physical writers have shown themselves strangers to the elements of morals. Such an assertion, unaccompanied by proof, could hardly fail to be regarded, by a generous public, as groundless at least, if not slanderous and dishonourble. To prevent an imputation, therefore, so unmerited and exceptionable, we shall proceed to show that our assertion is true. Nor do we consider the task as either difficult in itself, or doubtful in its issue.

The subject of Mr. Combe's first lecture, is "THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL SCIENCE." And, as respects such "foundation," having first disclosed the views of other writers of the highest order, he then states his own. We shall here give a summary of the whole-a brief one of necessity, but we trust sufficiently clear and abundant in matter to be fully understood, and to accomplish the purpose for which it is intended.

"Our present inquiry," says our author, "is into the basis of morals regarded as a science; that is, into the natural foundation of moral obligation.

"The first observation, then, which I make, is, that there are two questions, very similar in terms, but widely different in substance, which we must carefully distinguish. The one is, what actions are virtuous? and the other, what constitutes them virtuous? The answer to the first question, fortunately, is not difficult. Most individuals agree that it is virtuous to love our neighbour, to reward a benefactor, to discharge our proper obligations, to love God, and so on; and that the opposite actions are vicious. But when the second question is put-why is an action virtuous,-why is it virtuous to love our neighbour, or to manifest gratitude or piety? the most contradictory answers have been given by philosophers. The discovery of what constitutes virtue, is a fundamental object in moral philosophy; and hence the difficulties of the subject meet us at the very threshold of our inquiries. It appears to me, that man has received a definite bodily and mental constitution, which clearly points to certain objects as in themselves excellent, to others as proper, and to others as beneficial; and that endeavours to attain these objects, are prescribed to us as duties by the law written upon our constitution; while, on the other hand, whatever tends to defeat their attainment is forbidden. The web-foot of the duck, for instance, clearly bespeaks the Creator's intention that the creature should swim, and He has given it an internal impulse which prompts it to act accordingly. The human constitution indicates various courses of action to be designed for man, as clearly as the web-foot indicates the water to be a sphere of the duck's activity."

Here Mr. Combe points distinctly, and, in our opinion, correctly,

to the ground-work of morals-to the true reason why some actions are virtuous and others vicious. The native constitution of the human mind is his text; and his commentary on it, which is unanswerable, is a lucid and satisfactory exposition of the point he is discussing. The mind he finds to be an aggregate of different faculties, some of a higher and nobler caste, and others of a lower and less noble one. And to act in conformity to each of these, there exists in every one a propensity, urgent in proportion to the activity and vigour of the faculty itself. Hence there prevails in the mind a perpetual conflict, more or less intense, according to circumstances, between its higher and lower faculties. And virtue consists in actions performed in obedience to the former, and agreeable to them; the cravings of the latter being subdued or disregarded. According to this understanding of the matter, the constitution of the human mind, and its entire and practical accordance with itself and with creation around us, is the genuine source of moral obligation. Conformity in action to that accordance, is virtue; and any intentional departure from it, is vice.

Such are the views of Mr. Combe, and of all other enlightened phrenologists, who have informed themselves on the subject, to the extent it deserves. Such, however, are not the views of the champions of metaphysics. Nor are there, we believe, any two of them who concur with each other in their notions respecting it. Of the multiplex discrepancy of their hypotheses on this point, our author gives the following succinct account-containing, we think, abundant evidence that they are all immersed in ignorance, and entangled in error. For to us it seems palpable, that such clashing of opinion between writers and teachers of equal standing, whose opportunities to arrive at truth have been alike favourable, testifies conclusively that the whole of them are wanting in correct information. Some of them may be nearer to their aim than others; but none of them have reached it. And had not Mr. Combe been directed, in the present case, by the lights of phrenology, the rule would have been as applicable to him as to others. He would have been incompetent to the masterly elucidation of his subject, which, under the lights and resources he possesses, he has so happily effected. Our author gives, we say, the following brief narrative of the conflicting theories of several distinguished and popular writers, respecting the foundation of moral science.

"Hobbes taught that the laws which the civil magistrate enjoins, are the ultimate standards of morality. Cudworth endeavoured to show that the origin of our notions of right and wrong is to be found in a particular faculty of the mind, which distinguishes truth from

Dr.

falsehood. Mandeville declares that the moral virtues are mere sacrifices of self-interest, made for the sake of public approbation, and calls virtue the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride.' Dr. Clarke supposes virtue to consist in acting according to the fitnesses of things. Mr. Hume endeavoured to prove that 'utility is the constituent or measure of virtue.' Dr. Hutcheson maintains that it originates in the dictates of a moral sense. Paley does not admit such a faculty, but declares virtue to consist in doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.' Dr. Adam Smith endeavours to show that sympathy is the source of moral approbation. Dr. Reid, Mr. Stewart, and Dr. Thomas Brown, maintain the existence of a moral faculty. Sir James Mackintosh describes conscience to be compounded and made up of associations. Dr. Ralph Wardlaw, of Glasgow, in a work on ethics, published in 1834, can see nothing in conscience except judgment."

That some of these views are correct, as far as they extend, Mr. Combe does not deny. On the contrary, he admits it. But, in consideration of the narrowness of their limits, he pronounces them severally defective and insufficient. Neither of them covers the whole ground of moral obligation. In neither of them are embodied all the reasons why an action is regarded as virtuous. Nor does either of them, therefore, harmonise with all the faculties of the human mind that minister to morality. They harmonise with but a few of them. In his exposition of their several deficiencies in these respects, he thus expresses himself:

"We are now able to understand the origin of the various theories of the foundation of virtue, to which I adverted at the commencement of this lecture, and which have been the themes of so much discussion among philosophers. According to the majority of the authors whom I have quoted, the three great foundations of virtue are, 1st, That all actions are virtuous which tend to promote the happiness of sentient and intelligent beings, and that they are virtuous because they possess this tendency; 2dly, That all actions are virtuous which are conformable to the will of God, and that they are virtuous for this reason, and no other; and 3dly, That all actions are virtuous which are in conformity with the dictates of our moral sense or moral faculty, and that this conformity is the sole requisite of virtue. The partisans of each of these foundations of virtue have denied the reality or sufficiency of the other foundations. These differences of opinion may be thus accounted for: The sentiment of Benevolence desires universal happiness, or the general good of all beings. When we wantonly sacrifice the happiness of any being, it is pained, and

produces uneasy emotions in our minds. Those philosophers who place the foundation of virtue in the tendency of the action judged of, to produce happiness, are right, in so far, because this is one foundation, but they are wrong in so far as they teach that it is the only foundation of virtue.

"In like manner the organ of Veneration desires to yield obedience to the will of God, and it experiences painful emotions when we knowingly contravene its dictates. Those philosophers who place the essence of virtue in obedience to the will of God, are sound in their judgment, in so far as this is one essential element in virtue, but they err in so far as they represent it to be the only one.

"And thirdly, Conscientiousness produces the feeling of duty, obligation, incumbency, and of right and wrong. It desires to do justice in all things. It enforces the dictates of our other moral faculties. Benevolence, for instance, from its own constitution, desires to communicate happiness; and Conscientiousness enforces its dictates, by proclaiming that it is our duty to act in conformity with them. It causes us to feel that we are guilty or criminal, if we wantonly destroy or impair the enjoyment of any being. It enforces, also, the aspirations of Veneration, and tells us that we are acting wrong if we disobey the will of God. Further, its own special function is to enforce justice, when our own rights or feelings, and those of other men, come into competition. Those philosophers who founded virtue in a moral sense, were right, in so far as this faculty is one most important foundation of virtue; but it is not the only one. The phrenologist considers the virtue of an action to consist in its being in harmony with all of these faculties."

Again: our author offers the following remarks, which are as interesting as they are well founded; but which phrenologists alone can fully appreciate.

"The idea of resolving morality into intellectual perceptions of utility; into obedience to the will of God; or into any single prin. ciple, has arisen, probably, from the organ of that one principle having been largest in the brain of the author of the theory, in consequence of which he felt most strongly that particular emotion which he selected as its foundation. Those individuals, again, who deny that there is any natural basis for moral science, and who regard the Bible as the only foundation of moral and religious duty, are generally deficient in the organs either of the moral sentiments or of the intellect, or in both; and because they feebly experience the dictates of a natural conscience, they draw the inference that it is the same with all mankind."

But we have not yet referred to the most striking and radical errors that prevail among metaphysical writers respecting the foundation of morality and virtue. Some of those writers contend that such qualities or conditions of mind have no foundation in nature at all; but that they are mere abstractions, created alone by positive and arbitrary laws. And those laws are recorded exclusively in the Scriptures, as the word and will of God, without which virtue and morals would be insignificant names.

According to this doctrine, it would not be criminal to kill, steal, dishonour parents, commit adultery, or bear false witness, were not those acts forbidden in the decalogue. The principles of nature, as practically manifested in the works of creation, attach to such deeds, in the opinion of the advocates of the doctrine, neither turpitude nor vice. They are wicked only because the Deity, in manifestation of his power, will, and pleasure, has so pronounced them; and had he pronounced them otherwise, they would have been otherwise-innocent and neutral, if not virtuous and praiseworthy.

If all this be true, then was Cain no criminal, on account of the murder of Abel; because at that period the commandments of the decalogue had not been issued. Nor had the Deity proclaimed that

murder was a sin.

We believe we do not state this doctrine too strongly. Certainly we do not so treat it intentionally; because we consider it too grave and momentous to be made a subject of caricature, irony, or jest. It is a notion narrow and fallacious in its nature, disrespectful to the Deity, and injurious to man, in consideration of the fetters of prejudice, superstition, and bigotry, in which it enthrals him. Were it true, it would abrogate one of the most beautiful and magnificent attributes of creation, which the united wisdom, and goodness, and power of the Creator have bestowed on his works. We allude to the attribute of universal adaptation-to that faultless correspondence of parts to each other, and that fitness of parts to the whole equally faultless, which every where pervade the universe of God, and render it a system of glorious perfection.

Nor is there any portion of this system more gloriously perfect, than that which relates to moral obligation. Every duty that man has to perform, instead of being the product of an abstract and arbitrary law, imposed on his being, is the native product of himself. It arises from the constitution of his own mind, and the corresponding aptitude of his body, as directly and naturally, as light issues from the sun or from a blazing substance, or as a ponderous body, when unobstructed, descends from a higher to a lower position. True, in