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(2) Grading. Simple assault is a Class A misdemeanor, unless committed in an unarmed fight or scuffle entered into mutually, in which case it is a Class B misdemeanor.

(3) Jurisdiction. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense defined in this section under paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (l) of section 201.

Comment

This section provides misdemeanor penalties for nonserious bodily attacks which are committed upon federally protected persons-federal officials or employees in the course of their duties or persons in federal enclaves or which are committed in the course of committing other federal crimes. The term "simple assault" is not presently defined by statute, but has been given meaning by judicial interpretation of the term "assault" (18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 113).

Note that the reduction to the petty misdemeanor level of assaults which are a part of unarmed fights permits such cases to be expeditiously brought before a United States commissioner or magistrate rather than a federal district court. An issue is whether the remaining simple assault offenses should be similarly graded to facilitate trials of these petty offenses.

§ 1612. Aggravated Assault.

(1) Offense. A person is guilty of a Class C felony if he:

(a) willfully causes serious bodily injury to another human being;

(b) knowingly causes bodily injury to another human being with a firearm, destructive device or other weapon the possession of which under the circumstances indicates an intent or readiness to inflict serious bodily injury; or

(c) causes bodily injury to another human being while attempting to inflict serious bodily injury on any human being.

(2) Jurisdiction. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense defined in this section under paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (l) of section 201.

Comment

Under existing law felonious assault is restricted to cases of maiming, assault with a dangerous weapon, and assault constituting an attempt to commit certain violent felonies (18 U.S.C. §§ 113, 114). Under this section an assault is aggravated if serious injury is willfully inflicted, or if any injury is inflicted by use of a firearm or destructive device or under other circumstances indicating a readiness or intent to inflict serious injury.

Grading distinctions finer than those proposed might be made. For example, willful assaults could be graded at the Class A misdemeanor level reserving the Class C felony penalty for assaults accompanied by

an intent to cause serious injury. Indeed, intentional infliction of a crippling injury (i.e., an injury which creates a substantial and permanent inability to carry on normal bodily functions, such as blindness, substantial paralysis, or multiple amputation) could be graded at a higher felony level.

§ 1613. Reckless Endangerment.

(1) Offense. A person is guilty of an offense if he creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or death to another. The offense is a Class C felony if the circumstances manifest his extreme indifference to the value of human life. Otherwise it is a Class A misdemeanor. There is risk within the meaning of this section if the potential for harm exists, whether or not a particular person's safety is actually jeopardized.

(2) Jurisdiction. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense defined in this section under paragraphs (a), (b) or (l) of section 201.

Comment

Although existing federal law penalizes some particular forms of endangering, e.g., tampering with motor carriers (18 U.S.C. § 33), the present section is new in generalizing the offense. The operation of dams, nuclear facilities, transportation facilities, etc. obviously affords many opportunities for recklessly endangering life in circumstances that would subject the actor to murder penalties if death resulted. The section will also cover reckless driving. By virtue of the "piggyback" jurisdiction of § 201 (b), this section will apply when endangerment occurs in the course of violation of penalized federal safety regulations, e.g., those relating to shipment of explosives.

§ 1614. Terrorizing.

(1) Offense. A person is guilty of a Class C felony if he:

(a) threatens to commit any crime of violence or act dangerous to human life, or

(b) falsely informs another that a situation dangerous to human life or commission of a crime of violence is imminent knowing that the information is false,

with intent to keep another human being in sustained fear for his or another's safety or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious disruption or public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, disruption or inconvenience.

(2) Jurisdiction. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense defined in this section under paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (e), (f) or (1) of section 201.

Comment

This section has a dual purpose: (1) it reaches, in one consolidated statute, efforts to terrorize a person by a threat serious enough to cause sustained fear, for example, through mailed threats to kidnap or to murder, presently proscribed in 18 U.S.C. §§ 876-77; and (2) it reaches acts of public terrorism, such as bomb scares, presently proscribed in 18 U.S.C. §§ 35, 837 (d). More remote threats, not intended to terrorize or disrupt, or not recklessly resulting in public disruption or in the creation of great and sustained fear in an individual, are dealt with as lesser crimes under §§ 1615, 1617 and 1618.

§ 1615. Threats Against the President and Successors to the Presidency.

A person is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if he threatens to commit any crime of violence against the President of the United States, the President-elect, the Vice President or, if there is no Vice President, the officer next in order of succession to the office of President of the United States, the Vice President-elect, or any person who is acting as President under the Constitution and laws of the United States:

(a) by a communication addressed to or intended to come to the attention of such official or his staff; or

(b) under any circumstances in which the threat is likely to be taken seriously as an expression of settled purpose.

"Threat" includes any knowingly false report that such violence is threatened or imminent.

Comment

Existing law, 18 U.S.C. § 871, penalizes, by up to five years' imprisonment, the making of threats against the President or successors to the Presidency. The Supreme Court has recently ruled that, in order to differentiate criminal conduct from privileged speech, the use of threatening language against the President must constitute a "real" threat of physical violence, not just "political hyperbole." Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). Yet, even if the threat is not seriously meant, the President should be protected from "the detrimental effect upon Presidential activity and movement that may result simply from a threat upon the President's life." Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969).

The proposed statute seeks to protect the President from threats which, even if they turn out to be prankish or ineffectual, cannot be taken lightly. Many threats are non-serious, if foolish, efforts to ex

press temporary anger. Someone seriously bent on assassination would not be likely to reveal himself prematurely by overt threats. Therefore, drunken threats, or angry political comments, by persons clearly incapable under the circumstances of carrying out such threats would not be criminal. But if the threat is sought to be communicated to the President or his entourage, or if it is followed by some overt act to carry it out, or if it is made under circumstances calculated to cause fear for the President among persons responsible for his safety and to evoke substantial counter-measures for the President's security, the threatener must clearly be dealt with as a criminal offender. Because most such threats pose no serious threat to Presidential safety, the offense is graded as a misdemeanor; a threat so frightening, disruptive or persistent as to amount to terrorization would be punishable as a felony under proposed § 1614.

§ 1616. Menacing.

(1) Offense. A person is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if he knowingly places or attempts to place another human being in fear by menacing him with imminent serious bodily injury.

(2) Jurisdiction. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense defined in this section under paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (l) of section 201.

Comment

The term "assault" having replaced the common law term "battery" to denominate the offense of actual infliction of injury, the term "menacing" is employed to denominate certain aggressions falling within traditional assault. However, the section is narrower than common law assault since it is limited to menacing imminent serious bodily injury. Nevertheless an attempt to commit any bodily injury will be an offense under the attempt (§ 1001) and simple assault (§ 1611) provisions. Conduct which might include menacing, e.g., “intimidation" and "threat", is proscribed in other sections, in some instances with more severe penalties. See, for example, civil rights offenses (§§ 1501, 1511–15), robbery (§ 1721), definition of "restrain" for kidnapping and related offenses (§ 1639 (a)).

§ 1617. Criminal Coercion.

(1) Offense. A person is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if, with intent to compel another to engage in or refrain from conduct, he threatens to:

(a) commit any crime;

(b) accuse anyone of a crime;

(c) expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person, living or deceased, to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair another's credit or business repute; or

(d) take or withhold official action as a public servant, or cause a public servant to take or withhold official action. (2) Defense. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that the actor believed, whether or not mistakenly: (a) that the primary purpose of the threat was to cause the other to conduct himself in his own best interests, or (b) that a purpose of the threat was to cause the other to desist from misbehavior, engage in behavior from which he could not lawfully abstain, make good a wrong done by him, or refrain from taking any action or responsibility for which he was disqualified.

(3) Jurisdiction. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense defined in this section:

(a) under paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (e) or (1) of section 201; (b) when the threat is to accuse anyone of a federal crime or to commit a federal crime; or

(c) when the threat in subsection (1) (d) involves federal official action.

Comment

This provision is intended to consolidate and replace existing "blackmail" and coercive threat statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 872-77). Certain forms of coercion are covered by rape and extortion legislation. See §§ 1641, 1643, 1732. See also threatening public servants (§ 1366), witnesses (81321), informants (§ 1322). In view of the availability of felony penalties for such categories of aggravated coercion, the basic coercion section here is classified as a misdemeanor.

Federal jurisdiction over the offense is similar to present jurisdiction; but it is extended somewhat to reach coercive threats to federal employees not covered by proposed § 1366, as well as threats by federal employees concerning their official duties for which there is jurisdiction under existing law. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 872.

§1618. Harassment.

(1) Offense. A person is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor if, with intent to frighten or harass another, he:

(a) communicates in writing a threat to commit any violent felony;

(b) makes a telephone call anonymously or in offensively coarse language; or

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