Though assemblies be had indeed for religion's sake, hurtful nevertheless they may easily prove, as well in regard of their fitness to serve the turn of hereticks, and such as privily will soonest adventure to instill their poison into men's minds. Hooker. The leperous instillment. Shakspeare. He from the well of life three drops instilled. Milton. They imbitter the cup of life by insensible instillations. Rambler. Those heathens did in a particular manner instil the principle into their children of loving their country, which is far otherwise now-a-days. Swift. How in the noon of night that pibroch thrills, Savage and shrill. But with the breath which fills Their mountain-pipe, so fill the mountaineers With the fierce native daring which instils The stirring memory of a thousand years, And Evan's, Donald's fame rings in each clansman's Byron. Childe Harold. ears. IN'STINCT, adj. & n. s. INSTINCT ED, adj. INSTINCTIVE, adj. INSTINCTIVELY, adv. French instinct; Span. and Port. instinto; Lat. instinctus. Moved; animated; a word not in use. Instinct, desire or aversion acting in the mind without the intervention of reason or deliberation; the power of determining the will of brutes. Instincted, impressed as an animated power. Instinctive, acting without the application of choice or reason; rising in the mind without apparent cause. Instinctively, by instinct or call of nature. Thou knowest I am as valiant as Hercules; but beware instinct; the lion will not touch the true prince: instinct is a great matter. I was a coward on instinct I shall think the better of myself and thee, during my life; I for a valiant lion, and thee for a true prince. Shakspeare. Henry IV. The very rats Instinctively had quit it. Raised By quick instinctive motion, As thitherward endeavouring. What native unextinguishable beauty must be impressed and instincted through the whole, which the defedation of so many parts, by a bad printer and a worse editor, could not hinder from shining forth. Bentley's Preface to Milton. Nature first pointed out my Portius to me, by which, independent of all instruction or experience, without deliberation, and without having any end in view, animals are unerringly directed to do spontaneously whatever is necessary for the preservation of the individual or the continuation of the kind.' Instinct,' says the late lord Monboddo, in his Ancient Metaphysics, is a determination given by Almighty wisdom to the mind of the brute, to act in such or such a way, upon such or such an occasion, without intelligence, without knowledge of good or ill, and without knowing for what end or purpose he acts.' Such in the human species is the instinct of sucking exerted immediately after birth; and such in the inferior creation is the instinct by which insects invariably deposit their eggs in situations most favorable for hatching affording nourishment to their future progeny. These operations are necessary for the preservation of the individual and the continuation of the kind; but neither the infant nor the insect knows that they are necessary; they both act without having any end in view, and act uniformly without instruction and without experi ence. and Many systems have been adopted to explain the principles which produce and direct the spontaneous actions of brutes. Some of the ancient philosophers ascribed to brutes an understanding different only in degree from that of man, and attributed their inferiority to the want of proper bodily organs. This system has been strenuously supported by M. Helvetius, De l'Esprit, tom. i. p. 2, &c. Cudworth endeavoured to explain the instinct of animals by a certain plastic nature. Des Cartes thought that all the actions of brutes might be explained by the simple laws of mechanism, and considered them as machines totally devoid of life and sentiment, but so curiously constructed by the Creator, that the mere impressions of light, sound, and other external agents on their organs, produced a series of motions in them, and caused them to execute those various operations, which had before been ascribed to an internal principle of life and spontaneity. But the actions and manners of brutes, which are totally incompatible with the mere principles of mechanism, evince the absurdity of this opinion. Buffon adopts the opinion of Des Cartes in part, but allows them life, and the faculty of distinguishing between pleasure and pain, together with a strong inclination to the former, and aversion from the latter. By these inclinations and aversions he undertakes to account for all, even the most striking operations of animals. The pre-established harmony of Leibnitz has also been applied to explain the actions of brutes. Others have considered the and immediate influence of the divine energy, actions of animals as produced by the constant directing all their inclinations and motions: such appears to have been the opinion of Addison, in the second volume of the Spectator. Concerning human instincts philosophers differ widely in opinion; some maintaining that man is endowed with a greater number of instincts than any species of brutes; whilst others deny that in human nature there is any power or propensity at all which can properly be called well nigh banished from the regions of philosophy. For such a proceeding it is not difficult to assign the cause. The instinctive scheme requires much less labor of investigation than the systems of Locke and the ancients; for upon the principles of it, when carried to its utmost extent, every phenomenon in human nature is thought to be sufficiently accounted for, by supposing it the effect of a particular instinct implanted in the mind for that very purpose. Hence, in some popular works of philosophy, we have a detail of so many distinct internal senses, that it requires no small strength of memory to retain their very names; besides the moral sense, we have the sense of beauty, the sense of deformity, the sense of honor, the hoarding sense, and a number of others, which it is needless here to mention. This new system, which converts the philosophy of mind into mere history, or rather into a collection of facts and anecdotes, though it has made a rapid progress, is not yet universally received. It has been opposed by many speculative men, and by none with greater skill than Dr. Priestley; who maintains, with the earliest admirers of Locke, that we have from nature no innate sense of truth, nor any instinctive principle of action; that even the action of sucking in new-born infants is to be accounted for upon principles of mechanism; and that the desire of the sexes is merely association.' instinctive. This diversity of opinion,' says Dr. Gleig,' may easily be traced to its source. There are not many original thinkers. The greater part of even those who are called philosophers implicitly adopt the opinions of certain masters whose authority they deem sufficient to supply the place of argument; and, having chosen their respective guides, each maintains with zeal what his master taught, or is supposed to have taught. When Locke so successfully attacked the doctrine of innate ideas, and innate principles of speculative truth, he was thought by many to have overturned at the same time all innate principles whatever; to have divested the human mind of every passion, affection, and instinct; and to have left in it nothing but the powers of sensation, memory, and intellect. Such, we are pursuaded, was not his intention; nor is there any thing in his immortal work which, when interpreted with candor, appears to have such a tendency. Great part of his Essay on Human Understanding has been very generally misunderstood. Much of its merit, however, was soon discovered; and mankind, finding philosophy disencumbered of the barbarous jargon of the schools, and built upon a few self evident principles, implicitly embraced every opinion advanced, or which they supposed to be advanced, by that illustrious author; especially if that opinion was contrary to any part of the scholastic system, which had so long been employed to perplex the understanding, and to veil Dr. Gleig proceeds to enquire, Whether or absurdity. Hence arose many philosophers of not there be instinctive principles in man?' eminence, both at home and abroad, who main-But,' he adds, in order to proceed upon sure tained, as they imagined, upon the principles of Locke, that in the human mind there are no instincts, but that every thing which had been usually called by that name is resolvable into association and habit. This doctrine was attacked by Lord Shaftesbury, who introduced into the theory of mind, as faculties derived from nature, a sense of beauty, a sense of honor, and a sense of ridicule and these he considered as the tests of speculative truth and moral rectitude. His lordship's principles were in part adopted by Mr. Hutchison of Glasgow, who published a system of moral philosophy, founded upon a sense of instinct, to which he gave the name of the moral sense; and the undoubted merit of his work procured him many followers.-It being now discovered, or at least supposed, that the human mind is endowed with instinctive principles of action, a sect of philosophers soon arose, who maintained, with much vehemence, that it is likewise endowed with instinctive principles of belief; and who built a system of metaphysics, if such it may be called, upon a number of innate, distinct, and independent senses. The rise of this sect is well known. Berkeley and Hume had adopted Locke's doctrine respecting the origin of our ideas; and had thence deduced consequences supposed to be dangerous in themselves, but which it was thought could not be denied without refusing the principles from which they were inferred. The foundation of the instinctive system being thus laid, the system itself was rapidly carried to a height far beyond what seems to have been the intention of its excellent author; and reason was VOL. XII. grounds, it will be proper to consider, first, such actions of the inferior animals as are generally allowed to be instinctive: for an attempt has been lately made to prove, that even these actions are the offspring of reason influenced by motives; and that instinct, as above defined, is a mere imaginary principle, which has no existence either in man or brute. Caterpillars, it is said, when shaken off a tree in every direction, instantly turn round towards the trunk and climb up, though they had never formerly been on the surface of the ground This is a striking instance of instinct. On the tree, and not upon the ground, the caterpillar finds its food. If, therefore, it did not turn and climb up the trunk, it would inevitably perish; but surely the caterpillar knows not that such an exertion is necessary to its preservation; and therefore it acts not from motives, but from blind impulse. The bee and the beaver are endowed with an instinct which has the appearance of foresight. They build magazines, and fill them with provisions; but the foresight is not theirs. Neither bees nor beavers know any thing of futurity. The solitary wasp digs holes in the sand, in each of which she deposits an egg. Though she certainly knows not that an animal is to proceed from that egg, and still less, if possible, that this animal must be nourished with other animals, she collects a few small green worms, which she rolls up in a circular form, and fixes in the hole in such a manner that they cannot move. When the wasp-worm is hatched, it is amply stored with the food destined for its support. The green worms are devoured in succession; and F the number deposited is exactly proportioned to the time necessary for the growth and transformation of the wasp-worm into a fly; when it issues from the hole, and is capable of procuring its own nourishment. This instinct of the parent wasp is the more remarkable, that she feeds not upon flesh herself. Birds of the same species, unless restrained, uniformly build their nests of the same materials, and in the same form and situation, though they inhabit very different climates; and the form and situation are always suited to their nature, and calculated to afford them shelter and protection. When danger, or any other circumstance peculiar to certain countries, renders a deviation from the common form or situation of nests necessary, that deviation is made in an equal degree, and in the very same manner, by all the birds of one species; and it is never found to extend beyond the limits of the country where alone it can serve any good purpose. When removed by necessity from their eggs, birds return to them with haste and anxiety, and shift them so as to heat them equally; and it is worthy of observation that their haste to return is always in proportion to the cold of the climate. But do birds reason, and all of the same species reason equally well, upon the nature and extent of danger, and upon the means by which it can be best avoided? Have birds any notion of equality, or do they know that heat is necessary for incubation? No: in all these operations men recognize the intentions of nature; but they are hid from the animals themselves, and therefore cannot operate upon them as motives. One instance of the mathematical skill displayed in the structure of a honeycomb, deserves to be mentioned. It is a curious mathematical problem, at what precise angle the three planes which compose the bottom of a cell ought to meet, in order to make the greatest possible saving of material and labor. This is one of those problems belonging to the higher parts of mathematics, which are called problems of maxima and minima. The celebrated M'Laurin resolved it by a fluxionary calculation, which is to be found in the Transactions of the Royal Society of London, and determined precisely the angle required. Upon the most exact mensuration which the subject could admit, he afterwards found, that it is the very angle in which the three planes in the bottom of the cell of a honey-comb do actually meet. Shall we ask here, Who taught the bees the properties of solids, and to resolve problems of maxima and minima? If a honeycomb were a work of human art, every man of common sense would conclude, without hesitatation, that he who invented the construction must have understood the principles on which it was constructed. We need not say that bees know none of these things. They work mos. geometrically without any knowledge of geometry; somewhat like a child, who, by turning the handle of an organ, makes good music without any knowledge of music. The art is not in the child, but in him who made the organ. In like manner, when a bee makes its combs so geometrically, the geometry is not in the bee, but in that Great Geometrician who made the bee, and made all things in number, weight, and measure. On the whole, it is evident, that the structure of a honey-comb is an effect of instinct which cannot be confounded with the operations of reason. But, on the other hand, we agree with Mr. Locke, that if brutes have any ideas at all, and are not mere machines, as some would have them, we cannot deny them to have some reason.' Yet, that animals have no power of enlarging their ideas, is a position, of the truth of which, though advanced by Locke, we have great doubts. It is well known that crows feed upon several kinds of shell fish when within their reach; and that they contrive to break the shell by raising the fish to a great height, and letting it drop upon a stone or a rock. This may perhaps be considered as pure instinct directing the animal to the proper means of acquiring its food. But what is to be thought of the following fact, which was communicated to the editors of the Encyclopædia Britannica, ' by a gentleman whose veracity,' they say, 'is unquestioned, and who, being totally unacquainted with the theories of philosophers, has of course no favorite hypothesis to support? In spring, 1791, a pair of crows made their nest in a tree, of which there are several planted round his garden; and in his morning walks he had often been amused by witnessing furious combats between them and a cat. One morning the battle raged more fiercely than usual, till at last the cat gave way and took shelter under a hedge, as if to wait a more favorable opportunity of retreating to the house. The crows continued for a short time to make a threatening noise; but, perceiving that on the ground they could do nothing more than threaten, one of them lifted a stone from the middle of the garden, and perched with it on a tree planted in the hedge, where she sat watching the motions of the enemy of her young. As the cat crept along under the hedge, the crow accompanied her by flying from branch to branch, and from tree to tree: and when at last puss ventured to quit her hiding place, the crow, leaving the trees and hovering over her in the air, let the stone drop from on high on her back. That the crow, on this occasion, reasoned, is self-evident; and it seems to be little less evident, that the ideas employed in her reasoning were enlarged beyond those which she had received from her senses. By her senses she might have perceived that the shell of a fish is broken by a fall: but could her senses inform her, that a cat would be wounded or driven off the field by the fall of a stone? No: from the effect of the one fall preserved in her memory, she must have inferred the other by her power of reasoning.' Having, by the above and other arguments, proved that there is such a principle as instinct in the inferior animals, and that it is essentially different from human reason, Dr. Gleig returns to our own species, and enquires, Whether there be any occasions upon which man acts instinctively, and what those occasions are? This, says he, is a question of some difficulty, to which a complete and satisfactory answer wil} perhaps never be given. The principle of asso ciation (see METAPHYSICS) operates so power fully in man, and at so early a period of life, that in many cases it seems to be impossible to distinguish the effects of habit from the operations of nature. Yet there are a few cases, immediately connected with the preservation of the individual and the propagation of the kind, in which, by a little attention, these things may be distinguished. We have already given an instance in the sucking of a child, which we believe to be an operation performed by instinct. Dr. Priestley, however, thinks differently; the action of sucking, says he, I am confident, from my own observations, is not natural, but acquired. What observations they were which led him to this conclusion he has not told us, and we cannot imagine; but every observation which we ourselves have made compels us to believe that an attempt to suck is natural to children. It has been observed, by Mr. Smellie, that the instinct of sucking is not excited by any smell peculiar to the mother, to milk, or to any other substance; for that infants suck indiscriminately every thing brought into contact with their mouths. He therefore infers, that the desire of sucking is innate, and co-eval with the appetite for air. The observation is certainly just: but a disciple of Dr. Priestley's may object to the inference; for in sucking and swallowing our food, and in many such instances, it is exceeding probable, says the Dr., that the actions of the muscles are originally automatic, having been so placed by our Maker, that at first they are stimulated, and contract mechanically whenever their action is requisite.' This is certainly the case with respect to the motion of the muscles in the action of breathing; and if that action be of the same kind, and proceed from the very same cause with the action of sucking, and if a child never show a desire to suck but when something is brought into contact with its mouth, Dr. Priestley's account of this operation appears to us much more satisfactory than that of the authors who attribute it to instinct. But the actions of breathing and sucking differ essentially in several particulars. They are indeed both performed by means of air; but, in the former, a child for many months exerts no spontaneous effort, whilst a spontaneous effort seems to be absolutely necessary for the performance of the latter. Of this indeed we could not be certain, were it true that infants never exhibit symptoms of a wish to suck, but when something is actually in contact with their mouths; for the mere act of sucking then might well be supposed to be automatic and the effect of irritation. But this is not the case. A healthy and vigorous infant, within ten minutes of its birth, gives the plainest and most unequivocal evidence of a desire to suck, before any thing be brought into actual contact with its mouth. It stretches out its neck, and turns its head from side to side, apparently in quest of something; and that the object of its pursuit is something which it may suck, every man may satisfy himself by a very convincing experiment. When an infant is thus stretching out its neck and moving its head, if any thing be made to touch any part of its face, the little creature will instantly turn to the object, and endeavour by quick, alternate motions from side to side to seize it with its mouth, in the very same manner in which it always seizes the breast of its nurse, till, taught by experience to distinguish objects by the sense of sight, when these alternate motions, being no longer useful, are no longer employed. If this be not an instance of pure instinct, we know not what it is. It cannot be the result of association or mechanism; for, when the stretching of the neck takes place, nothing is in contact with the child's mouth, and no association which includes the act of sucking can have been formed. Associations of ideas are the consequence of simultaneous impressions frequently repeated; but when the child first declares, as plainly as it could do were it possessed of language, its wish to suck, it has not received a single impression with which that wish can possibly be associated. The greater part of those actions, as well as of the apparently instinctive principles of belief, we have no doubt, are acquired; but we are persuaded that a child sucks its nurse, as a bee builds its cell, by instinct; for upon no other hypothesis can we account for the spontaneous efforts exerted in both these operations; and we think it no disgrace to our species, that in some few cases we should act from the same principle with the inferior creation, as nothing seems more true than that, Fr. instituer; Lat. instituo. To fix; establish; settle or prescribe; to educate or in -Reason raise o'er instinct as we can; In this 'tis God that works, in that 'tis man. IN'STITUTE, v. a. & n. s. INSTITUTION, n. s. INSTITUTIONARY, adj. IN'STITUTOR, N. S. IN'STITUTIST, n.s. struct; the leading idea is to build upon. Institute, established law; settled order; precept; maxim; example. Institution, act of establishing; a positive law; education. Institutionary, elementary; containing first principles. Institutor, an instructor; one who establishes an institution. Institutist, a writer of elemental in structions. The institution of God's law is described as being Hooker. established by solemn injunction. Here let us breathe, and haply institute A course of learning, and ingenuous studies. Shakspeare Green gall the institutists would persuade us to be an effect of an over-hot stomach. Harvey on Consumption. That it was not out of fashion Aristotle declareth in his politics, among the institutionary rules of youth. Browne. If children were early instituted, knowledge would insensibly insinuate itself. Decay of Piety. It might have succeeded a little better, if it had pleased the institutors of the civil months of the sun to have ordained them alternately odd and even. Holder on Time. The theocracy of the Jews was instituted by God himself. Temple. They quarrel sometimes with the execution of laws, and sometimes with the institution. Id. This law, though custom now directs the course, As nature's institute, is yet in force, Uncancelled, though disused. Dryden. It is a necessary piece of Providence in the institution of our children, to train them up to some what in their youth, that may honestly entertain them in their age. L'Estrange. The holiness of the first fruits and the lump is an holiness merely of institution, outward and nominal; whereas the holiness of the root is an holiness of nature, inherent and real. Atterbury. His learning was not the effect of precept or institution. Bentley. To institute a court and country party without materials, would be a very new system in politics. Swift. The certain feasts are instituted now, Cowper. Conversation. Byron's Manfred. INSTITUTE, OF INSTITUTION, in literature, is a term applied to establishments for the promotion of science generally, and was first given to the French National Institute, founded in December 1795. That nation, at the time of the Revolution, having conceived a hatred to every thing royal, abolished the seven Royal Academies, and substituted the National Institute. It was first opened the 7th of December, when Benezech, the then minister for the home department, attended, and the decree of foundation was read; which was to the following purport:-The Academy of Arts and Sciences belongs to the republic, and Paris is its place of residence. Its employment is to aim at bringing all arts and sciences to the utmost perfection of which they are capable. It is to notice every new attempt, and all new discoveries, and to keep up a correspondence with all foreign literary societies. And, by the particular orders of the Executive Directory, its first studies are to be directed to those subjects which more immediately tend to the reputation and advantage of the French republic. The academy is to consist of 288 members, half of whom are to reside in Paris, the other half in the departments; and to them is to be added a certain number of foreigners, as honorary members, confined at present to twentyfour. The academy is divided into three classes, each class into sections, each section to contain twelve members. First class, mathematics and natural philosophy. This class is divided into ten sections. 1. Mathematics; 2. Mechanical arts; 3. Astronomy; 4. Experimental Philosophy; 5. Chemistry; 6. Natural history; 7. Botany; 8. Anatomy and animal history; 9. Medicine and surgery; 10. Animal economy, and the veterinary science. Second class, morality and politics. This class consists of six sections. 1. Analysis of sensations and ideas; 2. Morals; 3. Legislature; 4. Political economy; 5. History; 6. Geography. Third class, literature and the fine arts. This class consists of eight sections. 1. Universal grammar; 2. Ancient languages; 3. Poetry; 4. Antiquities; 5. Painting; 6. Sculpture; 7. Architecture; 8. Music. For each class a particular room in the Louvre is appropriated. No one can be a member of two classes at the same time; but a member of one class may be present at the meetings of any other. Each class is to print, yearly, an account of its transactions. Four times a year there are to be public meetings. On these occasions, the three classes meet together. At the end of each year, they are to give a circumstantial account to the legislative body of the progress made in that year in the arts and sciences. The prizes given yearly by each class are to be publicly notified at certain times. The sums requisite for the support of the institution are to be decreed yearly by the legislative body, upon a requisition made by the executive directory. The first forty-eight members were chosen by the executive directory, to whom the choice of the remaining members was confided. To the members residentiary in Paris is reserved the choice both of the department and the foreign members. On a vacancy any class, three candidates are named by the class for the choice of the body at large. Each class is to have, at its place of meeting, a collection of the products, both of nature and art, and a library, according to its particular wants. The regulations of the institution, with respect to the times of meeting and its employments, are to be drawn up by the body at large, and laid before the legislative assembly. On the restoration of the house of Bourbon, every thing royal was restored, and the National Institute was reconverted to a Royal Academy. Still, however, the same objects are pursued. in The French National Institute appears to have given rise to 'The Royal Institution of Great Britain,' founded in 1799 by the celebrated count Rumford, and which is situated in Albemarle Street, Piccadilly. The establishment is upon a magnificent plan, and the building adapted to the design. It comprises, a reading room for English and foreign newspapers; a library for reference, and another for the reading of modern publications; a museum of curiosities; a mechanical repository for machinery, &c.; a chemical laboratory on a grand scale, the learned Mr. Brande being the chemical professor; and, lastly, a splendid amphitheatre for lectures, which will hold 700 persons, with a gallery capable of holding 200 more. The number of proprietors was 400, who are life-holders and subscribers. This society is incorporated, and prints its Transactions in a quarterly publication. Its members are authorised to add to their names the initials M. R. I. INSTITUTE, in Scottish law. When by dispo sition or deed of entail a number of persons are called to the succession of an estate one after another, the person first named is called the institute, the others substitutes. INSTITUTES, in literary history, a book containing the elements of the Roman law. The institutes are divided into books; and contain an abridgement of the whole body of the civil law, being designed for the use of students. See LAW. INSTITUTION, LONDON. See LONDON. INSTITUTION, AFRICAN. See AFRICAN INSTITUTION. INSTITUTION, in the canon and common law, signifies the investing a clerk with the spiritualities of a rectory, &c., which is done by the bishop, who uses the following formula:-'I institute you rector of such a church with the cure of souls, and receive your cure and mine.' |