with the whole animal creation; and, in a metaphorical sense, but restrained to perceptions of pure intellect only, ascribed to the Deity himself.

Clear and intuitive however as is our perception of these truths, we nevertheless find by experience, that our senses sometimes deceive us, either through a defect in themselves, or an obscurity and confusion in the objects presented, or a too slight attention of the mind. Nay, we sometimes through a wrong education, or through a bias received from those we have long conversed with, and much venerated, habitually attach ourselves to that, as a first principle, and as self-evinent, which is really false. Thus it is that imperfection and error are found in the very fountain of all our knowledge, and springing from thence, are apt more or less to tincture the stream. But this, which rarely happens, and may in most cases, be easily avoided, or rectified, hinders not the evidence (I mean the self-evidence) mentioned, from furnishing the foundation of all our other knowledge.

On the certainty of this evidence, and by the light of these primary truths, reason is able to work out a proof of other truths, neither clear in themselves, nor evidenced by lights of their own, but transparent nevertheless to the light of first principles. When these, which 1 call secondary truths, are once proved, and received as such by the understanding, they serve again as axioms for the establishment of new ones, and so on. Kindled at the first, they now emit a light, in effect, their own, applicable to subsequent obscurities, in a chain, consisting sometimes of many links; for example, the man just mentioned, to whom our Saviour had given sight, having a clear conviction of the happy change in himself, and of this truth also, that God heareth not sinners, concludes from thence, in his disputation with the Jews, that Christ was no deceiver, but a good man, and sent from God. It is chiefly, if not wholly, in this second step of knowledge,that our reasoning faculty is concerned, and shews itself more or less powerful, according to its different degree of natural or acquired ability in different men. this exertion of the rational faculty, the mind extends its perception of truth beyond the verge of its senses, and even internal apprehensions of first principles, so as to see or know, at a distance from itself.

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Here also we are still more apt to be deceived, not only as taking that for an unquestionable and self-evident truth, which in reality is false, and concluding from it as certain; but likewise as reasoning wrong from right principles, through some imperfection in, or a bad use of, the reasoning faculty itself. It is true, our reasoning faculty is as much the work of God, and perhaps as perfect in itself, as our senses, and other powers of perceiving self-evident principles; but in regard to the exercise of this faculty, we are more voluntary, I dare not see, free, than in that of the senses and perceptions mentioned; and therefore, here is more room for error, as here is a greater concurrence of our own. Yet this is the very faculty or power, which extends our knowledge beyond that of brutes, enables us to subdue them, and appropriate all their powers to our own use. It is also this faculty which gives birth to all the arts and sciences, and renders us capable of religion.

But that the human mind may not be confined to these two inlets of knowledge, which would circumscribe our understanding, and with it our sphere of action, within very narrow limits, there is a much larger field opened to us by a third way, which, passing through the primary and secondary truths, puts us into the hands of faith, founded on report, in order to informations of the last consequence to us, whereof our senses, our reason, and our own experience, could never have given us any intelligence, much less any certainty. The notices of this third class being in their own nature wholly dark and opaque to those who can be made acquainted with them only by report, are illuminated and brought into view by the light thrown on that report from self-evident truths, and sound arguments.

Faith now, or belief, is an assent of the rational mind to some report, whether affirmative or negative, on the admitted credit of him or them who make it. On this all commerce, all trials at law, and therefore all government, or society is founded. By this we have the use of sensation at the most distant parts of the world, though we stir not from home. Nay, since the invention of writing, by this we may see what the rest of mankind hear, taste, feel, or smell, over the whole earth, and so become as it were all eye. By this we raise the dead again, and recall to our view the transac

tions of past ages. By this we may even commence prophets, and foreknow all the events of considerable consequence that shall happen to us, from the present hour, to all eternity. An instance may make me more intelligible. The man born blind, and restored to his sight by our Saviour, having from a full conviction of the fact, and the infinite truth, and goodness of God, proved to himself, that Christ camc from God, goes on by both, by all the credit he had with his neighbours, as a man of veracity, by the concurring testimony of his parents, and all who had known him from his infancy, and by the reasonings that had satisfied himself, not only to report the miracle every where, but by that means also to confirm the faith of some, and to bring over others who were yet unbelievers.

But in this third step of our progress towards knowledge by faith or belief, there is more room for error and imposition, than in both the former. The reporters may be deceived themselves, or wilfully mean to deceive others; and either to believe or disbelieve, may be attended with great and equal consequences, whether beneficial or mischievous.

To prevent as far as in us lies, the danger of either, we ought when the matter reported concerns us, in any respect or degree, to examine with proportionable attention, and by all the lights afforded us in primary and secondary principles, whether it is possible or probable in itself; what were the means of knowledge, both as to capacity and opportunity, in the reporter; whether he is to our own knowledge, or so vouched by others, in whom we may safely confide, a person of tried integrity; whether he apparently hath, or possibly may have, an interest in our belief of his report; whether he is able and willing to lay down a pledge of value proportionable to the risk we may run at all events in crediting what he says; whether others with equal signs of knowledge, and veracity, and under the sanction of an equal pledge, report the contrary; and if any do, what farther reasons there may be found in the nature of the thing, or the number of additional vouchers on either side, for assenting to this or that testimony.

Here now are several things to be remarked, before we apply these rules to the trial of Christian faith; as first, that faith is built on self-evidence, and rational proof; on

the former, inasmuch as we read or hear the report, and so have sensible evidence, that the report is made; on the latter, inasmuch as we weigh the reasons brought to support or invalidate its truth, to vouch for the credit, or prove the fallacy of the reporter; and judge for ourselves of the merits.

Secondly, it is to be remarked, that no degree of testimony can make a thing credible, as long as the mind deems it impossible; but, that in numberless cases, as the human mind is utterly unable to fix the real limits between possible and impossible, so it should be cautious of setting up imaginary ones, especially, if the whole matter attested, with its real possibility or impossibility, lies either at, or beyond the utmost verge of our natural capacities. It is hard finding mediums, and making distinctions, by the force, I mean, of mere reason, in things we see not at all, or very dimly.

Thirdly, it is to be observed, that when the matter attested is naturally improbable, the degree of testimony must be proportionably the greater, to be rationally believed. There is nothing the mind more readily fixes for itself than its set of probabilities, and improbabilities, the greater part of the materials, tools, and furniture of that chamber in the understanding, which belongs peculiarly to opinion. Yet between what they are, and what they ought to be, there is, in most minds, an immense difference, and, of course, an inexhaustible source of error.

Fourthly, we find, that knowledge, whether self-evident, or demonstrated, or believed, may be equally, and absolutely certain, the different methods of arriving at it making no difference in the degree of assent given to the truths it consists of. It is, for instance, equally certain to me who never saw him, that there was a Sir Isaac Newton; as it is, that any one demonstration in his book of mathematical principles, is a true and real demonstration; and of the truth again of that demonstration I am as certain, as fully convinced, as I am that I see the words of the demonstration in his book.

Lastly, experience puts it beyond all rational question, that as the will, in most minds, is greatly swayed by the affections and passions, so the understanding in the same minds is equally governed by the will, apprehending, judging, believing, or forbearing these acts, or performing them

with more vigour, in regard to some subjects, and with less in regard to others, as the will, biassed by pleasure, prejudice, or interest, directs. Hence it comes, that men, who have the same capacities and lights, think so very differently, and know, the one so much less than the other; and while one conceitedly erects his opinions into axioms, another, as conceitedly, reduces the axioms of all mankind into doubts, denying the certainty of every thing. This power, or rather usurpation on the prerogative of reason, seems to be carried farther in matters of faith, than in those of demonstration; but really is not, for men believe only as they judge of the arguments for and against believing, so that every proof of arbitrary believing is an equal proof of arbitrary judging.

This is that very freethinking, which many contend for, without knowing it, who at the same time insist that judgment and belief, in all things, necessarily follow evidence. Men judge freely, say they, who cannot help in the same instance, concluding after a certain manner. Is not this a contradiction? So indeed it seems. But both sides of a contradiction must be received as true, if they do not lie too close, when there is a necessity for it; and there is nothing so good at creating such necessities, as the will, when at a pinch, and strongly stimulated.

By this view of faith in general, as distinct from our other ways of acquiring knowledge, we come prepared to conceive in a clearer manner, than otherwise we should be able to do, the nature of Christian faith; and by the rules and remarks already suggested, and presently to be applied to the particular purpose of that faith, shall be able to make our way through some difficulties, not so easy by other means to be avoided.

The Christian faith now is, a strong assent of the rational soul to the truth of God's promises, and a resolute determination of the will and heart to close with the conditions annexed to those promises, in the gospel covenant, Or Christian faith is, with a clear conviction of the understanding, and an entire resignation of the will and heart, firmly to confide in, ardently to love, and dutifully to obey the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, in whose name, and by whose co-operation, we are reformed, pardoned,

VOL. II.

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