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At page 240: Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, U. S. D. C., Eastern District of Texas, February 12, 1934. (Oil production, like mining, not interstate commerce.)

At page 240: United States v. Bob Lieto, U. S. D. C., Northern District of Texas, February 16, 1934. (Wages and hours of an employee not subject to Federal regulation.)

At page 241: Hart Coal Corporation v. Sparks, U. S. D. C., Western District of Kentucky, May 19, 1934. (Injunction from prosecuting for violation of minimum wage provisions.)

At page 241: Irma Hat Co. v. Retail Code Authority, U. S. D. C., Northern District of Illinois, July 31, 1934. (Retail trade beyond regulatory power of Federal Government.)

At page 241: United States v. Gearhart, U.S.D. C. of Colorado, August 8, 1934. (Production and sale of coal within borders of one State not interstate commerce. Minimum price provisions not effective.) At page 241: United States v. Eason Oil Co., U. S. D. C., Western District of Oklahoma, September 22, 1934. (N. R. A. unconstitutional.) United States v. Belcher, U. S. D. C., Northern District of Alabama, October 31, 1934 (N. I. R. A. unconstitutional and Lumber Code invalid).

At page 241: United States v. Kinnebrew Motor Co., United States District Court, Western District of Oklahoma, November 12, 1934. (Sales of second-hand automobiles not within power of Congress to regulate.)

At page 242: United States v. Sutherland, United States District Court, Western District of Missouri, December 7, 1934. (N. I. R. A. not valid as to retail lumber merchant.)

At page 242: United States v. Rogles, United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, January 24, 1935. (Retailing of coal not within Federal control.)

At page 242: Table Supply Stores, Inc. v. Hawking, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, January 23, 1935. (Local merchant not liable for failure to pay minimum wages.)

At page 242: United States Electric Coal Co. v. Rice, United States District Court, Eastern District of Illinois, December 21, 1934 (Mining coal wholly intrastate.)

At page 243: Champlain Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma (268 U. S. 235). (Regulation of the extraction of oil for a State conservation Commission to prevent waste within State. The Supreme Court held that this was entirely within the authority of the State.)

At page 243: Edilman v. Boeing Air Transport Lines (289 U. S. 249). (The taking of gas from a tank and placing it in an airplane at an airport a wholly local transaction.)

At page 243: Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost (286 U. S. 165). (Kilowatt tax by State of Idaho sustained as an act of manufacture, though the energy flowed from Idaho into Utah.)

FOLLOWING CASES ILLUSTRATE THE PRINCIPLE THAT CONGRESS MAY NOT EXCLUDE FROM COMMERCE ANY ARTICLE OR COMMODITY IRRESPECTIVE OF ITS NATURE EXCEPT IT BE PRODUCED UNDER SUCH TERMS AS CONGRESS REQUIRES

At page 244: In Hammer v. Dagenhart (247 U. S. 251), commonly known as the "Child Labor Case", Congress undertook to deny

transportation in interstate and foreign commerce to goods produced by the labor of persons of a fixed age and working more than a certain number of hours, or between certain hours of the day.

At page 245:

* * * But it is insisted that adjudged cases in this Court establish the doctrine that the power to regulate given to Congress incidentally includes the authority to prohibit the movement of ordinary commodities, and therefore that the subject is not open for discussion. The cases demonstrate the contrary.

And the minority of the Court dissenting through Mr. Justice Holmes held:

The objection urged against the power is that the States have exclusive control over their method of production, and there Congress cannot meddle with them, and, taking the proposition in the sense of direct intermeddling, I agree to it and suppose that no one denies it.

At page 245: Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (259 U. S. 20), commonly known as the "Child labor tax case", attempted to accomplish the same end as the above case through another coercive power, namely taxation, the Court held:

Yet when Congress threatened to stop interstate commerce in ordinary and necessary commodities, unobjectionable as subjects of transportation, and to deny the same to the people of a State in order to coerce them into compliance with Congress' regulation of State's concerns, the Court said this was not in fact regulation of interstate, but rather that of State concerns and was invalid (referring to the Dagenhart case).

At page 246:

So here the so-called "tax" is a penalty to coerce people of a State to act as Congress wishes them to act in respect of a matter completely the business of a State government under the Federal Constitution.

Mr. Emery discussed section 4 of the resolution and pointed out that the arbitrary restriction of contract amounted to a taking of property without due process of law:

What has happened here is that the earning power of every citizen of the United States is limited to the amount that he may be permitted to earn within a fixed period of time.

* * *

At page 250: Wolff v. Kansas Court of Industrial Relations (262 U. S. 522), and Dorchy v. Kansas (262 U. S. 286), held it to be a denial of the due process of law to compel the arbitration of differences resulting from disputes over wages and hours.

This was because it arbitrarily took from both parties the right to make their contract with each other.

Pamphlets and charts, numerous letters, and several petitions by workmen (exhibits not printed) tend to show that unemployment would be aggravated, and recovery impeded by the enactment of the bill.

CONCLUSION

The effect of inadequate employment recovery during the limitations of hours under the N. R. A. admitted by the proponents of the bill (hearings, pp. 42, 57, 61) is to discredit the theory of the pending bill that more drastic and rigid limitations would excite business activity and create jobs. The rational deduction is that more limitations would cause more unemployment.

The inexorable laws of nature requiring flexible hours of service for perishable and seasonal products, and requiring obedience to human

S. Repts., 74-1, vol. 1-33

characteristics, individually and in families, and to human capacity and qualifications, which hinder transfers from one occupation to another and from one section to another, render the theory of the bill impractical.

The economic certainty of the sequence of frozen time and wages, increased costs and prices, lower real wages and less purchasing power, diminished volume of production and sale, reduced business activity and increased idleness with lower standards of living, ought to prevent the enactment of this bill.

The fundamental conflict of statutory control of the workman, with his freedom to contract and his equality of right to pursue happiness through the exercise of spirit, mind, and body calls for protection by Congress of the workman against such a statute as this.

Finally, all Americans are entitled to have Congress govern itself to the extent of refraining from the passage of this act which so obviously violates the rights of citizens of the several States; to have their own States regulate intrastate production and commerce, to be secure in the ownership and possession of their property, and to be free from fear of confiscation, embargo, boycott, forfeiture, impairment of contract, and of fines and imprisonment, for transacting lawful business in a lawful way.

We recommend that S. 87 be not passed.

WARREN R. AUSTIN.

We have read the report and concur in the recommendation.

DANIEL O. HASTINGS.
EDWARD R. BURKE.

74TH CONGRESS 1st Session

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SENATE

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REPORT No. 372

QUALIFICATIONS OF PRACTITIONERS OF LAW IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARCH 13 (calendar day, March 26), 1935.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. KING, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. 395]

The Committee on the District of Columbia, to whom was referred the bill (S. 395) relative to the qualifications of practitioners of law in the District of Columbia, having considered the same, report favorably thereon and recommend that the bill do pass with the following amendments:

On page 2, between lines 4 and 5, insert a new paragraph as follows: A member of the bar of the highest court of any State, not recorded as disbarred upon the membership rolls of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, shall be entitled to represent parties or interests in the courts of the District of Columbia in causes which arise from time to time affecting parties and subject matter without the District of Columbia. No court of the District of Columbia shall enforce against any such member of the bar of the highest court of any State any rule promulgated by such court which would require that there be joined of record associate counsel having an office in the District of Columbia or providing for the exclusion of such member of the bar from practice in such causes, if the party represented shall file, at the time counsel enters his appearance, with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction consent that service upon said clerk shall be service upon said party and his counsel.

On page 3 strike out line 19 after the word "same, ", and lines 20 to 25; on page 4 strike out lines 1 to 3, and part of line 4 to the word "law", and insert in lieu thereof the following:

nor shall anything in said sections contained prevent any person, partnership, or firm, now or hereafter registered by the United States Patent Office, to practice before it, and not a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, from performing any and all of the services incident to patent, trademark, copyright, and unfair competition practice before and out of the Patent Office and out of court; nor prevent any member of the bar of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, who is also a member of or an associate of a firm or partnership which is registered to practice before the United States Patent Office, but all the members of which are not members of the bar of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, from practicing law to the full extent of his authority as a member of said bar.

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

This proposed legislation is designed to protect the public of the District of Columbia against persons who hold themselves out as lawyers while not qualified to act as such. Existing District laws make it possible for anyone to represent to the public that he is skilled in the law and qualified to give legal advice, and to draw up legal documents. The only limitation to such practice is that the practitioner of law may not represent his clients in a court to which he has not been admitted as a member of the bar.

NEED FOR LEGISLATION

At a public hearing before the subcommittee appointed to study this bill, testimony showed that there are numerous persons in the District who are practicing law without appearing in the local courts. Many of this class have not been admitted to practice in the courts because of inability to demonstrate the possession of sufficient qualifications, or for other reasons.

The District laws at present require examination or license, or both, before permitting persons to engage in the practice of the healing arts, dentistry, veterinary medicine, pharmacy, optometry, accountancy, nursing, architecture, and other professions.

There is no provision in law at present to require persons to show their qualifications to practice law in the District; nor do the District laws require persons practicing law but not admitted to the bar of local courts to be subject to the disciplinary action of the courts.

The bill exempts from its provisions persons engaged in practice before Federal Departments, the United States Patent Office, or before courts in the District of Columbia other than the District Supreme Court, when such persons clearly identify themselves as lawyers practicing only before courts or in such departments or bureaus.

ENDORSEMENTS

The bill has the endorsement of the District Commissioners, the American Bar Association, the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, the Women's Bar Association of the District of Columbia, the Barristers Club of the District of Columbia, the Federation of Citizens' Associations, and other organizations and individuals. communication from the Commissioners favoring enactment of the bill is appended hereto as part of this report.

Hon. WILLIAM H. KING,

COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Washington, D. C., February 2, 1934.

Chairman Committee on the District of Columbia,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

SIR: The Commissioners of the District of Columbia have the honor to submit the following on Senate bill 316, Seventy-third Congress, first session, entitled "A bill relative to the qualifications of practitioners of law in the District of Columbia", which you referred to them for report as to the merits of the bill and the propriety of its passage.

The purpose of this bill briefly stated, is to prohibit, with certain exceptions, anyone from engaging in the practice of law in the District of Columbia unless he be a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of the District, and also to prohibit any partnership, corporation, association, or firm from engaging in such practice, with the exception of associations, partnerships, and firms, all of the

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