as the disapprobation is moral-of wounded Benevolence, and Conscientiousness, and Veneration. Revenge is a state of mind which can never be maintained, except in violation of the dictates of all these sentiments; and although the furor of Destructiveness and Self-esteem, by which it is chiefly produced, may be sufficient to lead to the murder of its object, in the very moment that the deed is committed, the stimulus by which the unnatural activity of these faculties was maintained is thereby instantaneously removed. The sight of his bleeding victim calls into powerful operation the moral combination, whose voice had been so long drowned in the hoarse cries of revenge. Benevolence reproaches him with tearing a fellow-creature from all the enjoyments of life, and hurrying him to an account for which, it may be, he was but ill prepared. Veneration accuses him of offending the Deity, by depriving, without any justifiable warrant, one of his creatures of the gift which he had been pleased to bestow, and thus violating his express command. Conscientiousness adds her solemn intimation that he has inflicted a punishment much greater than the offence deserved. The emotions of these several sentiments do not, it is true, maintain a separate and distinct existence in the murderer's mind, but are blended into one general feeling of remorseful condemnation :

"Diri conscia facti

Mens habet attonitum et surdo verbere cædit,
Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum."

We cannot, however, agree with Dr. Brown in defining virtue to be a term expressive of the relation of a certain simple emotion of our mind to certain actions contemplated by us, the emotion being so evidently in many instances compound.

It is indeed to the ignorance of, or inattention to, the real nature of this moral principle, and its modes of operation, we would ascribe the fact of which all human history affords such abundant evidence, that in every age, and in almost every nation, the term virtue has been used in circumstances so essentially different, as apparently to have deprived it of that fixed and determinate signification which we hold it in its strict and true meaning to convey. Men have uniformly agreed in applying the title of virtuous to those actions of which human happiness appeared to them to be the object; and it is therefore we would acknowledge, even without revelation, that the dictates of the moral law are written in every heart. And though every phrenologist, we might say every common observer of human nature, must own they are written in different individuals with very

different degrees of legibility, the characters in which they are inscribed are always the same. Benevolence will never prompt to selfishness, Veneration to disrespect,-nor Conscientiousness to injustice, because its developement in any given individual or nation is small. Its voice may be faint and feeble, but its language will never vary. If, therefore, the term virtue has been applied, on different occasions, in senses evidently contradictory, it is not because the moral principle, whose relation to the action it expresses, approves at one time what it condemns at another, but because the nature of the principle itself has been mistaken or overlooked. It will be afterwards shown, when we approach the consideration of those causes which tend to produce the obstructions and modifications to which this principle is liable, to what source the endless variety and incongruity in human opinion on the subject of virtue are to be traced. We must now endeavour to explain what we conceive to be the nature of the principle itself.

As virtue is never ascribed to any action of which self is the object, we must search for that principle whose relation to certain actions, contemplated by us, is expressed by the term in question, in those sentiments which prompt to the discharge of the duties in which the relation of man to other beings is involved. If we take the propensities, the first great class of faculties which prompt to action, and consider them in reference to their separate functions, we find that they are all gratified by an exercise of which self alone is the object, whatever else may be the subject. Advancing to the second class the sentiments-we discover that they differ from the former in this-that while they, too, prompt to action, their activity is at the same time accompanied by a specific emotion or feeling. An accurate observer of their several functions will also prove, that they themselves may be arranged into two distinct classes; viz. those of which self is still the object in reference, to which their activity is called forth, and those which find their legitimate object in prompting to the discharge of duties in which the interest of our fellow-men is employed. If we analyse Self-esteem, Love of Approbation, Cautiousness, Hope, Ideality, Wonder, Firmness, and Concentrativeness, in their several and separate functions, we shall find that, with perhaps one exception-viz. Hope-they are directly influenced solely by causes affecting the relation in which self stands to the object, or event, by which they are severally excited.

Self-esteem, for example, is affected by every thing that has a tendency to increase or diminish the importance of self. When Macduff presented to the mind of Macbeth the alternative of "living

to be the show and gaze o' the time," it was this sentiment which prompted him rather to accept the combat with an adversary "unborn of woman," even while he anticipated its fatal result: "I'll not yield

To kiss the ground before young Malcolm's feet,

And to be baited with the rabble's curse."

Love of Approbation, again, is affected by whatever changes the aspect in which self appears to the world. To be the "observed of all observers" is its highest gratification, while it is very gall and wormwood to its nature

-"to be made

A fixed figure for the Time of scorn
To point his slow unmoving finger at."

Cautiousness, producing the emotion of fear, is excited by whatever appears pregnant with personal injury, and of itself prompts only to such actions as would so alter the relation of self to the exciting object, or event, as to avert the threated danger. The sentiment of Hope differs from all the other propensities and sentiments to which we have been alluding. All these produce, when excited to activity, some specific desire, as Combativeness for contentionAcquisitiveness for property-Love of Approbation for praise, &c. Whereas Hope begins and ends with a simple feeling, sui generis, susceptible of being directed in a great variety of ways, but not desiring any one class of things as its peculiar object. It produces the tendency to believe in the possibility of obtaining what the other faculties desire. We cannot, therefore, include this faculty either under that class of sentiments of which self is the object, in relation to which their activity is excited, or among those which find their legitimate object in prompting to the discharge of duties in which the interest of our fellow is immediately concerned. It blends indif ferently with either, according to circumstances, and is, in this respect, without any determinate character.

Ideality, which gives the desire of what the French call the "beau ideal," and Wonder, which seeks its gratification in every thing new, or with whose qualities the other faculties are yet unac quainted, are so evidently of that class of which self is the direct object, in relation to which they are called into action, that illustra. tion is quite unnecessary. Of Firmness and Concentrativeness, it need only be observed, that they have no relation to external objects, and that their influence terminates on the mind itself. They only add a quality to the manifestations of the other powers. We have thus gone over all the sentiments, except Benevolence, Veneration,

and Conscientiousness, and we have found that, with these exceptions, their direct end is either selfish or indifferent. To none of those, therefore, can we refer that moral principle whose approbation or disapproval is expressed in reference to actions involving the relation of man to his Creator and to his fellow-the only actions to which virtue or vice is conceived to attach. They may be, and are undoubtedly, often brought to lend their aid in supporting and adorning virtue; but if its pure banner, “sans peur et sans reproche,” be withdrawn, they will enlist with equal readiness in the service of vice. There is nothing necessarily moral in their nature; and it is therefore, we conclude, that it cannot be the relation of any feelings which they can directly generate to actions contemplated by us with moral approbation, that is expressed by the term virtue.

All men agree in ascribing the title of virtuous only to those actions of which human interest and happiness are conceived to be the object; and to the faculties which directly prompt to such actions, we would accordingly turn for the elements of that moral principle by which they are approved. In other words, we hold virtue to be a term expressive of the relation of the sentiments of Benevolence, Veneration, and Conscientiousness, to certain actions contemplated by us, in which the enlightened exercise of these sentiments is involved. It is observed by Mr. Combe, in his admirable reflections on the harmony of the faculties, that the dictates of these sentiments, when enlightened by intellect, always harmonise. And moreover, that whatever conduct they approve when so enlightened, is always perceived by the understanding to be expedient; and, if practically followed out, actually proves in its consequence to be so; demonstrating, as he observes, the truth of the maxim, “nunquam aliud natura, aliud sapientia dixit." Hence we perceive not only that Benevolence, Veneration, and Conscientiousness, acting either singly or combined, according to the circumstances of the case, comprise the elements of that emotion which is the essence of every moral decision, but that their decisions are fixed and invariable, because they are such as the intellect, when sufficiently informed, will always discover to be the most expedient for the purpose they have in view, viz. human interest and happiness.

All theories, and all men capable of forming an opinion on the subject, have agreed, as has been already stated, in associating the idea of virtue only with what is conceived to have a tendency to promote the interest and happiness of man. But as different minds and different circumstances produced different estimates of such interest and happiness, hence arose an infinite diversity of opinion as to the faculties which give the virtuous character to the actions, in the

performance of which this interest and happiness are sought. We have endeavoured to point out those sentiments whose direct end is either selfish or indifferent, which prompt to some change in the relation of self to the object or event by which they are excited. In these there is nothing necessarily moral; and, therefore, we have concluded that it cannot be the relation of any feelings which they can directly generate to actions contemplated by us with moral approbation that is expressed by the term virtue. From these we turn to Benevolence, Veneration, and Conscientiousness, and finding the aim of their functions to be precisely the reverse, i. e. seeking some change in the relation of the object by which their separate or combined activity is called forth to the self by which that object is contemplated; and that it is only with actions tending to produce such changes that the idea of virtue is associated, we then deduce the proposition, that virtue is a term which expresses the relation of the moral emotions, produced by the combined activity of Benevolence, Veneration, and Conscientiousness, to certain actions contemplated by us, in which the enlightened exercise of these sentiments is involved.

Although by such an analysis as the foregoing we find it necessary, as already intimated, to differ from Dr. Brown, in regarding the moral emotion as always and necessarily simple, the difference is rather verbal than essential, it being evident, from the manner in which he illustrates the operation of this emotion, which he describes as one and simple, that in reality it embraces all the elements we have noticed as members of this moral confederacy.

It is not unworthy of observation, as a fact which appears to lend its testimony in support of our theory, that the various precepts of the moral law appear to be addressed directly to the three superior sentiments in question. Obedience to the first four commandments of the decalogue, involving the duties arising out of the relation of man to his Creator, flows manifestly from enlightened Conscientiousness and Veneration, the former acknowledging the justice of homage to such a Being, and the latter inspiring with the emotion in which it is paid. The fifth commandment appears to result from the three sentiments specified acting in harmonious concert. The sixth commandment flows more immediately from Benevolence in its positive injunction, aided by Conscientiousness in its negative command; the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth, from Conscientiousness.

We may add another remarkable instance from the same sacred source, where a similar coincidence is yet more strikingly evinced. It was taken from the book of Micah, where, in the 8th verse of the sixth chapter, all those duties which man owes to God and to his