the animal economy. Every physiologist knows that the ethmoidal nerve takes cognizance of odors; the optic nerve of sights; the portio mollis of sounds; that the glossopharyngeal is a nerve of sensation, and the hypoglossal a nerve of motion; but no one has found out the different organic arrangement of their atoms; no one has ever discovered, in any structural differences whatever, the very slightest reason why each of these nerves is fitted to perform its peculiar function, or why it is unable to perform any other function. The objection that the phrenologist cannot point out the precise metes and boundaries of the organs, is equally futile and frivolous. In relation to one organ, at least, that of Amativeness, it is not true, the metes and boundaries being as distinct as those of the lungs or liver, and the situation and developement of the rest can be clearly pointed out. It is true, however, that the precise boundaries of the cerebral organs have not been discovered, nor has the precise boundary line between Maine and New Brunswick; yet no one doubts that the state of Maine and the province of New Brunswick have a separate existence. But what is more to the point, we know the seat of the gustatory nerve, but no one can tell the boundaries of its ramifications. We know the seat of the olfactory nerve, but no one can trace its limits, nor can any one tell at what exact part of the buccal cavity the nerves of touch terminate. In the same sheath, nerves of sensation and motion are bound up, but they cannot be distinguished from each other, their

metes and boundaries cannot be pointed out. Stronger yet, physiologists agree that the anterior column of the spinal marrow is the seat of the motory tract of spinal nerves, that the posterior column is the seat of the sensory tract of spinal nerves. No one doubts that between these columns there is a mete or boundary; but, though earnestly sought for, no one has been able to detect it. All that can be said is, that the motory tract is bounded posteriorly by the sensory tract, and that the sensory tract is bounded anteriorly by the motory tract; just as the phrenologist says that the organ of Veneration is bounded posteriorly by that of Firmness, and that the organ of Firmness is bounded anteriorly by that of Veneration.* It is no doubt true, as Mr. Solly, in his admirable work on the brain, remarks, that "it is quite possible that perfect distinctness of parts, as regards their function, may exist without any visible line of separation." pp. 153. The objection of Professor Smith might be urged with equal force against distinctness of function in the various parts above mentioned. But to us the true aim of philosophy appears to be, not to accumulate but to remove obstructions; not to give up what we have because we possess not all, but to hold fast that which we possess, while we earnestly strive for higher attainments; not to bury our own talent in the earth because it is not ten talents, but sacredly to guard and profitably to employ it, that our stores may accumulate.

On page 95, the professor brings forward an objection against the plurality of organs in the brain, founded on the complexity of its anatomical structure. He calls particular attention to the commissures which establish a communication between its various parts, and adds: "So complex an apparatus of tracts, chords and bands, affecting so close a union, can lead to no other conclusion than that the sensorium is an intricate machine, destined to perform its functions as an associate whole. Not that every portion of it is on all occasions necessarily and equally employed, but anatomy certainly opposes, so far as it can oppose, the idea of insulation in the operations of the cerebum." To the essential points of this extract, we would ask the attention of the reader.

1. It is here expressly maintained that the brain is complex in its structure; that it is an intricate machine. Now we ask whether this

* Sir Charles Bell maintains that there are three spinal columns; the anterior for voluntary motion; the middle for respiration, and the posterior for sensation. That the anterior portion of the medulla oblongata is for motion, and posterior for sensation, all admit; the existence of a respiratory column, we deem problematical. If it exist, however, it but adds force to the argument in the text, inasmuch as no line of seperation between any two of these columns can be discovered. Anatomical researches throw no light whatever on this question; physiological observations only can determine it.

complexity of structure is not in precise harmony with the complexity of function for which the phrenologist contends. If every part of the brain can perform every function of the brain, difficult indeed would it be to reconcile this complexity and intricacy with the fact, every where 'else confirmed, that nature attains her ends by the most simple and direct 'means.

2. This complexity, says Professor Smith, leads to the conclusion that 'the brain is destined to perform its functions" as an associated 'whole,” NOT, however, that every portion of the brain is, on all occasions, necessarily and equally employed." On the first of these observations we remark, that the intimate association of every part of the brain with every other part, is strictly accordant with the plurality of cerebral organs, for in most mental operations, two or more of these organs have to work simultaneously in associated activity, which renders this intercommuni'cation essential. In relation to the second of these observations, we ask if in any given mental act any portion of the brain be not employed, is it not because the action of that portion would not produce the desired end? And is hot the rest of the brain active because, by its action, the desired result can be attained? Surely an affirmative answer to both questions is the most rational. But still further; may not the part that is active be the part which, according to the phrenologist, constitutes the very organ or organs the action of which would, in the given case, be required? There is, at any rate, (and this is the only position we are here bound to establish,) nothing in the above statements of the professor 'unfavorable to such a presumption.

All preliminary observations, however, seem to have been made for the purpose of adding force to the closing point, namely, "anatomy certainly opposes, so far as that science can oppose, the idea of insulation in the operations of the cerebrum." It will be perceived that the professor himself is very doubtful to what extent, if to any, anatomy can oppose this idea, and that he impliedly excepts the cerebellum from the influence of his observations. But what can the professor mean by "insulation in the operations of the cerebrum," if not the activity of one part while the other is quiescent? He has, however, precluded himself from urging an objection to such insulation, for he has just admitted that all the brain is not in action in every mental operation; and especially is such an objection incompatible with a doctrine laid down by him on page 130, namely, that the anterior lobe of the brain is the especial seat of the reasoning faculty. If, therefore, the professor means that one part of the brain cannot act while the other is quiescent, then does he contradict himself; and if he do not mean this, then we do not know what he means, and consequently cannot answer.

"

In confirmation of the doctrine that one part of the brain may be active while the rest is inactive, we adduce two facts; one resting on the authority of Dr. Smith, and the other readily ascertainable by him. On page 82, the professor mentions a young man who lost a portion of the frontal bone, a distinct osseous edge remaining, after which "close study would cause such internal soreness and external inflammation," as would compel him to desist. "It is quite certain," says the professor, "that here motions of some kind had occurred in the cephalic mass;" that is, of course, in the anterior lobe; the seat, according to phrenologists, of the intellectual organs, and the professor, it will be observed, expressly, limits the cause of such an occurrence to close intellectual action, the influence of the feelings and passions being excluded by this limitation. As a contrast to this, we may refer to a child of Mr, Mapes, a scientific gentleman, who is a member of the Society of Natural History of which Professor Smith is a vice president. At four years of age, she fell from a room window, and her skull was so much fractured that a considerable portion from the posterior superior region had to be removed. The integuments healed over, however, and she recovered. Now, through the integuments, it may be observed that when those feelings are excited the organs of which, according to phrenologists, lie in the region of the fracture, the brain is felt through the integuments to be in a great commotion, but if, when thus excited, the child's attention be drawn to and fixed upon a mathematical problem, a case in which, according to Dr. Smith, "every feeling dies within us," all this commotion of the region disappears, and nothing remains but the regular arterial throb. (Combe's Lecture's on Phrenology, edited by Boardman, pp. 340.) We have heard Mr. Mapes describe the sensation, produced by these motions of the brain as like those produced by the struggling of a leech through the folds of a silk handkerchief. Here, then, we have peculiar motions in the anterior lobe of the brain during intellectual action, and, so far as we can judge from the report of the case, quiescence of this lobe during the activity of the feelings; we have, too, motions in the region of certain sentiments during the excitement of those sentiments, and quiescence of that region during the activity of the intellect. Such cases strongly corroborate the doctrine of distinct cerebral organs, and conclusively. demonstrate that various portions of the brain may be independently active.

(To be continued.)