are, do nevertheless admit of a very simple explanation by the theory that has just been submitted. This will become more apparent on considering the causes which tend to modify and obstruct the operation of the emotions to which we have referred the perception and recognition of morality.

That branch of the subject, however, is both too large and too important to be embraced by the present article. Leaving it, therefore, for a subsequent occasion, we shall only add here some general remarks on the theory of virtue we have unfolded. It has appeared, from the cursory analysis that has been given of the propensities and sentiments of our nature, that these two great sources of human action, in reference to the objects they have in view, naturally arrange themselves into two distinct classes; those, viz. whose direct end is to prompt to some change in the relation of self to the object or event by which they are excited, and those which prompt to some change in the relation of the object in reference to which they are called into activity to the self by which that object is contemplated. The interest of self is sought exclusively by the one, the interest of the community by the other. It is apparent, that

virtue can never be associated with the activity of the former, however beneficial may be the results to which they lead; it has, accordingly, been referred solely to the exercise of the latter. Whensoever the action to which the first and inferior class of desires and sentiments lead is at variance with the dictates of the second and higher class, that action must necessarily be hurtful and immoral; for the very obvious reason, that it is condemned by the sentiments whose exclusive object is the interest and advantage of those whom that action affects. To suppose these should condemn what they themselves are seeking to obtain, is a contradiction in terms. The activity of these selfish and lower desires and feelings may exist in three different relations to the higher sentiments so often enumerated in the relation of unison and harmony, and then they support and adorn the virtue to which the others alone give birth; in the relation of indifference, and then the action is without any moral character; or in the relation of opposition, and then the action is vicious and immoral. These are laws which nature has imposed on our mental constitution-and the laws of nature are immutable. Virtue and vice, then, it follows by necessary consequence, have each a determinate and unchangeable character. If in Hindostan it be regarded as a dictate of Benevolence to expose an aged parent on the banks of the Ganges, and a dictate of Veneration to join in the monstrous obscenities of the idol worship of Juggernaut; and if in ancient Sparta a dexterous theft was justified by law, VOL. III.-8

the anomaly involved in such actions is apparent only, not real. If Benevolence appear to be employed in shortening the life of a fellowcreature, and Veneration in doing homage to an image devoid of any quality of superiority, and if Conscientiousness appear to have seen nothing to condemn in the crime of theft committed under certain circumstances, it is not because these sentiments have been dictating in India and Lacedemon what they condemn in England, but because, in these instances, their real dictates were either entirely subdued, or were shrouded in the darkness of a benighted intellect, and brutalised by the supremacy of animal desire. The sentiments, every phrenologist is aware, do not themselves perceive the objects fitted to excite their activity. This is the province of intellect. And it is merely because ignorance and superstition disable this medium from conveying correct impressions of things as they really exist in their several relations, that the apparent inconsistency, in the cases we have just noticed, takes place. The moral emotions, when duly enlightened, are invariable in their dictates.

And while we are thus led to the conclusion, that there is a principle of virtue in our nature, in itself pure and unchanging, we shall be restrained from glorying too much when contemplating the high elevations to which it may conduct individuals of our species, by remembering that the very source which supplies the proud idea of the merit of human virtue points at the same moment to the dangers by which that virtue is environed-to the snares in our degenerate nature by which it is surrounded-to the struggle in which it is always engaged, and in which it is so often overcome; and, casting our eyes along the page of human history, we shall be compelled with humility to acknowledge, that if the lamp of virtue be, in truth, still shining in the human heart, here with a brighter and there with a dimmer lustre, its flame, if it be not fed by a heavenly hand, is all too feeble to withstand the noxious vapours and the gusts of evil passion to which it is exposed for,

"Man in nature's richest mantle clad,
And graced with all philosophy can add,
Though fair without and luminous within,
Is still the progeny and heir of sin,

Thus taught, down falls the plumage of his pride;
He feels his need of an unerring guide,

And knows, that, falling, he shall rise no more,
Unless the power that bade him stand, restore."

ARTICLE II.

REVIEW OF COMBE'S LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

(Continued from page 64 of this Journal.)

In lecture sixteenth, we witness one of Mr. Combe's ablest efforts. In most respects, also, it is entirely satisfactory to us, and conforms in all points to the doctrines of phrenology. It is on the subject of "government." After justly rejecting the several theories of the origin of government that have been contended for by different writers, he proposes the following as the phrenological theory :

"In the human mind, as disclosed to us by phrenology, we find social instincts, the activity of which leads man to congregate in society. We discover, also, organs of Veneration, giving the tendency to look up with respect to superior power, to bow before it, and to obey it. There are also organs of Self-esteem, prompting men to assume authority, to wield it, and to exact obedience. Government seems to me to spring from the spontaneous activity of these faculties, without any special design or intention on the part either of governors or of subjects. In rude ages, individuals possessing large brains, (which give force of character,) active temperaments, and large organs of Self-esteem and Love of Approbation, would naturally assume superiority, and instinctively command. Men with smaller brains, less mental energy, and considerable Veneration, would as instinctively obey, and hence government would begin."

With a single exception, we heartily concur in this theory. Nor is our dissent even there dogmatically positive. It amounts to but little more than a doubt on a single point, of no very vital importance, respecting which we have long doubted, and published, many years ago, some of our reasons for non-concurrence and scepticism in the matter. It relates to the organ and sentiment of the love of power and command-that feeling which, not consisting alone in a high estimate of self, inclines the possessor to grasp at, and assume, if possible, the control of other persons, and employ them as instruments in the achievement of his own purposes, or of such enterprises as are set on foot by the community, or a portion of it, and com. mitted to his direction.

If we do not misunderstand him, Mr. Combe regards the feeling or sentiment of love of power or command as a compound or amalgamation of two other sentiments, Approbativeness and Self-esteem, or as in some way resulting from the action of their organs. And

such, we believe, is the opinion of other phrenologists on the subject.

In this view of the matter, we say, we cannot fully concur. Nor does our non-concurrence arise from any wish being entertained by us to be considered the discoverers of a new organ. Far from it. We make no pretension to such discovery. On the contrary, we expressly renounce the pretension, and frankly acknowledge ourselves no discoverers. Our belief on the subject, as far as our view or sentiment deserves the name of belief, has arisen from an attempt made by us, partly from self-examination, and partly on more general grounds, to form, for our own satisfaction, such an abstract analysis of the mind, as to attain a full and complete view of all its truly original faculties. And in the course of that process, we fancied at least that we ascertained the existence of a few faculties, for which no organs have yet been discovered-we should rather say, for which none had been discovered at that time. Of these faculties, the love or sentiment of power and command over other persons was one; and the love of absolute freedom was another. Two others were, an abstract or fundamental love of existence or life, apart from cowardice; and a love of subsistence, or of food and drink, apart from the mere agreeability of their taste and flavour, and the gratification experienced in the use of them.

Since the period of our analysis, which was made about sixteen, and published thirteen years ago, the organs of the two latter propensities are believed to have been discovered, and are now included in the catalogue of faculties under the names of Vitativeness and Alimentiveness. But of the love of power, and the love of freedom, no organs have yet been discovered. Nor do we know that any phrenologists of note believe in their existence. In our inquiries into the subject, the following is the course of investigation we pursued.

Feeling of every description is known to be an attribute of nervous or cerebral matter.

No single nerve, or portion of cerebral matter, can be the seat and instrument of more than one distinct original feeling.

Every original and distinct feeling, therefore, whether it be animal or moral, must have a distinct organ, or portion of the brain, appropriated to itself.

But, from the most accurate scrutiny of the subject we have been able to make, the love of power and authority appears to us to be a feeling as primitive, and as distinct from all others, as Hope or Conscientiousness, Veneration or Benevolence. It must therefore have a cerebral organ of its own. This must be received as a physiological

axiom, if it be true that the love of power is a primitive feeling. And we believe it to be so.

That the feeling exists, is doubted by no one; because every one has a consciousness of possessing somewhat of it himself. It must therefore be either simple and primitive or compounded and secondary. If the latter, what are its elements?—of what primitive organs and faculties is it composed? No one has heretofore answered this question. Nor do we know what idea to attach, or how, indeed, to attach any idea at all, to the expression secondary or compound feeling or faculty. As well might we speak of a compound thought, a compound inference, or a compound want. True, we may think of many things, and want many things, and in that way make up what may resemble a compound. But, in their nature, and in the abstract, the want and the thought are essentially simple.

As regards Approbativeness, we perceive no shade of real affinity between it and the love of power. That they are necessarily proportionate to each other in the same individual, is a position which cannot, we think, be claimed, and would not be admitted. Nor have observation and experience taught us to believe that the case is different as relates to Self-esteem. We have neither felt it in ourselves, nor found it always in others, actually and of necessity equal in degree to the love of power. No doubt Self-esteem, when possessed in a high degree, modifies very materially the style and manner in which the love of power is exercised and manifested. It renders them more haughty, stern, and repulsive. It also gives to the entire character of the individual the same caste and aspect. If we mistake not greatly, however, we have seen individuals distinguished for the love of power and influence, who were far from being remarkable for their manifestation of Self-esteem. In truth, we think that some of the most mild and modest men in their general deportment we have ever known, were, when any exigency demanded it, the most resolute and determined in exercising their power and authority, and in enforcing obedience to them. If appearances have not misled us in our judgment, such, in part, was the character of Washington-as a man, proverbially unassumingas an officer, one of the most firmly and confidently imperative.

That the love of freedom of both body and mind is a primitive and independent feeling in man, as well as in many of the inferior animals, is a position in which we positively believe, for reasons which we cannot at present detail, but which to ourselves are satisfactory.

We know that a resort to self-consciousness is not the only step to be taken in an inquiry into the existence or non-existence of a mental