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low him, in a religious way, or expect that from the creature which is only to be found in him; or when we esteem men as lords of our faith; or when his sovereignty, or right to govern us, is called in question, while we presumptuously, or wilfully, rebel against him; this is, in effect, a dethroning, or denying him to be the true God; but more of this when we consider the sins forbidden in the first commandment *.

3. From the unity of the Godhead, we may infer, that we ought to take heed that we do not entertain any conceptions of the divine Being, which are inconsistent herewith; therefore, as we are not to assert a plurality of gods, so we are not to think or speak of God in such a way as tends to overthrow the simplicity of the divine nature; therefore we must not conceive that it is compounded of various parts, all which, being taken together, tend to constitute the divine essence; which gives occasion to that known aphorism, generally laid down by those who treat of this subject, that whatever is in God, is God; which we must reckon as one of the incomprehensibles of the divine Being, which when we attempt to speak of, we only give an evident proof of the imperfection of our finite understandings, and that we cannot order our words, by reason of darkness: however, it is necessary, when we lay down this proposition, that we signify what we intend hereby, that so we may not be supposed to use words without ideas; and especially that we may, in some measure, account for those modes of speaking, which are agreeable to scripture, which so often describes God as having a plurality of perfections, and those, in some respects, distinct; and yet, at the same time, that we may not hereby be led to infer a plurality of gods. Here let it be considered,

(1.) That we have not the least similitude, or resemblance, of this in any finite being. Every thing below God is composed of parts, some of which we call integral, as all the parts of matter taken together constitute the whole; others are called essential, as when we say an intelligent being has various powers or properties which are essential to it; so that it would not be complete without every one of them; and that these are all of them distinct, so that we cannot say whatever is in the soul of man is the soul, but every one of those powers, or properties, taken together, constitute the man; but this is by no means to be applied to the divine Being; therefore,

(2.) When we conceive of God, as holy, powerful, just, good, &c. we must not suppose that these perfections are so many ingredients in the divine Being, or that, when taken together, they constitute it, as the whole is constituted of its parts; for then every one of them would have no other than

* Quest, ca.

a partial perfection, and consequently the essential glory of one of those attributes would not be equal to the glory of the divine Being, which is supposed to consist of them all; and therefore the would be something in God less than God, or a divine prcction less than all the divine perfections taken together, which we are not to suppose. These are the properties of composition; and therefore, when we speak of God as a simple or uncompounded Being, we cannot forbear to mention them as what are inconsistent with his perfection as such.

Neither are the divine perfections distinct or different from one another, as the various parts of which the whole is constituted are said to be distinct; which follows from the former, since the divine essence has no parts; therefore we are not to suppose, that the divine attributes, considered as they are in God, are so distinguished, as one thing, or being, is from another; or as wisdom, power, justice, mercy, &c. are in men; for that would be to suppose the divine Being as having several distinct, infinitely perfect beings contained in it, which is contrary to its simplicity or unity; or, at least, if we call it one, it would be only so by participation and dependence, as a general or complex idea is said to be one, which partakes of, and depends on, all those particular or simple ideas that are contained in it; or, to illustrate it by numbers, as one hundred is one, as it contains such a number of units in it, as are, all taken together, equal to a hundred; this is not what we mean, when we say God is one.

Moreover, when we speak of the divine perfections, as being in God, we suppose them all essential to him, as opposed to what is accidental. Now an accident is generally described, as what belongs, or is superadded, to a being or subject, which it might have existed without, or have been destitute of, and yet sustained no loss of that perfection, which is essential to it: thus, wisdom, holiness, justice, faithfulness, are accidents in men; so that they who have them not, do not cease to be men, or to have the essential perfection of the human nature: but this is by no means to be applied to the divine Being and attributes; for to suppose God to be destitute of any of them, is as much as to say that he is not infinitely perfect, or that he is not God. This, I think, is generally intended, when it is said, whatever is in God, is God; which, because it may be reckoned by some to be a metaphysical speculation, I should have avoided to mention, had it not been, in some respects, necessary, since the unity of God cannot well be conceived of, unless his simplicity be defended; and I do not see how that can be maintained, if this proposition be not duly considered. I have used more words than are needful, or repeated the same ideas too often, in attempting to explain it, I have done

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it to avoid some scholastic modes of speaking, or with a design to render what has been said more intelligible; but to this we may add,

(3.) That when we speak of the divine perfections as many, or distinct from one another, as we often do, and have scripture warrant to justify us therein, namely, when we speak of the justice of God, as different from his mercy, or these, from his power, wisdom, faithfulness, &c. this must not be deemed inconsistent with what has been said concerning the divine simplicity and therefore let it be considered, that the nature and perfections of God are incomprehensible; and therefore all the ideas which we have of them are taken from our comparing them with some small resemblance that there is thereof in intelligent creatures, and, at the same time, separating from them whatever argues imperfection.

And from hence it follows, that we are not supposed to know, or be able to describe, what God is in himself, and, as I humbly conceive, never shall: such knowledge as this is too great for any but a divine person; therefore our conceptions of him are taken from and conformed to those various ways, by which he condescends to make himself visible, or known to us, namely, by various acts conversant about certain objects, in which he is said to manifest his perfections: thus, when an effect is produced, we call that perfection that produces it his power; or as the divine acts are otherwise distinguished with respect to the objects, or the manner of his glorifying himself therein, these we call his wisdom, justice, goodness, &c. And this is what we mean, when we speak of various perfections in God; though some suppose that they express themselves more agreeably to the nature of the subject, or to the simplicity of God, in that, whenever they speak of any of the divine perfections, they speak of them in such a way, as that they are denominated from the effect thereof; as when they take occasion to mention the power of God, they call it God acting powerfully; or of his justice or faithfulness, they express those perfections by, God acting justly or faithfully*. But however we express ourselves, when we speak of the distinct perfections of the divine nature, this is what we principally intend thereby: and here our thoughts must stop, and make what is too great for a finite mind to conceive of the subject of our admiration, and adore what we cannot comprehend: such knowledge is too wonderful for us; it is high, we cannot attain to it.

See de Vries Exercitat. Rational.

QUEST. IX. How many persons are there in the Godhead? ANSW. There be three Persons in the Godhead, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one, true, eternal God, the same in substance, equal in power and glory; although distinguished by their personal properties. QUEST. X. What are the personal properties of the three Persons in the Godhead?

ANSW. It is proper to the Father to beget the Son, and to the Son to be begotten of the Father, and to the Holy Ghost to proceed from the Father and the Son from all eternity. QUEST. XI. How doth it appear that the Son and the Holy Ghost are God equal with the Father?

ANSW. The scriptures manifest, that the Son and the Holy Ghost are God equal with the Father; ascribing unto them such names, attributes, works, and worship, as are proper to God only.

I

N these three answers is contained the doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity, which is a subject of pure revelation; (a) and, because it is so much contested in the age in which we live, we are obliged to be more large and particular, in laying down

(a) "God is One: a most pure, most simple, and most perfect Being. The absolute unity and simplicity of this glorious Being is strictly exclusive of any division of perfections. Yet, as human knowledge is not intuitive but discur sive, we find it necessary to form and communicate our conceptions, by referring them to distinct and infinite attributes. Such are independence, spirituality, eternity, immutability, power, knowledge, rectitude, and benevolence.

It is absurd to say, that either the abstract essence, or any of the infinite perfections of God, in themselves, or in their exercise, can be grasped, included, or comprehended (or whatever equivalent term be used) by a limited intellect. “A part of His ways, a little portion of Him," we know; for He has unveiled it. The knowledge of the best and greatest finite mind can only be, to immortality, an ap proximation; and therefore must for ever be infinitely small. God alone is capa HLE OF COMPREHENDING His own nature, mode of existence, and perfections.

The only questions, therefore, that we have to ask, are, Has Deity, in fact, communicated to man any information concerning HIMSELF? And what has He communicated? Whatever such revelation may be, it is impossible that it should be self-contradictory, or any other than most becoming to infinite wisdom and purity. This revelation authorizes us, by a variety of inductive proofs, to conclude, that, with regard to the mode of existence of the ONE Divine Essence, the Unity of the Godhead includes a Trinity of Persons (so denominated for want of any better terms) who are scripturally styled the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: Distinct, not in essence or in perfections, but only personally: One, not personally, but in the common possession of the same identical nature and attributes. No contradiction or absurdity is involved in this doctrine, because the unity re fers to one respect, and the trinity to another. But we make no difficity in pro fessing our incapacity to include in our knowledge, or express by any possible terms, the respect in which the Trinity of persons subsists in the perfect Oneness of the Deity. Such pretension would imply a contradiction."

SMITH'S LETTERS TO BELSHAM

the reasons of our belief of it, and in our defence thereof, against those that deny it. It is a doctrine that has been defended by some of the most judicious writers, both in our own and other nations; whereof some have proved that it was maintained by the church in the purest ages thereof, which therefore renders it less necessary for us to enter into that part of the controversy; but we shall principally insist on it as founded on the sacred writings: and whereas others have rendered some parts of this' doctrine more obscure, by confining themselves to the scholastic ways of speaking, we shall endeavour to avoid them, that so it may be better understood by private Christians; and the method we shall pursue in treating of it shall be,

I. To premise some things which are necessary to be considered, with relation to it in general.

II. We shall consider in what sense we are to understand the words Trinity, and Persons in the Godhead, and in what res spect the divine Persons are said to be One.

III. We shall prove that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, have distinct personal properties, and therefore that we have sufficient reason to call them Persons, in the Godhead, as they are in the first of these answers; and under this head shall consider what is generally understood by what is contained in the second of them, which respects the eternal generation of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Ghost; and what cautions we are to use, lest, by mistaking the sense thereof, we be led into any error, derogatory to, or subversive of the doctrine of the Trinity; and also shall endeavour to explain those scriptures, which are generally brought to establish that doctrine.

IV. We shall endeavour to prove that these three Persons, especially the Son and Holy Ghost, are truly divine, or that they have all the perfections of the divine nature; and therefore that they are, in the most proper sense, the one only living and true God. (a)

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(a) "That which is taught in the scriptures concerning the incomprehensible and spiritual essence of God ought to suffice, not only to overthrow the foolish errors of the common people, but also to confute the fine subtilties of profane philosophy. One of the old writers seemed to have said very well,That God is all that we do see, and all that we do not see.' But by this means he hath imagined the Godhead to be diffused into all the parts of the world. Although God, to the intent to keep men in sober mind, speak but sparingly of his own essence, yet, by those two names of addition that I have rehearsed, he doth both take away all gross imaginations, and also repress the presumptuous boldness of man's mind. For surely his immeasurable greatness ought to make us afraid, that we attempt not to measure him with our sense: and his spiritual nature forbiddeth us to imagine any thing earthly or fleshly of him. For the same cause he often assigneth his dwelling place to be in heaven. For though, as he is incomprehensible, he filleth the earth also: yet because he seeth our minds by reason of their dulness to lie still in the earth, for good cause he lifteth us up above the world, to shake off our sloth and sluggishness. And here falleth to ground the error of the Manichees,

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