SCOTTISH BURGH REFORM BILL.

THE straw is being moved. The rat nests are in process of being uncovered, and the rats about to be sent scampering. Those sinks of corruption-the Burgh Corporations-are about to become purified ; and the little, nasty, stinking, and devouring creatures which infested them are to be speedily dislodged. In the year of Grace, 1833, the inhabitants of the Scottish towns, large and small, from the great cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow, to the little towns of Culross and Dornoch, are, for the first time, these many centuries, to have some influence in the management of their own civic affairs.

One of the first acts of Ministers in the Reformed Parliament has been to bring in a Bill for the destruction of the close system. We thank them heartily for their Bill. It demolishes the old system; and that is no small matter of congratulation among the friends of popular rights. But the new system which this Bill introduces is far, in our opinion, from being so good as it might be.

In considering what the Reform of the Burgh System should be, the first question which occurs is, Can the full measure of reformation be attained? In the case of the Reform of the representation, the question was avowedly, not what was best, but what was attainable. A perfect reform could not have been carried without revolution; and less than the ministerial measure would not have engaged the support of the people. But in Burgh Reform there was no need of adopting the same middle course that was wisely pursued in the case of Parliamentary Reform. A House of sane Lords would never think of opposing the united wish of the Ministers, the House of Commons, and the people, on any plan of Burgh Reform. The King's consent might be calculated on; and the Tory party in the House of Commons, although it should be joined by the most conservative of the Whigs, is nothing to the number of the Ministerialists, liberal Whigs, and Radicals, who would support a complete measure of Reform, if proposed by Ministers.

What then is the best sort of Burgh Reform? That which will encroach least on the liberties of the townsmen; that which will give them the completest control over those they may appoint to manage their affairs. How would the inhabitants of a city do, if left to their own discretion, after the demolition of the old system, and without an act of Parliament establishing a new one? They would assemble, and elect a certain number of their fellow-citizens to manage the city's affairs, for a certain time; when another public meeting would be held, to receive an account of their managers' stewardship, and to appoint successors to such of the managers as might not be re-elected. A very simple matter, truly. All that is really wanted by an act of Parliament, is to give the authority of law to the proceedings of these Managers, to enforce the payment of assessments they lay on, and to enable them, as a body recognised in law, to sue or be sued. That is all. And why should not this plain measure be adopted? There is no good reason why it should not but there is a bad one; and with those who have hitherto made our laws, a bad reason is of more cogency than a good. Such a Reform in the Burghs would be consistent with entire freedom,-a blessing that it is not meant by the aristocracy of Britain that this country should enjoy. It would work too well, and could not fail to suggest a similar mode of conducting the affairs of the nation. It would be a step to thorough Parliamentary Reform.

Let us see in what the provisions of this Bill differ from the proper measure which we have given above.

Instead of all the inhabitants, or rather all the householders, having a vote at the election of those who are to rule over them, and levy assessments on their property, the qualification of a voter for those who are "In some bit brugh to represent

A bailie's name,"

is to be the same as that for an M.P. Here the bad reason appears without disguise. For surely it cannot be said by the most insolent Tory or plausible Whig that ever wagged unprincipled tongue, that a man in one of our country towns who occupies a L.9, or L.5,—ay, or a L.2 house, is not a competent enough judge whether Symon Brodie the grocer, or Matthew Briggs the hosier, is the fitter man to be one of the Bailies of Badenough, for a single year of probation. But there is absur dity in this clause, as well as a sneaking avoidance of good. It will disqualify all but a small knot of the wealthier citizens. It will create a little pestilent aristocracy in all but the very large burghs. In some of the smaller burghs it will not leave many more qualified voters than there are places to fill. The monstrous proposition to make a L.10 qualification necessary for a vote at a burgh election, shews how much the authors of the Bill dread a diminution of the qualification for a vote in the election of members of the House of Commons.

The election is to be by open poll. We will not say, make it by balt; but we say, leave it to the choice of the inhabitants of each burgh, to vote by open poll or by ballot, as they please. Let the qualified voters meet, and decide by a majority whether their approaching election should be by ballot or otherwise. And there must be no talk of the ‚ mob” or the “rabble” being those chiefly for the ballot. No man who keeps a house over his head by honest exertion, is to be despised as a mob-man. The half-crown of burgh cess which he has to pay, is as much to him as the half-guinea paid by his wealthy neighbour; and he is equally with his neighbour interested to see that none but a discreet and honest man be appointed to administer justice and levy assessments. It is the poorer classes who most need the protection of the ballot. We are mistaken, however, if most of the wealthy citizens would not, like the nobility and gentry in their clubs, prefer concealing their vote, and avoiding offence to either candidate for civic honours.

Another provision to which we object, is that by which one-third part of the Councillors are to go out annually. This is a very common regulation in such cases; and in the constitution of public companies, such as insurance offices, &c. It is one that never is found to work well for the partners, though often for the Manager, the board of Directors themselves, or the leading men in the Company. It is the close system as nearly as is consistent with any appearance of freedom. By means of it, we have known the Manager of an insurance office appointed on the same principles as Chancellors of the Exchequer are; and, as might be expected, conducting the business of the Company with all a Chancellor of the Exchequer's usual skill and success,-maintain himself in place notwithstanding repeated attempts to dislodge him, and the evidence of falling stocks that a change in the management was necessary. When a Provost or Manager gets one set of Councillors or Directors to be favourable to his views, it is easy managing the whole body afterwards. Only the third part goes out; and the stanch friends of the Provost, or Manager, are re-elected by the influence of the Directors and their

chief. That probably reduces the one-third which retires, to one-sixth ; and the joint influence of the Manager and Directors scarcely ever fails to secure the election of men whom the Manager can depend upon as easy men, (dangerous animals in office,) or friends. If the former, a few dinners, and plenteous draughts of claret, soon transform the easy man into a steady, if not an active friend. It is no objection to what we propose, to say that it is expedient to retain a number of men experienced in the business of the Company or corporation. Let the electors judge of that expediency. We do not say, change the whole of the Magistrates, or Directors, annually; but only, let the electors judge how many, and which individuals shall be changed.

But what have we next?—The Councillors to elect the Magistrates! Why, my good Lord Advocate, ci-devant Editor of the Edinburgh Review, and ex eo officio champion of liberal opinions for the time being, what, in the name of slyness and slavery, do you mean by this? Where do you find the precedent for this, even in the Parliamentary Reform Act, incomplete as it is? We were told that that Act was but the point of the reforming wedge, and that everys ubsequent measure was to drive the wedge farther into the tenacious trunk of Toryism. But here is a pulling out of the wedge, a step backwards,—and a relapsing towards the perfection of the close system, in the very moment you pretend to be abandoning it for ever! We need not tell a person of your Lordship's acuteness, that the very worst system, having the appearance of election, would be the interposition of several steps in the elective process between the people and those ultimately elected. No, no, my Lord, this will not do at all. It's a sly touch, but no go. With your leave, the inhabitants of the Scottish Burghs will choose their Magistrates themselves, instead of choosing those who are to choose them. The thing is so awkward in its nature, that there is no expressing it without awkwardness; an argument which will, perhaps, go as far with your Lordship as any that can be brought against this sleekit clause.

These are the principal objections which we have to the Scottish Burgh Reform Bill. There are many provisions in it of smaller moment that it would also be well to amend; such as the Provost and Treasurer being elected for three years; accidental vacancies in the Council being to be filled up by the Council itself till the next election, when, of course, it would be represented as an affront to turn the person so elected out; the taking of fees at lodging claims, inspecting the record of voters, or lodging objections; the making it necessary that an applicant for admission to the roll should have been for twelve months a freeman, or have resided six months in the Burgh,-clauses only necessary to prevent fraudulent advantage being taken of the very limited number of qualified persons under the L.10 restriction. But we forbear. The Bill must be amended; and, if the good of the Burgesses is to be the object studied, there will be no difficulty in devising what the amendments ought to be. If any other object is aimed at, the Lord Advocate may be assured that his Bill will be a very temporary measure. He will have to mend it before two years, if he be in life and in office so long. There is one provision of a restrictive kind, which, friends of liberty, as we are, we would recommend to the Lord Advocate to add,-That the Magistrates shall have no power to contract debt on account of the Burghs, to a greater extent than the Burgesses, at a public meeting, agree to pay off by three equal instalments, to be levied during the pre. sent, and two succeeding years, in addition to the ordinary assessments

or revenues of the place, which are not to be burdened by any deed of the Magistrates or the Burgesses. What foolish squandering of the resources of after-times would not such a regulation have prevented in the times gone by!

WHIGS AND TORIES.

WHAT is the difference between the Whigs and the Tories? It is not solely that one is in, the other out. There is a farther difference, and it is well that it should be understood. And now that the Whigs are sunken in public estimation, it is right that they should have the benefit of any distinction which can fairly be drawn in their favour.

In power, it appears, that the Whigs are capable of more good and of more evil than the Tories. It were easy to recite measures of improvement proposed, or accomplished by the Whigs, which the Tories would not have undertaken. On the other hand, the Irish Coercion Bill, though it exactly accorded with the policy of the Tories, exceeded their daring ; and the Whigs have, without disguise, outraged public opinion, by defending jobs and villanies which the Tories would not have ventured to vindicate in the same impudent manner, but would have sheltered themselves from attack under false pretences. The credit which the Whigs gain by liberal professions, promises, and some good deeds, they carry to account for the perpetration of evil. They do good that evil may come of it. The popularity obtained by a public benefit is made a means for a public wrong. The gratitude for a service is worked into endurance of an injury. The Tories don't touch upon either of these extremes. There is perhaps more mischief in their hearts, but there is also more fear. They let "I dare not wait upon I would;" they have the dog's eye and the stag's heart: they are, in a word, unpopular, and restrained by the consciousness of that truth; the strong law of public opinion, or the apprehension of it, is ever on them.

Let us now compare the opposition of those two parties. The Whigs, out of office, were clamorous patriots,―unrelenting enemies of abuses and oppressions; perfect dragons of economy, not to be moved to toleration of unnecessary expense, except for royal personages, whose favour they were always anxious to fund against occasion. In opposition, the Whigs after all deductions, worked for the people's cause. In opposition, the Tories have worked against it. The Tories have hoisted no false colours; they have steadily fought under the black flag; they have pretended to no patriotism, to no concern for the liberties and rights of the people. On the contrary, when the Whigs have proposed an invasion of the Constitution, they have publicly assisted in the villainy, and concurred in all extravagances. A poor attempt to play the other game was made by Mr. Dawson, who pretended a zeal for economy, and attacked jobs and sinecures; but it was scouted by his party. Indeed, the Tories have acted as if they had a reversionary interest in the abuses of Government, and were averse to damage this property. They have fought the enemy with a private's tenderness for the ship which they desire to make their own; and their guns are aimed at the persons, and the rigging, not at the hull, which they hope will yet bear their fortunes. The opposition of the Tories is thus an opposition to the people and to Government, when it proposes any measure for the

good of the people; but in enterprizes of mischief they aid and abet the Ministers. The alternative of a Whig or Tory Government will not long exist; but if we had no other prospect, the question which must arise upon it would be a difficult one, Whether it would be better to have a Tory Government, capable neither of so much good, nor of so much evil as the Whigs in office, and resisted by a Whig opposition, professing all liberal and patriotic principles, and with unceasing activity assailing abuses and acts of oppression; or a Whig Government vibrating between good and ill, and obstructed in measures of public benefit by the Tory opposition, and assisted by them in measures of mischief? This would be a nice question; but after the ruin which the Whigs are bringing on themselves by their desertion of the people, it is hardly possible that they can resume the part in opposition which they formerly enacted with such plausibility. After their measures of tyranny, their extravagances, their defences of jobs, and acts of injustice and oppression, it is scarcely conceivable that they can muster the impudence to reprove similar proceedings on the part of the Tories. Indeed the Whigs have declared the error of many of their impeachments of the Tories, and asserted that the experience of office has shewn practices to be necessary and proper, which they had in opposition denounced as flagitious. The things for which Mr. Thomson, Sir James Graham, and Lord Althorp attacked Goulburn, Herries, and that fry, are now the things which they justify; but without any acknowledgment of the wrong which, according to their own representations, they must have done their former antagonists.

The Whigs and the Tories have each a House of Parliament. The Whigs have the Commons; the Tories the Lords. A Whig Ministry has the difficulty of managing the Lords; a Tory Ministry would have the difficulty of managing the Commons. A Tory Ministry could no more be Tory in its practices, than a liberal Ministry can be liberal. In either case, a compromise is certain. A Tory Ministry must be Whig, in as great a degree as the Whig Ministry is Tory. Thus it would have the support of a portion of the Commons' House, composed of the trimmers, the timid, the moderate, the indifferent, together with the camp followers of every and any Government; and might thus muster a majority. The country would not long bear this mongrel thing, with its petty reforms and concessions; but Parliament would brave it, till the voice of the people scared it from its complaisance. A Tory Ministry would, of course, be able to carry small improvements through the Lords, which, small as they might be, would be too large for the feeble influence of the Whigs in that House. The Lords would favour the Government of their party, and, against the grain, for the purpose of propitiating the people, permit them to carry measures which they would refuse to the Whigs. The Whigs, if they chose, might subdue the Lords, but this would in no way suit the Whig game; for if, by a reaction, or the menace of it, the Lords were reduced to acquiescence, there would be no pretext for denying and paring down measures of improvement demanded by the country. The course would be free; nothing would stand in the way of the correction of abuses; and there would, consequently, be nothing in office worth the possession of the Whigs. The opportunity they now have of pleading, or pretending the opposition of the Lords to all effective measures, and great objects of public benefit, is much valued by the Whigs; and by no act of theirs will they forego this convenient scape-goat,