achieve it and the problems are formidable, the financial problems, siting problems, and problems of who handles the nuclear waste from the reactor, from the reprocessing plant. I am not minimizing any of these problems but I do think it is perhaps the most important objective we should strive to achieve in a nonproliferation sense.

I also feel that ultimately a comparable approach should be made to enrichment plants, that if these plants were multinationally owned and operated under rigid international controls, that we could breathe much easier with respect to how the product of the plant was being used or whether the product of the plant was being enriched to the weaponsgrade level, which, as you know, has to be around 80 percent plus.

Dr. Taylor supported the concept of regional fuel cycle plants. However, he urged that the plants be located "such as to make it unlikely that any country sufficiently controlling such a center could divert large quantities of plutonium to weapons making purposes."

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

Having considered the testimony, the Committee concludes that the United States should make every attempt to pursue in international forums efforts to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military purposes either by governments or sub-national groups. The Committee believes that further agreement among nuclear suppliers aimed at the development of more stringent safeguards and efforts between suppliers to exercise restraint in the sale of nuclear materials, equipment and technology can have a salutary effect in lessening the dangers inherent in nuclear proliferation. There is little doubt that the world will see in the next several decades a vast expansion of nuclear power facilities. This expansion can be of substantial benefit to many nations. Given the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, the Committee believes that the best approach is not to attempt to thwart the legitimate energy requirements of other nations but to attempt to help bring the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy to the world. At the same time, however, it is clearly important that the United States explore with others all possible avenues through which the risk of this beneficial expansion can be minimized. Clearly the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world will pose a threat to all nations. For the United States, the spread of nuclear weapons will require thorough evaluation of national security policies.

The Committee takes very seriously the warning voiced by Mr. Ellsworth that: Further nuclear proliferation would have serious security implications for the United States. In addition to the destabilizing effects on the international regime, proliferation would complicate providing for the national defense, could contribute toward greater possibilities of U.S. involvement in nuclear war, and would provide additional opportunities for terrorism.

The Committee has received substantial information, on a classified basis, in regard to the possibility of meaningful agreement among the nuclear suppliers as to safeguards on the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and on other measures to reduce the risk that nuclear transfers will lead to further weapons proliferation. The Committee hopes that these efforts, if successful, will make a significant contribution in the quest for better controls. In recommending approval of this resolution the Committee recognizes these initiatives of the executive branch. However, the Committee believes that further steps need to be taken along the lines proposed in Senate Resolution 221.

Accordingly, the Committee met in open session in December 9, 1975, and without objection ordered Senate Resolution 221 reported favorably to the Senate.

INDEX TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF S. RES. 221

[Page references are to the daily editions of the Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.]

S. Res. 221 introduced by Mr. Pastore (for himself, Mr. Mondale, Mr. Inouye. Mr. Montoya, and Mr. Symington) on July 26, 1975, and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S13859-61.

Reported (S. Rept. No. 94-525) December 10, 1975, S21583.

Considered and agreed to by the Senate on December 12, 1975, S21961.

NOTE.-Public Law 95-108 (91 Stat. 871), August 17, 1977, contained the following provision:

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 6. Section 49 (a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act is amended to read as follows:

"(a) To carry out the purposes of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated

"(1) for fiscal years 1976 and 1977, the sum of $23,440,000 (and such additional amounts as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs); and

"(2) for fiscal year 1978, the sum of $16,600,000 (and such additional amounts as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs); to remain available until expended. Of the sum authorized to be appropriated by this section for the fiscal year 1978, $2,000,000 shall be available only for the purpose of furthering the nuclear safeguards programs and activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency.".

APPENDIX FF

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11953

ASSIGNING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FUNCTIONS TO THE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AND NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 (72 Stat. 1799), Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 (87 Stat. 1089), the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 App. U.S.C. 2061 et seq.), and the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended (50 App. U.S.C. 2251 et seq.), Executive Order No. 11490 of October 28, 1969, as amended by Executive Order No. 11921 of June 11, 1976, is hereby further amended as follows:

SECTION 1. The "Table of Contents" is amended as follows: (a) In Part 14. delete "Atomic Energy Commission" and substitute therefor "Energy Research and Development Administration".

(b) After Part 14 insert "14A Nuclear Regulatory Commission".
SEC. 2. Amend Part 14 to read as follows:

"PART 14-ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

"Section 1401. Functions. (a) The Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) shall prepare emergency plans and develop preparedness programs for the continuing conduct of ERDA activities in any national emergency-type situation, including nuclear attack on the United States. These plans and programs shall include development of a state of readiness in those areas with respect to national emergencies which are governed by applicable provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and they shall be coordinated with the Federal Preparedness Agency (GSA), Department of Defense, and other departments and agencies as is appropriate.

"(b) The Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration shall develop operational plans and procedures and develop a state of readiness so that if, and only if, authorized by lawful authority during a national emergency declared pursuant to statutory or constitutional authorization, the Energy Research and Development Administration will be prepared to:

"(1) Health and Safety. (a) Shut down, place in safe standby condition, or curtail operations of and maintain under surveillance, as required, all ERDAowned facilities and operations which could become or cause a significant hazard to public health and safety in the event they are damaged or destroyed: and (b) bring to bear such ERDA resources as can be made available to assist Federal, State and local officials to alleviate the suffering of the public and to minimize damage to property and to the environment.

"(2) Nuclear Materials Security. Assure the security of special nuclear material, fissionable material, or nuclear weapons or devices in ERDA custody; participate in the conduct, direction or coordination of search and recovery operations for nuclear materials, weapons or devices; assist in the identification and deactivation of improvised nuclear devices; and render advice on radiation and damage probabilities in the event of the detonation of an improvised nuclear device."

NOTE.-Public Law 95-143 (91 Stat. 1210), October 26, 1977, contained the following provision:

SEC. 3. (a) The first sentence of section 2(b)(3) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 is amended

(1) by inserting "(i)" immediately after "No loan or financial guarantee or combination thereof";

(2) by striking out "shall be finally approved by the Board of Directors of the Bank, and no loan or financial guarantee or combination thereof" and inserting in lien thereof ", (ii) in an amount"; and

(3) by inserting immediately after "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" the following: ", or (iii) for the export of technology, fuel, equipment, materials, or goods or services to be used in the construction, alteration, operation, or maintenance of nuclear power, enrichment, reprocessing, research, or heavy water production facilities,”.

(b) Section 2(b) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 is amended by redesignating paragraphs (4) through (6) as paragraphs (5) through (7), respectively, and by inserting immediately after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:

"(4) The Secretary of State shall report to the appropriate committees of Congress and to the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank if he determines that any country that has agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safeguards materially violates, abrogates, or terminates, after the date of enactment of this paragraph, such safeguards or that any country that has entered into an agreement for cooperation concerning the civil use of nuclear energy with the United States materially violates, abrogates, or terminates, after the date of enactment of this paragraph, any guarantee or other undertaking to the United States made in such agreement or that any country that is not a nuclear-weapons state (as defined in article IX (3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) detonates, after the date of enactment of this paragraph, a nuclear explosive device. The Secretary shall specify which country or countries he has determined to have so acted, and the Board shall not give approval to guarantee, insure, or extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to such country unless the President determines that it is in the national interest for the Bank to guarantee, insure, or extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to such country and such determination has been reported to the Congress not less than twenty-five days of continuous session of the Congress prior to the date of such approval. For the purpose of the preceding sentence, continuity of a session of the Congress shall be considered as broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain shall be excluded in the computation of the twenty-five day period referred to in such sentence.".

(c) The first sentence of section 2(b) (5) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as redesignated by subsection (b), is amended

(1) by striking out "or" immediately after "the United States,"; and (2) by inserting before the period at the end thereof the following: ", or (C) the purchase of any liquid metal fast breeder nuclear reactor or any nuclear fuel reprocessing facility".

NOTE.-Public Law 95-148 (91 Stat. 1230), October 31, 1977, contained the following provision:

"SEC. 112. None of the funds appropriated or made available (other than funds for 'International organizations and programs') pursuant to this Act for carrying out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, may be used to finance the export of nuclear equipment, fuel, or technology or to provide assistance for the training of foreign nationals in nuclear fields."

“(3) Production. In an emergency, continue or resume essential:

"(a) Development, manufacture, assembly and control of nuclear weapons, components thereof, and equipment, except to the extent that the control over nuclear weapons and equipment shall have been transferred to the Department of Defense:

"(b) Development of the technology related to the production of power from all forms of energy sources;

"(c) Production and processing of nuclear reactor fuel, special nuclear materials, and other special products;

"(d) Related feed materials procurement, processing, and development; and "(e) Repair, maintenance, and construction related to the above activities. "(4) Priorities and Allocations. Administer, within the agency, priorities and allocations authority that may be delegated to ERDA, including the authority to authorize procurement and production schedules and make allotments of source materials and strategic and critical materials allocated to ERDA under national emergency industrial mobilization and defense production plans.

"(5) Scientific and Technical Information. Organize, reproduce, and disseminate scientific and technical reports and data relating to emergency preparedness for energy research, development, engineering, applications and effects to interested Government agencies, the scientific and technical communities, the public, and approved, friendly and cooperating foreign nations. In the dissemination of such information, utilize, to the extent appropriate, the capabilities of the National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce. "(6) State Relations. Maintain in coordination with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) general liaison with States concerning ERDA health and safety operations to ensure that these operations are effectively maintained during periods of national emergency.

“(7) International Liaison. Maintain, in consultation with the Department of State and in coordination with other departments and agencies as appropriate, with respect to emergency preparedness activities of mutual interest involving nuclear or nonnuclear energy research and development, essential liaison with foreign nations, foreign organizations, and international organizations.". SEC. 3. Add a new part after Part 14 as follows:

"PART 14A-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

"SEC. 1450. Functions. (a) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall prepare national emergency plans and develop emergency preparedness programs and procedures for the continuing conduct of the nuclear regulatory activities of the Federal Government as specified in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. These emergency preparedness plans and programs shall be designed to develop a state of readiness under conditions of national emergency including emergencies related to the national defense. "(b) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall develop operational plans and procedures and develop a state of readiness so that if, and only if, authorized by lawful authority during a national emergency declared pursuant to statutory or constitutional authorization, the Commission will be prepared to:

"(1) Regulation. In an emergency, continue or resume (a) controlling the possession, use, transfer, import, and export of licensed nuclear materials and facilities; (b) authorizing the operation or continued operation of key facilities important to the national defense, or ordering the suspension of operation of licensed facilities and activities as necessary; and (c) authorizing the recapture from licensees of special nuclear materials where necessary to assure the use, preservation, or safeguarding of such materials for the common defense and security.

"(2) Health and Safety. Order the suspension or limitation of operation, if required, of Commission-licensed nuclear facilities and activities which could otherwise constitute an unnecessary hazard to public health and safety; and assure the development and maintenance of emergency preparedness programs by licensed facilities and activities.

"(3) Contingency Plans. Implement contingency plans, developed in consultation and coordination with ERDA and other departments and agencies as appropriate, for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear materials, high-level radioactive wastes, and nuclear facilities resulting from all activities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; and participate in the execution of the plans where necessary to protect the public health and safety and the common defense and security.

"(4) Facility and Nuclear Materials Security and Safeguards. Assure the continued maintenance by licensees of security and safeguards programs at licensed facilities and for nuclear materials to provide physical protection to the facilities and their nuclear materials against thefts and sabotage.