Paul H. Nitze's answers to additional questions submitted by Senator Prepared statement of Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny Appendix: Secretary Brown's answer to additional question submitted by Senator State Department's responses to additional legal questions for the record.. State Department's responses to additional questions submitted for the 530 544 599 600 607 611 State Department's response to Senator Glenn's request for Presidential comment on action if treaty is rejected 614 Secretary Vance's response to question asked by Senator Stone concerning public disclosure of U.S. agreement with the Soviet Union on Cuban missile crisis 615 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Muskie, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Baker, Helms, Hayakawa, and Lugar. Also present: Senator Jake Garn. OPENING STATEMENT The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order. Of the many and varied tasks that comprise the work of the U.S. Senate, and in particular of the Committee on Foreign Relations, none is more important than the obligation we take up today. The Constitution and tradition charge us with the specific responsibility to receive treaties that have been negotiated by the executive branch, to examine them carefully and diligently, to reflect upon them, to make such modifications as we deem necessary, and then to report our recommendations to the entire Senate for ratification or rejection. That is the task we undertake today for the treaty known as SALT II-the second agreement to limit strategic arms between the Soviet Union and the United States. [Text of SALT II Treaty follows:] 96TH CONGRESS } SENATE { EXECUTIVE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEG MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STAT TRANSMITTING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIC JUNE 25, 1979.-Treaty was read the first time and, together with 39-118 O U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1979 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL To the Senate of the United States: THE WHITE HOUSE, I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, known as SALT II, including the Protocol thereto, both signed in Vienna, Austria, on June 18, 1979. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the Report of the Secretary of State with respect to the Treaty, together with the following related documents: 1. a series of Agreed Statements and Common Understandings concerning the obligations of the Parties under particular articles of the Treaty; 2. a Memorandum of Understanding that will establish an agreed data base by categories of strategic offensive arms along with associated statements of current data; 3. a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines on the Limitation of Strategic Arms concerning the next phase of negotiation on this subject; and 4. a Soviet statement on the Backfire bomber, together with a U.S. response. For thirty years the United States has pursued a fundamentally bipartisan foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, with the objectives of deterring aggression by maintaining strategic forces second to none, creating a pattern and tradition of negotiation to settle differences, building a strong framework of allies, and stabilizing the globe by halting the uncontrolled growth and spread of nuclear weapons. SALT II strengthens each of these objectives. The seven years of negotiations, under three administrations representing both political parties, were carried out in closer consultation with Congress and under greater public scrutiny than any other arms limitation treaty. SALT II is truly a national accomplishment. It is my best judgment and firm belief that these patiently negotiated agreements further the long-standing goals for our nation's security. They improve our strategic situation and allow for further improvements in the future. They reaffirm our leadership of the world in the cause of nuclear arms control. They allow us to negotiate for peace from strength in SALT III. Like SALT I, the Test Ban Treaty, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT II is another important step forward toward our basic goal of a secure America at peace in a stable world. I pledge the full cooperation of my Administration in helping to explain the principles and details of the agreements. Therefore, I request with a sense of special urgency the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate to ratification of the SALT II Treaty. JIMMY CARTER. LETTER OF SUBMITTAL DEPARTMENT OF STATE, The PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to transmission to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and the Protocol thereto, together referred to as the SALT II Treaty. I am enclosing with the Treaty: a series of Agreed Statements and Common Understanding, reflecting understandings and supplementary provisions associated with various articles of the Treaty; a Memorandum of Understanding and Statements of Data, which record the numbers, by category, of the strategic offensive arms of each Party that are limited by the Treaty; a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for the conduct of the next phase of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms; and a Soviet statement on the Tu-22M (Backfire) bomber, along with subsequent exchanges between the two Presidents on this issue. The SALT II Treaty and the enclosed related documents were meticulously negotiated over more than six years. In my judgment, they strengthen our national security and that of our Allies. -For the first time, the two sides will be limited to an equal number of strategic weapon systems. -For the first time, reductions in the number of operational Soviet weapon systems will be required. -And for the first time, we will be slowing the race to build new and more destructive weapons. The Treaty limits can be adequately verified by our own national technical means. These highly sophisticated systems, such as photoreconnaissance satellites, enable us to determine for ourselves what strategic systems the Soviets have, what new systems they test and deploy, and what existing systems they dismantle or destroy in order to bring and maintain their forces within Treaty ceilings. The Treaty establishes rules for counting strategic systems and other provisions which will simplify the task of verifying Soviet compliance. Finally, the Treaty allows us to develop and deploy the systems we need to modernize our strategic triad-such as the Trident submarine and ballistic missiles, the cruise missile for our bombers, and a new intercontinental ballistic missile, the MX. (V) |